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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to investigate the change of urban governance in post-socialist 
China, as illustrated by the redevelopment of a shantytown or penghuqu 
neighbourhood established during the Third Front Construction (1964-1981) in 
Luzhou, a city in Western China. In the literature on Western cities, the change of urban 
governance in the neoliberal era has been described as a shift from managerialism 
towards entrepreneurialism. While this is often depicted as to entail a qualitative 
transformation of the state, we cannot regard such a change as a fundamental shift. As 
argued in this thesis, the state, however entrepreneurial it is, would still maintain some 
redistributive functions, rendering the mode of urban governance nowadays bearing 
the characteristics of managerialism and entrepreneurialism simultaneously. This 
would be evident in China. On the one hand, the local state in China, which depends 
heavily on a land-based accumulation system, is becoming more entrepreneurial. On 
the other hand, as China remains a “socialist state”, the legitimacy of the state is still 
founded partly upon accountability to its people, especially those disadvantaged ones. 
Drawing upon a series of ethnographic data collected from fieldwork between 2015 
and 2017, this thesis will argue that entrepreneurialism and managerialism not only 
co-exist in the contemporary mode of urban governance in China, but intertwine in an 
integrated way, which may be termed “entrepreneurial managerialism”. The 
redevelopment of penghuqu, a national project aiming at improving the living 
conditions of disadvantaged urban residents with some degree of managerial features, 
has been strategically appropriated by the local state to serve its entrepreneurial vision. 
Furthermore, within the course of housing expropriation, the redistributive mechanism 
that could be dated back to the Maoist era with some modifications, have been 
mobilised to differentiate residents, and legitimise expropriation. The mode of urban 
governance that combines managerialism with entrepreneurialism also has significant 
implications for residents, shaping their minds and responses that bear such dual 
features. 
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Glossary 
 
Notes on Romanisation of Chinese terms: this thesis follows pinyin system to 
Romanise Chinese terms and characters. When referring to a term originally in 
Chinese, I present its English translation first and then introduce its pinyin 
representation and its original spelling in Chinese. Chinese characters and pinyin 
signals are put in a bracket, in the style as follows: “English translation (pinyin signals 
Chinese characters).” Here, in this glossary, these terms are listed in a different way 
for convenience: Pinyin signals are put at the beginning to enable the alphabetical 
ordering, and they are followed by Chinese Characters and then English translations.  
 
Baozhangxing zhufang 保障性住房: affordable housing 
bushu qiye 部属企业: enterprises under the direct administration of the First Ministry of 
Machinery 
chaiqian 拆迁: demolition and resettlement 
Changqi ⻓起, or Changjiang Qizhongji Chang ⻓江起重机⼚: The Changjiang River Crane 
Factory 
Changwa ⻓ 挖, or Changjiang Wajueji Chang ⻓ 江 挖 掘 机 ⼚: The Changjiang River 
Excavator Factory 
Changye ⻓ 液, or Changjiang Yeyajian Chang ⻓ 江 液 压 件 ⼚: The Changjiang River 
Hydraulic Components Factory 
chanquan diaohuan 产权调换: the exchange of the property right 
chaoda chengshi 超⼤城市: Super-Mega city 
chaoxiang 朝向: the direction a room faces 
chengqu 城区: urban area 
chengshi fangwu chaiqian 城市房屋拆迁: demolition of urban housing and resettlement 
Chengtaofang 成套房: full complete set of flat (with bathroom and kitchen inside) 
Chuangruzhe 闯⼊者: Red Amnesia (a movie) 
da chengshi ⼤城市: big city 
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diji shi 地级市: prefectural-level city 
dingzihu 钉⼦户: nail household 
diyi caijing zhoukan 第⼀财经周刊: The First Financial Weekly 
duoceng 多层: multi-storey building 
erji chengshi ⼆级城市: second tier city (prefectural city) 
fadong qunzhong dou qunzhong 发动群众⽃群众: play the mass off against each other 
fanfu zuogongzuo 反复做⼯作: communicate repeatedly 
fanggaifang 房改房: housing 11trategizi during the housing reform 
feichengtaofang ⾮成套房: incomplete set of flat (without bathroom and kitchen inside) 
fenfang 分房: housing allocation 
fensan 分散: disperse  
fuli fang 福利房: welfare housing 
gongping 公平: equity or justice 
gongtan mianji 公摊⾯积: shared area 
gongzufang 公租房: public rental housing 
Guihuaju 规划局, or chengxiang guihua guanli ju 城乡规划管理局: Bureau of Urban-Rural 
Planning Management 
guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang 国 有 ⼟ 地 上 房 屋 征 收 与 补 偿: 
expropriation of or compensation for housing on state-owned land 
hengda 恒⼤: Evergrade Real Estate Group 
huxing 户型: house structure 
jiachou buke waiyang 家丑不可外扬: not washing your dirty linen in public 
jiancheng qu 建成区: built-up area 
jianzhu mianji 建筑⾯积: gross floor area 
jiaxiang ren 家乡⼈: person from the hometown 
jiedao banshichu 街道办事处: Sub-district Office 
jiedao 街道: sub-district 
jindong 进洞: inside caves 
Jing-Guang tielu 京⼲铁路: Beijing-Guangzhou Railway 
jiucheng he penghuqu gaizao 旧城和棚户区改造: old town and penghuqu redevelopment 
jumin zizhi gaizao 居民⾃治改造: residents’ autonomous redevelopment 
kaoshan 靠⼭: near mountains 
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laoshi ⽼实: simple-minded 
lungang 轮岗: wait for the posts to be available 
miaozi 苗⼦: Miao ethnicity 
moni zhengshou 模拟征收: quasi-expropriation 
penghuqu gaizao 棚户区改造: penghuqu redevelopment 
Qianxiyuan 千禧苑: Millennium Garden 
qu 区: city district 
sanxian chengshi 三线城市: tier-3 city or city established during the Third Front Construction 
sanxian jianshe 三线建设: The Third Front Construction 
shequ 社区: residential communities 
shi 市: city or municipality 
shida jiechu qingnian ⼗⼤杰出⻘年: Ten Outstanding Young Persons 
shifu 师傅: mentors 
shiyong mianji 使⽤⾯积: net floor area 
sixian chengshi 四线城市: tier-4 city 
sixiang gongzuo 思想⼯作: thought work 
teda chengshi 特⼤城市: mega city 
Wenhuaju ⽂化局: Municipal Bureau of Culture 
Wenwu ju ⽂物局: Bureau of Cultural Relics  
Xi Dada 习⼤⼤: Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China 
xian 县: County 
xianji shi 县级市: county-level city 
xianle qingchun xian zhongshen, xianle zhongshen xian zisun 献了⻘春献终⾝，献了终⾝
献⼦孙: contributed not only youth, but also whole lives and even offspring 
xiao chengshi ⼩城市: small city 
xiao gaoceng ⼩⾼层: small high-rise 
xibu huagongcheng ⻄部化⼯城: Chemical industy city in Western China 
xingzheng fuyi ⾏政复议: appeal for administrative reconsideration by a higher authority 
xingzheng susong ⾏政诉讼: sue the local government 
Xinwen Lianbo 新闻联播: a CCTV news programme 
xuanfang 选房: choosing flat 
xunshi zu 巡视组: inspection group 
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yi chutou wage jinwawa ⼀锄头挖个⾦娃娃: find gold by digging only once 
yiba chizi liangdaodi ⼀把尺⼦量到底: use only one ruler to measure until the end 
yinbi 隐蔽: conceal 
zhandi gong 占地⼯: land-occupying workers 
zhao 找: looked for troubles 
zhengyi 正义: justice 
zhicheng 职称: professional rank 
zhiwu 职务: posts 
zhixia shi 直辖市: City under the direct administration of the central government 
zhongdeng chengshi 中等城市: Middle-level city 
Zhongguo jiucheng 中国酒城: Chinese City of Liquor 
zhonglian zhongke 中联重科: Zoomlion, a Chinese leading machinery company 
Zhujianju 住建局, or zhufang yu chengxiang jianshe ju 住房与城乡建设局: Bureau of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Construction 
Zhujianju 住建局, Guijianju 规建局 or zhufang yu chengxiang guihua jianshe ju 住房与城乡
规划建设局, Municipal Bureau of Housing and Urban-rural Planning and Construction 
zonggui ban 总规办: Office of General Planning 
zuo de ke ai 左得可爱: being naively left-wing  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Entry to the thesis 
In 2013, Chinese Central Television (CCTV), the mouthpiece of the Chinese 
Communist Party, made a long series of reports, ten episodes in all, on the 
redevelopment of an old neighbourhood called Caojiaxiang1 in Chengdu, the capital 
city of Sichuan Province. The first five episodes of this series were even broadcast on 
Xinwen Lianbo (新闻联播), a live news programme that is rebroadcast daily by every 
important Chinese television channel at 7 p.m. This made the redevelopment of 
Caojiaxiang a well-known case throughout China. 
The redevelopment of Caojiaxiang was conducted in the name of penghuqu 
redevelopment (penghuqu gaizao 棚户区改造)2, and adopted an innovative mode called 
“residents’ autonomous redevelopment” (jumin zizhi gaizao 居民⾃治改造) (for further 
details, see Deng, 2017). Among the series of CCTV reports (CCTV, 2013), one scene 
was particular interesting. A resident of Caojiaxiang, Mr Sui, came to the housing 
expropriation office to pursue a negotiation. His claim for higher compensation for his 
properties had been declined by the expropriation officials. But, having failed to come 
to an agreement, as he was about to leave he found himself besieged by indignant 
residents in Caojiaxiang. They urged him to accept the compensation scheme and 
surrender his properties in the public interest, or else he would be detained there. Mr 
Sui suddenly felt that he had turned into a public enemy (see Figure 1-1). After almost 
                                                      
1 Literally, Caojiaxiang means the lane of the Cao Family. 
2 In this thesis, I use the term “redevelopment” to translate the Chinese word “gaizao”. Gaizao is an ambiguous 
term, which may refer to either a fundamental change (reform), or a minor change of specific features (renovation). 
For penghuqu gaizao, the state advocates both renovation and redevelopment measures (see Section 4.5). But in 
practice, redevelopment measures are more widely practised and so I translate penghuqu gaizao as penghuqu 
redevelopment. The word ‘renovation’ will also be used where applicable. 
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twenty hours in the same place, Mr Sui, now worn out, finally agreed to the 
compensation offered. He was then released by the residents, who were also exhausted. 
 
Figure 1-1 Screen shot: Mr Sui surrounded by his neighbours 
Source: Notes: Mr Sui, the man in the chair, is saying: “Now I have become the enemy”. 
 
The case of Caojiaxiang provokes debate on at least two issues. First, the 
redevelopment of Caojiaxiang had been conducted as part of the national project of 
penghuqu redevelopment. The question is how this national project can be reconciled 
with the needs of local government. Penghuqu, translated sometimes as “shanty town” 
or “shanty area” (see Lu, 1995; Wu and He, 2005; Huang, 2012; Shi et al., 2016; Li et 
al., 2018), is a kind of decrepit neighbourhood in a Chinese city where living 
conditions are poor. The redevelopment of penghuqu, which had long been a local 
practice, became a national project in 2007. The redevelopment of penghuqu is now 
being carried out, under the sponsorship of the central government, as the most 
important component of China’s new affordable housing system (baozhangxing 
zhufang 保障性住房; see Chapter 4). The Chinese central government committed itself 
 
 
18 
to improving the living conditions of more than 100 million residents in penghuqu 
neighbourhoods (General Office of the State Council, 2014). 
The second debate that might derive from the case of Caojiaxiang involves 
questions about the way in which residents are mobilized, including the use of the 
system of “residents’ autonomous redevelopment”. Promoted by the state throughout 
China in penghuqu redevelopment practices, “residents’ autonomous redevelopment” 
probably assumes that local residents will unite and play a more significant role in the 
redevelopment process of their own neighbourhoods, rather than being dictated to by 
a coalition of the state and market forces such as prevails in contemporary urban China 
(for example, Yang and Chang, 2007; Shin, 2009a; Wu, 2016). But, as the experience 
of Mr Sui shows, this mode eventually generated antagonism among the residents 
themselves. What do these local initiatives tell us about state-society relations in a 
rapidly urbanising China? 
 
1.2 Research Context 
In the last twenty years, the system of housing provision in urban China has 
been dramatically transformed. In 1998, as a critical measure of the housing reform, 
the socialist welfare housing scheme, after years of local experiments, was terminated 
(Wang and Murie, 1996; Wang, 2000; Wang and Murie, 2000). Before this reform, 
public housing in Chinese cities had been allocated to workers in the state-owned 
enterprises and employees in the public sector (Whyte and Parish, 1984: 76-85; Davis, 
1989; Wang, 1995). This mode of public housing constituted an important pillar of the 
socialist welfare system (Wu, 1996). However, the system not only produced 
widespread housing shortages, poor maintenance of the stock and ineffective methods 
of allocation, but also impaired economic growth, because the state had to bear the 
 
 
19 
heavy responsibility of providing public housing (Wang and Murie, 1999). It was 
believed that privatisation might be the remedy. Therefore, along with the overall 
market transition, public housing was privatised and commodified (Zhou and Logan, 
1996; Adams, 2009; Man, 2011), or recommodified (Davis, 2003). The responsibility 
for supplying dwellings to Chinese citizens was thus transferred to the market. A real 
estate market, which had been eliminated in the Maoist era (Wang, 1992), started to 
boom again and has become a major component of the economy (Wu et al., 2007: 
Chapter 3). 
The commodification of housing did improve the overall housing conditions 
for China’s urban residents (Zhou and Logan, 1996), but it also resulted in a series of 
economic, political and social changes. For one thing, the commodification of housing 
fuelled speculation in land and real estate in China. Earlier, in 1988, the amendment 
of the Chinese Constitution and the Land Administration Law marked the foundation 
of a land market in China (Xu et al., 2009; Hsing, 2010). This amendment 
differentiated two rights in relation to land, namely, the ownership right and the land 
use right (Yeh and Wu, 1996). While urban land remained state-owned, the land use 
right could be leased at a profit for a fixed period (Hsing, 2006). Later, in 1994, the 
reform of China’s tax-sharing system altered the fiscal relations between central and 
local governments. After the reform, as a recentralisation strategy, the central state took 
a greater share in the fiscal resources, imposing tighter budget constraints upon local 
governments (Tao et al., 2010). But the local states were also left with a space in which 
to generate local revenue through land development, including land expropriation, 
conveyancing and leasing, in the form of extra-budgetary revenue (Lin and Yi, 2011; 
Cao et al., 2008). Therefore, the local states, as the de facto landlords (Shin, 2009a), 
were motivated to use their monopoly power over land to pursue land accumulation, 
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either by converting rural land for industrial and real estate development (Zhang, 2000), 
or seeking the “rent gap” through expropriating land in existing urban areas in the 
name of redevelopment (Yeh and Wu, 1996; Yang and Chang, 2007). Land revenues 
thus constituted a vital source of revenue for the local state (Li, 1999; Ho and Lin, 
2003; Yeh 2005; Ong, 2014). Furthermore, the political agenda of China’s local state 
leaders has been entirely dominated by urban development, which has been described 
by You-tien Hsing (2010: 6) as “the urbanisation of the local state”. 
The urban-oriented accumulation mechanism has produced in China a mode of 
“speculative urbanisation” (Shin, 2014a), which affected the lives of the masses to 
their detriment. First, with the upward spiral of land prices, real estate speculation took 
off, triggering a crisis in housing affordability. Between 2004 and 2015, land prices for 
residential and commercial use in 35 large cities increased nearly five-fold (Wu et al., 
2015). In the same period, from 2003 to 2013, the average real estate prices in China’s 
leading cities grew by 13.1 per cent per year (Fang et al., 2015); they are now between 
two and ten times higher than the cost of construction (Claeser et al., 2017). For ten 
years there was no effective provision of affordable housing (Wang and Murie, 2011) 
and the high cost of housing became a major cause of social instability in general (Man, 
2011; Yang and Wang, 2011). Second, the local state, to maximise the revenues that it 
accumulates from land, always adopts enforcement measures (or “eminent domain”) 
to expropriate land and housing at the cost of infringing the rights and interests of the 
public. As a result, disputes over land expropriation and housing demolition also 
generated widespread social unrest and resistance (So, 2007; Hsing, 2010; Guo, 2011; 
Whiting, 2011; Shao, 2013). 
The new affordable housing system in China in recent years was established in 
some sense to mitigate the negative consequences of housing commodification. In 
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2007, after a ten-year vacuum following the housing reform, this system of affordable 
housing was first set up with the dual intention of improving public welfare (gaishan 
minsheng 改善民⽣) and reducing social inequality, as well as stimulating domestic 
consumption at a time of global financial crisis (Huang, 2012; Chen et al., 2014). The 
foundation of the affordable housing system may be contextualised in the so-called 
“golden age of social policies” under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 
(2002-2012) (Howell and Duckett, 2018). Unlike the previous social welfare system, 
which benefited only a small proportion of the population (Davis, 1989; Dillon, 2015), 
this new system, it is argued, provides for the very first time social security and a safety 
net for all citizens, under the regime of the Communist Party (Howell and Duckett, 
2018). 
 
The privatisation of public housing and the retreat of the state from public 
housing provision was never unique to China. In a broader context, it can be interpreted 
in the framework of the dramatic change experienced by urban governments in 
Western societies from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). In fact, it 
had long been doubted whether the provision of public housing should be taken as a 
pillar of the welfare state (Ginsburg, 1979; Harloe, 1995; Malpass, 2005). But after the 
Second World War, faced by the urgent need to cope with a housing deficit, the 
provision of public housing became one of the noticeable characteristics of the welfare 
state in the West (Hill, 1991; Ball, Harloe, and Martens, 1988). In addition, the 
provision of public housing by the state and the state’s assistance with home ownership 
(in such forms as subsidies and loans) fostered an important social group called “urban 
managers”, who were the “gatekeepers” of urban resources and could allocate public 
housing at their discretion in (Ford, 1975; Gray, 1976; Williams, 1976, 1982). 
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Therefore, their personal values, attitudes and preferences could generate specific 
spatial results in the urban fabric, such as social stratification, social segregation, and, 
inevitably, social injustice (Rahl, 1970, 1975). The important role played by the state 
in the redistribution of social surpluses and the dominance of bureaucratic 
organisations in the allocation of redistributive resources constituted the defining 
features of the managerial mode of urban governance (Griffith, 1998). 
Apart from the typical welfare state, in some of the developmentalist states in 
East Asia, the provision of public housing also constituted an important pillar of their 
social policies and facilitated their economic growth (Castells et al., 1990; Park, 1998). 
This was particularly the case in Singapore. As revealed by Park (1998), the state-
society relationship in Singapore had a great impact on the housing policy of the 
Singaporean government. When the Singaporeans attempted to build an independent 
nation, the People’s Action Party, to gain populist support, initiated a populist alliance 
with the people by promoting such populist policies as public housing and education 
(ibid.: 281-282). Therefore, the public housing programme became a cornerstone in 
ensuring the political legitimacy of the ruling party in Singapore (Castells et al., 1990; 
Chua, 1991, 1997; Haila, 2015). Even if some public housing was privatised later, in 
order to improve housing quality, privatisation per se still served as a tool to maintain 
political legitimacy and political patronage (Eng and Kong, 1997). 
However, with the transformation of urban governance from managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989) – or the rise of neoliberalism (Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 
2005) – the state started to retrench in its responsibility for redistributing goods in its 
territory, at the same time redirecting its mode of governance towards facilitating 
speculation, promoting certain places and delivering social services in conjunction 
with private business (Harvey, 1989a). In the realm of public housing, such a 
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transformation was buttressed by a long-held belief in owner occupation, such that 
purchasing a house in the real estate market should be the norm (Harloe, 1995), 
generating a large-scale privatisation of public housing, not only in typical welfare 
states such as Britain (Forrest and Murie, 1988), bus also in developmentalist states in 
East Asia (Ronald and Doling, 2010). 
This trend is particularly applicable to Britain, where the “right to buy” scheme, 
especially under Thatcherism, led to the faster privatisation of public housing than took 
place in any country in Western Europe (Forrest and Murie, 1988; Castles, 1998: 251), 
and in any other sector of the welfare state in the UK (Forrest and Murie, 1988: 5). 
Nowadays, the state has significantly limited its direct involvement in the housing 
sector, rendering the occupancy of social housing merely a “residual role”, taken by 
largely low-income people, rather than something that once prevailed in a wide range 
of people (Harloe, 1995: 3; Woods, 2000: 137). The “residual role” of public housing 
was in line with its “wobbly pillar” status in the welfare state, as argued by some 
scholars (Torgersen, 1987; Malpass, 2003). Furthermore, with the rising importance of 
private ownership, the state turned to transforming housing into an asset, a new source 
of welfare for individual families, thus promoting asset- or property-based welfare 
(Groves et al., 2007; Malpass, 2008). This has also been the practice of 
developmentalist states in East Asia (Ronald and Doling, 2010). 
With the entrepreneurial change of urban governance and the rise of 
neoliberalism, the privatisation, commodification and even financialisation of 
communal assets may be subject to the need to accumulate and the maximization of 
profit at the expense of people’s rights. This is best revealed by David Harvey (2003, 
2005) in his concept of “accumulation by dispossession”. According to Harvey, 
accumulation by dispossession means “to release a set of assets (including labour-
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power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Over-accumulated capital can 
seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use” (Harvey, 2003: 
149). Or, as Levien puts it, accumulation by dispossession refers to the “use extra-
economic coercion to expropriate means of subsistence, production or common social 
wealth for capital accumulation” (Levien, 2011: 457).  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Against this backdrop, the present research critically examines the (re-) 
establishment of the affordable housing system in China, with the redevelopment of 
penghuqu as the major concern. Two main questions are considered. First, does the 
practice of penghuqu redevelopment suggest that urban governance in China, which is 
now tinged with entrepreneurial characteristics (in particular, dominated by the logic 
of land accumulation), has shifted its orientation and retaken a managerial, or even 
paternalist approach? Second, what implication does it have for local residents, who 
are supposed to benefit from the social welfare provision? The first main question can 
be further divided into a series of related sub-questions: First, how does the national 
project of penghuqu redevelopment, which bears the characteristics of managerial 
mode of governance, take shape? Second, what is the situation of the local pratices of 
the national project of penghuqu redevelopment? Third, how does the local state 
develop new avenues of accumulation with entrepreneurial characteristics? Fourth, 
how does the national project of penghuqu redevelopment interact with the 
entrepreneurial urban governance?  
To address these questions, a series of intensive periods of fieldwork was 
conducted between 2015 and 2017. I take the redevelopment of Qiancao, in Luzhou, 
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Sichuan Province as a case in which to explore the underlying logic of urban 
governance in contemporary China. Qiancao, established during the Third Front 
Construction period, was an urban area mingling industrial and residential uses (1964-
1981), and formed part of the central state’s preparation for war in the Cold War era. 
As in the case of Caojiaxiang, the redevelopment of Qiancao was conducted in the 
name of penghuqu redevelopment. With more than 10,000 households, meaning 
30,000 people, to be relocated, the redevelopment of Qiancao was the largest 
individual project of penghuqu redevelopment in the whole of Sichuan Province 
(Sichuan Daily, 2016). The choice of Qiancao as a Third Front city provides an 
opportunity to discuss the socio-spatial impact of urbanization, drawing attention away 
from the Eastern coastal cities that have been at the centre of urban China studies. 
This thesis argues that the managerial and entrepreneurial mode of urban 
governance should be considered dialectically. Redistributive mechanisms, which are 
the essential part of managerial urban governance, were able to be appropriated to 
serve entrepreneurial purposes. To analyse this is to describe the concept of 
“entrepreneurial managerialism”. Through a detailed examination of the 
redevelopment of Qiancao, this thesis will demonstrate how the local state strategically 
took advantage of the local history in relation to Third Front Construction and the 
landscape of the area to present a heterogeneous neighbourhood as penghuqu in order 
to procure resources that were being redistributed by the central state. Meanwhile, 
informed by the practices in Caojiaxiang, the local redistributive bureaucrats applied 
the residents’ autonomous redevelopment model to the redevelopment of Qiancao. By 
manipulating the redistributive mechanism, they successfully exerted pressure upon 
residents and achieved their goal of accelerating land and housing expropriation, while 
ensuring that resistance by local residents was contained. 
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1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, in 
Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature and propose a framework of entrepreneurial 
managerialism. In this chapter, I first explore the instrumental dimension of 
redistribution or social welfare. Next, I review mainstream debates on the 
characteristics of the managerial and entrepreneurial modes of urban governance and 
the explanations for the dynamic of the change from managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism. The tendency in general, and particularly in the Chinese context, 
will be considered to show in what sense the redistribution of resources could be 
manipulated to serve specific purposes. The situation of socialist redistribution, both 
in the Central and Eastern European countries and in pre-reform China, will also be 
considered. At the end of Chapter 2, it is proposed to consider the managerial and 
entrepreneurial mode of urban governance from a dialectical perspective, which I term 
as “entrepreneurial managerialism”, so as to understand the contemporary mode of 
urban governance. The rest of this thesis demonstrates how China’s penghuqu 
redevelopment can be accounted for through the lens of entrepreneurial managerialism. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the research method. In this chapter, I first review the 
process of my fieldwork and introduce the various sources of the materials used in this thesis 
to support my arguments. Following this introduction, I reflect upon some critical issues in 
relation to my fieldwork, which consist of the rationale of the field site selection, some 
constraints encountered when conducting interviews, and the efforts I made to overcome those 
constraints. I believe these issues are not only critical for the course of my fieldwork per se, 
but may also shed light on the theme of this thesis. For example, from observing how local 
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residents were sensitive to my appearance as a stranger in their neighbourhood, it may be 
inferred that the redevelopment project placed them in a precarious and anxious position. 
Chapter 4 provides the context for this thesis: both the historical context, 
namely, the Third Front Construction, and the policy context, that is, the 
redevelopment of penghuqu as a national project. Regarding the historical context, I 
review the general process of Third Front Construction and how it was implemented 
locally in Qiancao. The experience of some residents as “Third Front migrants” is also 
explored in this chapter. As noted above, the local history in relation to the Third Front 
Construction has been strategically mobilised by the local state to justify its 
redevelopment project. In addition, as further examined in Chapter 7, local residents 
also referred to their personal experience within and after the course of Third Front 
Construction to frame their perception of justice and injustice in the ongoing 
development. The policy context first traces penghuqu back to its emergence and in its 
early period under the Communist regime. The emergence of penghuqu went hand-in-
hand with the industrialisation of China. I also review the establishment of the new 
affordable housing system in recent years and the process by which the redevelopment 
of penghuqu has moved to a central position in this new system. 
Chapters 5 to 7 contain the empirical findings. Chapter 5 first extends the 
discussion in Chapter 4 on the essence of penghuqu. I argue that penghuqu should not 
be regarded as a common-sense policy with a specific content. On the contrary, it has 
never been clearly defined. I review how the central policies on penghuqu 
redevelopment change over time to reveal the flexibility of penghuqu in terms of its 
scale, range and policy purpose. The vagueness and flexibility of the central policies 
on penghuqu redevelopment leave room for the local government to exploit 
development opportunities. The second part of this chapter scrutinises the local 
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practice of penghuqu redevelopment in Luzhou. It explores how the local state 
orchestrates Qiancao as penghuqu by re-mobilising its historical linkage with the Third 
Front Construction and exaggerating the negative dimension of the living conditions 
there. This qualifies it for national resources and facilitates land acquisition. In this 
regard, this chapter shows how entrepreneurial managerialism is not to be considered 
as merely a local practice: It is made possible by the mutual action, or even a kind of 
collusion, of the central and the local state. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the other dimension of the entrepreneurial 
managerialism, that is, the critical role played by the redistributive bureaucrats once 
given discretion to pursue entrepreneurial purposes. The redistribution of scarce 
resources was able to be used to reward people who contributed to the generation of 
land revenue. Conversely, those who hindered the progress of redevelopment would 
be punished by being put at a disadvantage in the redistribution process. This chapter 
examines how the local officials devised a sophisticated allocation scheme to play a 
dual role in allocating resettlement housing. As speed (in particular, the speed of 
housing expropriation) became a critical feature pursued by the entrepreneurial local 
state, those who could surrender their dwellings soonest were rewarded. By contrast, 
the housing expropriation authority also mobilised residents’ social ties with their 
neighbours and acquaintances, and their dependence upon existing redistributive 
mechanisms, to put pressure on local residents and compel them to surrender their 
dwellings without violence. In fact, the chapter reveals that the mode of residents’ 
autonomous redevelopment served as a mechanism to bind most residents together and 
redirect the potential antagonism caused by land and housing expropriation towards 
society. This could fragment the society even more, a state which may be seen by the 
local state as desirable, particularly under entrepreneurial managerialism. 
 
 
29 
Chapter 7 is concerned with the implications of entrepreneurial managerialism 
as a mode of urban governance for local residents, especially for their perception of 
justice and injustice. As the local state turned to pursue entrepreneurial purposes that 
prioritised the exchange value of land and housing over their use value, residents may 
also have been inclined to accept the fairness of exchange in light of their sense of 
justice and injustice. Meanwhile, managerial urban governance, although sharply 
different from that under the socialist redistributive system, still plays a role. As a result, 
local residents could also refer to their previous experience to articulate their 
satisfaction or discontent with the current scheme for allocating resettlement housing. 
However, it may not be sufficient to constrain the debate on the issue of redistribution 
around social justice alone. As something widely debated in political philosophy, the 
issue of recognition, especially the recognition of particularity, is also necessary (if not 
more important) for social justice. The remaining part of this chapter looks at local 
residents’ frustrations and the way in which they derive from officialdom’s failure to 
acknowledge their particular treatment of their housing. It is argued that only when 
housing has been cherished in terms of its use value, rather than exchange value, can 
we achieve a kind of social and spatial justice. 
The concluding chapter summarises the findings of this thesis, and also 
includes reflections on the changes that happened in Qiancao after my fieldwork. I also 
state some limitations of this research which could be further elaborated as part of 
future research. 
 
1.5 Potential Contributions 
This thesis aims to make a contribution in the following aspects.  
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First, by proposing entrepreneurial managerialism and using the case of 
penghuqu redevelopment in China to exemplify it, this thesis, rather than merely 
emphasising the rise of entrepreneurialism, advocates a dialectical understanding of 
the change in urban governance (Harvey, 1989; particularly in China. Wu, 2003; Chien, 
2013a; He et al., 2018). By doing so, we can understand the statecraft and the essence 
of the state in a relational way. Even a state dominated by entrepreneurial ideology 
could still use some strategies with strong managerial characteristics to serve its 
entrepreneurial purposes. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but can be 
integrated with each other in a more nuanced way. In this regard, entrepreneurialism 
per se, or a purely market-dominated logic, may not be the fundamental pursuit of 
urban governance, but is merely adopted in an instrumental way, as managerialism was 
under the capitalist welfare state. 
Second, this thesis explores the redevelopment of penghuqu not through the 
lens of policy debate, which in some sense takes penghuqu as a kind of policy doxa, 
an a priori, self-evident category, but in order to question the essence of penghuqu per 
se and expose penghuqu as a discursive constituent. By doing so, this thesis attempts 
to extend current research on penghuqu redevelopment or the new affordable housing 
system in China (for example Huang, 2012; Ni et al., 2012; Li et al., 2018) and bring 
the issue of penghuqu redevelopment into a more general debate on urban 
redevelopment. In addition, by scrutinising how the stigma on penghuqu in China is 
not the same as that of other types of urban neighbourhood where low-income urban 
people congregate, such as the slum or “sink estate” in the British context (Lees, 2014; 
Slater, 2018), it will reveal how the socialist legacy has implications for the 
entrepreneurial urban practices in contemporary China and further sheds light on the 
reflection of neoliberalism in the Chinese context. 
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Third, in terms of the research on contemporary Chinese cities, this thesis 
attempts to make a contribution by bringing cities “off the map” (Robinson, 2006, 
2008) and into mainstream urban studies. A wealth of studies on mega-cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou has delineated a general image of urban 
transformation in contemporary China. The urban changes in these mega-cities are 
undeniably critical for understanding the overall trend. However, these mega-cities 
may also be unique because they are the “frontier” where political power, capital and 
the forces that could drive significant changes in civil society (such as NGOs and 
academic researchers) are concentrated. Such a unique combination could shape a 
particular mode of relationship between different agencies, which may diverge from 
what can be found elsewhere. This thesis joins the attempt to explore the urban change 
elsewhere (see Chien, 2013a; Su, 2015; He et al., 2018). As the local state has been 
constrained by its political, fiscal, and financial capabilities, it may pursue some 
innovative ways that are not to be observed at the frontier. 
Fourth, this research has sought to convey the experience of the “forced” 
migrants from the East to a Third Front city, and exhibits how their sense of justice 
and injustice, as well as their understandings of the (Party-)State and its actions, have 
been shaped in the long course of China’s industrialisation, economic reform and 
urbanization. If it has done so, this research will extend some existing studies (for 
example, Lee, 2007) on working class politics in China.
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Chapter 2 Entrepreneurial Managerialism: Revisiting the role of 
redistribution in the entrepreneurial era 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The mode of urban governance in Western countries underwent a critical shift 
in the 1970s, as outlined by David Harvey (1989a); it was a transformation from 
“managerialism to entrepreneurialism”. Similarly, it was a transformation from a 
Fordist “welfare” state to a neo-liberal, post-Fordist “workfare” state (see Jessop, 
1995). Since then, debates around the change to entrepreneurialism in urban 
governance have become heated. Much effort has been invested in exploring the 
dynamics of this transformation and describing the innovative strategies made by 
entrepreneurial cities. This framework is also applied by many scholars as they explore 
the urban changes in contemporary China. But an important issue remains unclear, 
namely, is this change a fundamental transformation? How should we understand the 
social redistributive measures after the entrepreneurial change? For China, which is 
still being defined as a socialist country that retains many redistributive mechanisms, 
this issue is even more critical. 
In this chapter, I first explore the instrumental dimension of redistribution, 
namely, that redistributive measures can serve other purposes than achieving a 
fundamental justice, with reference to both the capitalist societies and the socialist 
societies. Then, I will review the key features of managerial and entrepreneurial mode 
of urban governance and describe some of the driving forces of the change from 
managerialism to entrepreneurialism. By highlighting the possible convergence of 
these two modes, I seek to propose my idea of entrepreneurial managerialism. 
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I argue that rather than regarding managerialism and entrepreneurialism as 
excluding each other, it is better to regard managerialism and entrepreneurialism in a 
dialectical way and pose them on opposite ends of the same spectrum of urban 
governance. A given mode of urban governance may bear the features of both 
entrepreneurialism and managerialism at the same time (Shin, 2016a). The 
instrumental dimension of redistribution enables redistributive measures to be 
manoeuvred for entrepreneurial purposes. In the Chinese context, to understand the 
essence of some new redistributive measures (in this research, the redevelopment of 
penghuqu), the concept of “entrepreneurial managerialism” bearing the features of 
both entrepreneurialism and managerialism is proposed as a framework of 
understanding China’s urban governance. 
 
2.2 The instrumental dimension of redistribution 
Instrumental use of redistribution in the capitalist societies 
In the Western context, redistribution is widely concerned as the approach to 
realise social equality. Typically, it could be defined as follows (Calhoun, 2002: 142): 
“[a] shift in the distribution of income or wealth, generally as a means of 
pursuing egalitarian goals or of assisting disadvantaged sections of the population. 
The most common tools of redistribution are taxes on income, wealth, and 
commodities; transfer payments … and the provision of public goods … Other 
measures include price controls, rent controls, minimum-wage legislation, and the 
rationing of goods and services. At the societal level, the challenge is not merely to 
achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth, but to increase wealth so that 
redistribution is not simply a zero-sum game in which one person’s gain is another’s 
loss. For this reason, equity considerations cannot be divorced from issues of how 
income and wealth are generated. Government action can also privilege the 
redistribution of ‘opportunity …” 
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In general, as according to Korpi and Palme (1998), welfare states have at least 
three types of redistributive policy. The first one focuses on targeted social groups, 
such as the disabled; the second one adopts a more universal approach that provides 
all citizens with benefits of an equal standard; the third one is similar to the second 
one, but takes account of citizens’ earnings and income before the redistribution. The 
benefits they may obtain should determine their level of income.  
For the first type, that is, the targeted policy, some researchers think it could 
not help achieve the goal of reducing inequality. According to Korpi and Palme (1998), 
if a large number (or a majority of) citizens were excluded from the welfare scheme, 
they might form coalitions and revolt against or even repeal taxes. Meanwhile, 
targeting specific groups reduces the total amount of social wealth being transferred 
(ibid.: 672). This creates a kind of “paradox of redistribution”, namely: “the more we 
target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality 
via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and inequality” 
(ibid.: 681-682). In this regard, to ensure a well functioning welfare state, welfare 
policies should adopt a universal logic that covers everyone irrespective of their 
personal traits (e.g. Tawney, 1952; Korpi, 1980; Garfinkel et al., 1996; Wilson, 1996; 
Korpi and Palme, 1998). 
However, some researchers (Le Grand, 1982; Goodin and Le Grand, 1987; 
Saez, 2006; Kakwani and Subbarao, 2007) doubt the universal logic of welfare 
provision to be wasteful, or could even enhance social inequality. For example, as 
argued by Le Grand (1982: 137), any universal redistribution may end in being used 
by the better off and favouring them, thus disadvantaging other social groups and 
aggravating inequality. Hence this faction of researchers claim that it is more efficient 
to concentrate scarce resources on those who are in need. 
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The fact that either mode of welfare scheme could contribute to a greater level 
of inequality could challenge the seemingly solid linkage between redistribution and 
social equality. In fact, it is better to consider the use of redistributive measures to cope 
with social inequality as an “affirmative remedy” (Fraser, 1995a; further discussion in 
Chapter 7) of the internal contradiction of the capitalism, which could achieve some 
degree of equal result, but leave the source of inequality, that is, the capitalist mode of 
production intact. Redistributive measures primarily serve the fundamental incentive 
of capital accumulation, which is “Moses and the prophets” (Marx, 1973: 595). In this 
regard, redistribution could be regarded as an instrument that serves different purposes 
of the regime. 
The role that welfare measures played in the developmentalist state in East Asia 
could be a vivid case of such understanding of redistribution. Ian Holliday (2000, 2005) 
refers to the Esping-Anderson’s typology of welfare regimes (1990) to consider the 
condition of welfare provision in the developmental states, East Asia in particular. He 
uses the term the “productivist world of welfare capitalism” (Holliday, 2000: 709) to 
describe the welfare model in East Asia. In general, welfare policies in these states are 
subordinated to, and serve the purpose of economic growth, which is the source of 
legitimacy for these developmentalist states (see also Gough, 2001; Kwon, 2005). 
Song’s research (2009) on the welfare regime in South Korea may exemplify 
Holliday’s model. In South Korea, where at one stage in its rapid economic growth a 
redistributive system was less than firmly established, a welfare regime could even be 
established in direct response to the need for neoliberalisation (Song, 2009; see also 
Lee, 1999; Song, 2003). Song (2009) calls this mode of welfare regime “the neoliberal 
welfare state”. According to Song, redistributive measures that sought to provide 
citizens with a minimum standard of living were designed to cope with the decline in 
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the wake of the Asian Debt Crisis (1997-2001). Nevertheless, only certain citizens, 
such as unemployed young people (new intellectuals) and short-term homeless people, 
were prioritised as “deserving” recipients of welfare, in that they were still “promising, 
had the potential to be employed and contributed to the  information and service 
industries, making them “governable subjects of a neoliberal welfare state” (Song, 
2009: xii). 
As well as developmentalist states in East Asia, typical neoliberal countries 
such as the UK, the US, and Australia, the state also does not take an anti-welfare 
rhetoric, but, on the contrary, pursue reshaped welfare regimes and manipulate welfare 
provision to secure the maintenance of neoliberalism. Hartman (2005: 57) uses the 
metaphor that “neoliberalism has indeed got into bed with its putative enemy” to 
capture this phenomenon. Using the case of income support, Hartman (2005) provides 
three explanations for the coexistence of neoliberalism and redistributive measures. 
First, more recently employed people have to rely on income support to supplement 
their wages from precarious casual work. The provision of low income support helps 
the peripheral labour market to flourish, thus maintaining a stable supply of cheap 
labour. In the meantime, the provision of income support, although not too much of it, 
can also ensure that workers’ living conditions are slightly above basic subsistence, 
thus helping them gain a meagre capacity as  consumers in the market. Second, through 
the functionalist lens, the provision of social welfare under capitalism can to some 
degree contribute to social cohesion. It will, on the one hand, serve to syphon off public 
discontent in the face of malfunctioning capitalism, and, on the other, allow the 
recipients to maintain a certain degree of integration in society. Third, with the 
prevailing anti-welfare rhetoric and the basis of welfare provision shifting from 
entitlement to obligation, the recipients must submit to a plethora of disciplines and 
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conduct self-monitoring. By providing social welfare, the state achieves social control 
by producing docile subjects who internalise neoliberal disciplines. In sum, welfare 
provision is deemed by Hartman (2005) to be an integral part of neoliberal 
governmentality, maintaining the successful operation of neoliberalism at a time when 
social inequality is being exacerbated. 
More recent cases since the rise of neoliberalism in capitalist economies further 
demonstrate such function of redistribution (Kurtz, 2002; Mansfield, 2007; Morrison, 
2012; Scanlon, 2010). Redistributive measures have not been abandoned, but are 
strategically employed to support the underlying mechanism of accumulation. Against 
this backdrop, it is argued that the instrumental use of redistributive measures is not 
an exception, but rather the essence of redistribution. Social redistribution was 
supposed to achieve the result of narrower social inequality, but this would further 
serve the underlying demand of capitalism. 
 
Instrumental use of redistribution in the (former-)socialist societies 
By means of their welfare policies, in the former socialist countries of the 
Central and Eastern Europe (hereafter CEE), redistributive mechanisms were also able 
to be manipulated instrumentally, which generated social inequality, despite the 
different essence of redistribution. Szelényi attempts to make a differentiation between 
redistribution in the capitalist market economies and in socialism (or, in the West and 
in the East) (Szelényi and Manchin, 1987: 107): 
 “Redistribution has different meanings in the West and East. In the West, 
redistribution refers to transfer of incomes amid different groups of the population. In 
the East, redistribution means the appropriation of revenues of firms into the state 
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budget by central government apparatuses and the reallocation of these as government 
grants, subsidies, or handouts in the sphere of production and reproduction.” 
Or similarly, in an earlier version taking the case of socialist Hungary (Szelényi, 
1978: 75): 
 “Under State Socialism the state redistributed surplus, surplus which was 
never accumulated in personal income, but was directly centralised in the State budget 
and reallocated according to centrally defined goals.” (emphasis added) 
According to Szelényi (1978, 1983), this special context of redistribution 
became the source of greater inequality. As the state monopolised redistributive 
resources, the central redistributive bureaucrats in charge of the redistribution process 
were always inclined to formulate some redistribution schemes in favour of themselves 
and their own kind (Szelényi, 1978). They were already guaranteed privileged access 
to scarce resources over ordinary workers (ibid.: 77). Such special arrangements could 
strengthen and extend the socio-economic inequality. Therefore, addressing this 
injustice could not rely on the redistribution in a general sense for remedy, as in the 
capitalist society but demanded a new mechanism, which Szelényi calls “welfare 
redistribution” (Szelényi and Manchin, 1987). Meanwhile, as these socialist states 
prioritised industry (in particular, heavy industry) due to their political goals (such as 
rapid industrialisation to compete with the capitalist bloc), they would also channel 
redistributive resources to serve specific industrial sectors that could meet the 
requirement of rapid industrialisation (Kornai, 1959, 1972, 1992; Walder, 1992). 
 
Instrumental use of redistribution in the Chinese Context 
The logic of instrumental use of redistribution in former socialist states could 
also be applied to the Chinese context. As summarised by Xueguang Zhou (2004: 7-
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8), under socialism, with the monopolistic power of the Party State, redistributive 
priorities are decided by political logic rather than through a market process. 
Meanwhile, the state could also manipulate the redistributive mechanism to reward 
political loyalty in industries and bureaucratic organisations, thus achieving its goal of 
governance in these sectors (Walder, 1986; Nee, 1989; Lee, 1991; Zhou, 1995). 
To be specific, in the pre-reform era, welfare measures did exist in China, but 
they disproportionally benefited only a small part of the Chinese population, namely, 
workers (especially permanent workers in large factories) and employees in the public 
sector, generating a significant difference between urban residents and peasants (Davis, 
1989). This preferential treatment even betrayed the most deeply held commitments 
of the Communist Party to equality (Dillon, 2015: 2). Moreover, the peasants were 
further exploited by the enforced “price scissors” or “scissors effect” (Knight, 1995; 
Oi, 1993; 1999), that is, lowering agriculture’s terms of trade with industry and thus 
sacrificing it for the sake of industrialisation. Such an “urban bias” (Oi, 1993) could 
be understood only in the state’s requirement of rapid industrialisation. In this regard, 
according to Nolan and White (1984), the preferential welfare delivery to urban 
residents should rather be understood as “state bias”. For them (ibid.: 77), since China 
in the pre-reform era was quite poor, “there [was] a strong tendency for the state to act 
in furtherance of its own interests as a distinct (yet internally heterogeneous) social 
force. In key areas of strategic choice, policies which [were] defensible, indeed vitally 
necessary, to promote economic efficiency, social equity and political democracy 
[were] stifled or weakened by a state apparatus unable or unwilling to countenance 
change.” In this regard, the Third Front Construction, which contextualises my 
research (see Chapter 4), was a massive redistribution project that served the urgent 
need of the state for national security. 
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In addition to the industrialisation in general, the redistributive mechanism had 
also been used to serve another goal of the state, that is, social or interpersonal control 
through constructing a kind of patron-client relationship between Party officials and 
members of the society. Clientelism, along with other exchange-based mechanisms 
such as co-optation, is critical for the survival of a one-party regime (Magaloni & 
Kricheli, 2010). The works of Jean Oi (1985) and Andrew Walder (1986) spearheaded 
the application of the concept of clientelism to the Chinese context. They focus 
respectively on China’s rural politics and labour politics before the economic reform. 
Unlike some succeeding scholars (Paik, 2014; Paik and Baum, 2014) who explore the 
clientelist relationship in elites (eg. local government cadres and land developers) and 
the corruption caused by this mode of clientelism, Oi and Walder are concerned with 
the link between the elite and the masses and the social control based upon such 
clientelism. 
According to Oi (1985), the economic environment in Chinese villages, 
centred on the distribution of private and collective goods, laid the foundation for 
clientelist politics to flourish. The leader of a village team, who monopolises the power 
to allocate labour, income and welfare resources, becomes the patron, whilst the 
peasants who depend on the team leader to maximise their interests represent the 
clients. By distributing preferentially to their clients, patrons can garner not only 
political support from their clients (especially when patrons are subject to surveillance 
from higher ranking officials and thus in urgent need of support to demonstrate their 
achievement and secure their position), but also material repayment from them. 
Peasants as clients characteristically become the most enthusiastic supporters of the 
team leader. In the meantime, they can encourage other non-clients to act as they do. 
Although peasants who do not fall into the patron-client relationship have little 
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prospect of turning into clients, they have to show some degree of respect for the 
village leader or provide him with gifts if they want to keep immune from the worst 
distributive consequences. Applying this perspective to rural China, Oi seeks to 
demonstrate that the exercise of social control in communist/socialist societies may be 
flexible, subjective, and imbued with personal sentiment. In a broader sense, Oi claims 
that “clientelism should be part of the definition of a communist political system” 
(1985: 266). However, clients are not always passive. Rather they may take advantage 
of the clientelist mechanism to participate in politics and maximise their own interests, 
which may even contribute to the ineffective implementation of state policies. 
Andrew Walder’s research focuses on the basic units of Chinese urban society 
before the economic reform, namely the state-owned enterprises and organisation 
work-units. With the concept of “neo-traditionalism”, Walder (1986) reveals how 
clientelism became embedded in China’s labour politics. He first highlights two 
alternative understandings of social control in communist/socialist societies: 
totalitarianism and group theory. In a totalitarian society, which may also be found in 
the Soviet Union and other CEE countries, the ruling party seeks total power, total 
submission, and total social transformation under its ideology. To achieve these ends, 
the ruling party deploys secret police, recruits informants, and mobilises institutions, 
terrorising selected parts of the population and leaving the rest in a state of habitual 
obedience due to caution and fear (Walder, 1986: 2). Further, Walder (1986: 2–3) 
points out two major features of a totalitarian society. First, the tie between the ruling 
party and its active adherents is an impersonal and ideological one. In this regard, 
totalitarian movements are driven more by psychological and political impulses than 
by material interests. Second, a society under a totalitarian regime is atomised. The 
ruling party as a common authority is the sole mediator between individuals. From the 
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opposite perspective, group theory regards a communist/socialist society as 
fragmented. Unlike the diagnosis of totalitarianism which atomises individuals, group 
theory holds that in such a society different social groups emerge and seek to articulate 
and compete for their shared interests (Walder, 1986: 4–5). 
However, in pre-reform China, the strategy of social control differed 
fundamentally from either mode, and may rather be termed “neo-traditionalist”. For 
Walder, the core of neo-traditionalism is the distribution of scarce resources (both 
material and immaterial). According to Walder (1986: 7): 
 “The neo-traditional image stresses a formally organised particularism in the 
distribution of goods, income, and career opportunities, a network of patron-client 
relations maintained by the party, and a rich subculture of instrumental-personal ties 
independent of the party’s control.” 
To be specific, first, the neo-traditional model portrays social control in China 
as a kind of exchange. To maintain the Party State, it uses positive incentives rather 
than passive ones, such as coercion, to acquire political loyalty and compliance. 
Without a sufficient supply of resources outside the party’s control, individuals have 
to be affiliated to the system. Second, individuals’ loyalty here is a mixture of public 
loyalty to the party and its ideology, and personal loyalty to the party cadres. The two 
dimensions of loyalty constitute a highly institutionalised network of patron-client 
relations. Third, although the party’s ideology seems hostile to personal ties, which 
may turn to corruption in extreme cases, the whole structure leaves lower-ranking party 
officials with wide discretion in the disposing of scarce resources, such as the higher 
positions, official approval, housing, and public goods, thus fostering a plethora of 
instrumental-personal ties (Walder, 1986: 6-7). In sum, by dividing the public and 
generating antagonism amongst the rank and file (between a minority of loyal and 
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cooperative workers and the majority), the Communist Party manages to deflect any 
potential antagonism away from itself and to redirect it to the workers, thus achieving 
social control in state-owned enterprises (Walder, 1986: 12, 167). 
In the reform era, the Chinese economy has been redirected to operate with 
more features of a market economy, while redistribution plays a less important role 
(Nee, 1989), as noted above. With the expansion of the market, the delivery channels 
for resources are no longer monopolised by the Party State and its branches. 
Meanwhile, Chinese society has witnessed drastic changes, particularly the collapse 
of the work-unit system (cf. Bray, 2005). Despite all these changes, the clientelist 
relationship endures in some circumstances and performs specific functions. It is used 
to explain the expansion of employment in the public sector (Ang, 2016), or the way 
in which social stability is maintained (Lee and Zhang, 2013). For example, in recent 
years, many popular protests have arisen throughout China, but the regime under the 
Communist Party still remains remarkably stable. Ching Kwan Lee and Yonghong 
Zhang (2013) provide an explanation that steers clear of focusing on the macro 
infrastructure of the state and turns to the “microfoundation” of subordination. They 
highlight three mechanisms that constitute this “microfoundation”, namely, protest 
bargaining, legal-bureaucratic absorption, and patron-clientelism. According to them 
(Lee and Zhang, 2013), when a protest breaks out, the clientelist network can be 
mobilised to gather advanced or real-time information and influence public opinion in 
the neighbourhood, helping to control or even calm social unrest. Compared to the 
communist neo-traditionalist mode, this “revamped” clientelism has several new 
features. First, the scale of the social groups that can be integrated into the clientelist 
relationship has dramatically reduced. Only specific social groups are now included, 
such as civil servants, the elderly and retirees, and former protest leaders and 
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participants who are still dependent on the resources redistributed by the party state. 
Second, with the fading away of ideological commitment, what the patron can provide 
to different clients hinges more on material benefits and career security or promotion, 
a mode of clientelism which is more like buying cooperation. Third, in the Maoist era, 
the operation of clientelism entailed top-down institutional commands or the 
reassertion of party discipline, but it has since been replaced by a complicated 
bargaining process between the patron and the clientele. This process transforms the 
essence of clientelism, making it a less reliable or even fragile  mechanism. 
To summarise, in China, as well as those former socialist CEE states, where 
redistribution is the dominant mode of economic integration, redistribution can also be 
manipulated instrumentally for different purposes, such as serving the need of rapid 
industrialisation, generating the preferential allocation of scarce resources to suit 
redistributive authorities, and feeding clientelism for social (interpersonal) control. 
The bureaucratic system in charge of redistribution, with its wide discretion, is a major 
source of these functions. To highlight the instrumental dimension of redistribution 
could help us understand how the redistributive mechanisms could be fit to the 
entrepreneurial mode of urban governance. In the next section, I will review the 
characteristics of both the managerial and entrepreneurial mode of urban governance 
in general, as well as the entrepreneurial orientation of the Chinese state. 
 
2.3 The managerial and entrepreneurial modes of urban governance 
The managerial urban governance 
The departure point of the transformation of urban governance is 
managerialism. Griffith (1998: 42) identifies three major characteristics of 
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managerialism, which include “an emphasis on the allocation of state surpluses (rather 
than on the attraction of private investment flows); the dominance of bureaucratic 
organisational forms in the delivery of services (rather than the more flexible, less 
formalised, organisational approaches that were being adopted in the leading parts of 
the business world); and the dominance of social welfarist ideology (as distinct from 
the business values of wealth generation and competitive success)”. 
For many researchers, managerialism after the Second World War was a 
prevailing mode of urban governance for Western welfare states (Carley, 1991; 
DiGaento and Klemanski, 1993; Brenner, 2004). With managerialism underpinned by 
the Keynesian ideology and Beveridgean commitments, the state in post-war Western 
societies sought to replace ideas such as patronage, partiality, and laissez-faire that 
dominated previous modes of governance (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 4), and to take 
greater responsibility for social redistribution (Williams, 1982) as a response to greater 
social pressure after the Second World War. The welfare state in a sense became in this 
period a defining feature of the advanced industrial democracies (Pierson, 2001: 1). It 
was designed to remedy failures of the market and to protect citizens by a range of 
different measures, including compulsory insurance (covering health, unemployment 
and retirement); education and training programmes (aimed at enhancing citizens’ 
personal capability); social services and other income-support services, such as public 
or subsided housing and family allowances (Kitschelt, 2001: 265; Goodin et al., 1999: 
24). With these redistribution or transfer measures, the welfare state was able to further 
a variety of purposes, such as decreasing poverty rates, promoting social equality and 
integration, avoiding social exclusion, achieving high economic growth and 
maintaining social integrity and stability (Goodin et al., 1999). 
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In addition to the overall redistribution function played by the welfare state, 
the managerial mode of urban governance also operated at a micro level, namely the 
dominance of bureaucratic organisations in channelling redistributive resources to 
social groups and individuals. Resources were not automatically distributed to 
individuals, but were intermediated by the bureaucratic system constituted by agents, 
called “urban managers” (Gray, 1976; Williams, 1976, 1978; Robson, 1975) or 
“gatekeepers” of urban resources (Ford, 1975; Forrest and Wissink, 2017). According 
to Ray Pahl (1970: 206), these gatekeepers included 
 “those who control or manipulate scarce urban resources and facilities such 
as housing managers, estate agents, local government officers, property developers, 
representatives of building societies and insurance companies, youth employment 
officers, social workers, magistrates, councillors and so on.” 
Logically, the introduction of a sophisticated bureaucratic system to deliver 
public welfare was meant to get rid of the previous system of governance, which was 
corrupt, oppressive, and enmired in patronage, nepotism and corruption (du Gay, 1994). 
The new bureaucratic system was assumed to be neutral, professional and efficient 
(Pollitt, 1993: 2-5), allowing equality in the results of redistribution (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997: 5). But these gatekeepers in practice had wide discretion, conditioned 
by their values, attitudes, and preferences (Ford, 1975; Pollitt, 1993: 3). For example, 
in Britain, local government officials played a key role in allocating public housing, 
which was a scarce resource that many competed for (Forrest and Wissink, 2017). 
Their decisions to offer what housing to whom was based to some degree on their 
subjective judgements of family structure, existing housing conditions and housing 
needs. In this regard, the decisions of these bureaucrats could have significant 
implications for urban social and spatial segregation. Building societies in Britain 
played a similar role vis-á-vis buyers of private property, for the professionals had the 
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power to permit or reject applications for loans based on an applicant’s background 
(ibid.; Ford, 1975). The discretionary power of bureaucrats (not only governmental 
officials, but also other professionals such as are noted above) left space for 
discriminatory patterns associated with gender, race, ethnicities, and so on (Forrest and 
Wissink, 2017; Henderson and Karn, 1987). Therefore, for Pahl (1970, 1975), urban 
managerialism constituted a constraint on accessing scarce urban resources and thus 
contributed to social stratification and injustice. 
In sum, as noted above, managerial urban governance consisted, on the one 
hand, of a critical welfarist role in redistribution played by the state to achieve social 
justice while achieving the sustenance of the capitalist mode of production, and, on the 
other, a bureaucratic system, which used its own discretion to deliver welfare resources 
in a professional and efficient way. Table 2-1 summarises some key features of the 
managerial mode of urban governance. 
Table 2-1 Key features of the managerial mode of urban governance 
l In response to the crisis of democratic system after the Second World War; 
l Social welfarist ideology urban democratic system; 
l Emphasis on state redistribution/allocation of surpluses; 
l Dominance of bureaucratic organisations in the delivery of services (urban 
managers or the gatekeepers of scarce urban resources). 
 
The entrepreneurial urban governance 
In sharp contrast to managerialism, entrepreneurialism suggests the shift of 
many city administrations away from the provision of welfare, services and collective 
consumption (Castells, 1977; Pinch, 1985) towards a more capital-friendly stance. 
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Harvey (1989a) in his research identifies three key features of urban 
entrepreneurialism. According to him, urban entrepreneurialism “typically rests … on 
a public-private partnership focusing on investment and economic development with 
the construction of place driven by speculative initiatives rather than amelioration of 
conditions in a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) 
political and economic goal” (ibid.: 8; emphasis added). 
To be specific, first, entrepreneurialism changes the spatial strategy of urban 
governance from a territorial one that takes into account the improvement of residents’ 
living and working conditions in its jurisdiction to one that lays emphasis on place 
(ibid.: 7). Under entrepreneurialism, the place-making strategy focuses on enhancing 
the condition of a city and transforming it into an attractive locus for footloose capital 
rather than the good of the population in (ibid.; see also Brenner, 1999; Jonas and 
Wilson, 1999). City (or even neighbourhood) branding or place-marketing thus 
became a widely adopted strategy (Paddison, 1993; Short et al., 1993; Ward, 1998; 
Ward, 2000; Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005; Kavaratzis, 2007; Masuda and Bookman, 
2018). For one thing, urban governance will invest in physical and social infrastructure, 
and provide labour with the appropriate materials, etc. to create local advantages. In 
addition, substantial local fiscal resources can be used to subsidise large scale 
development. (Harvey, 1989a: 8) For another, urban governance is also committed to 
the “upgrading” of the consumption structure in its jurisdiction. Gentrification (Wyly 
and Hammel, 2001), beautifying urban areas by spectacles and other attractions (Acuto, 
2010), and boosting tourism (Page, 1995; Gillen, 2010; Su, 2015) are all in the toolkit. 
These strategies not only transform a city into “an innovative, exciting, creative, and 
safe place to live or to visit, to place and consume in” (Harvey, 1989a: 9), but also 
open new markets for speculative capital to make profits from (Jessop and Sum, 2000). 
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Second, in terms of the leading force of entrepreneurial practices, the local state 
is no longer the sole policymaking authority, but rather a constituent member of a 
partnership with other private participants, either local or external (Healey et al., 1992). 
A coalition between public and private agents to boost local economic growth has long 
existed, as revealed by the urban growth machine theory (Logan and Molotch, 1987; 
Molotch, 1976) and urban regime theory (Carley, 1991). Harvey regards the public-
private partnership (PPP) as the centrepiece of urban entrepreneurialism (1989a: 7). 
By participating in development, a local public sector could act as the risk bearer that 
exempts the private sector from difficulties and dangers (ibid.), thus strengthening a 
friendly atmosphere for capital accumulation. Hall and Hubbard (1996, 1998) coin the 
term “entrepreneurial city” to capture the cooperative mode of urban governance, 
characterised by the “proactive promotion of local economic development by local 
government in alliance with other private sector agencies” (Hall and Hubbard, 1998: 
4). 
 Third, entrepreneurialism is speculation-oriented (Harvey, 1989a; Hall and 
Hubbard, 1996) or profit-driven (Mazzucato, 2015). The speculative pursuit of profit 
inherent in entrepreneurialism is confirmed by Jessop and Sum (2000) in their 
discussion of the entrepreneurial city. According to these two writers (ibid.), the city 
has for centuries been the site where economic innovation is supported. What 
differentiates entrepreneurial cities from their predecessors is that the former serve 
capital accumulation rather than wealth creation. Like entrepreneurs that innovate to 
facilitate capital accumulation as suggested by Schumpeter, entrepreneurial cities use 
five fields of innovation to maintain or enhance their economic competitiveness, in the 
view of Jessop and Sum (2000: 2290). These include the production of new types of 
urban place or space (such as industrial parks) (see also Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Short 
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et al., 1993); new methods of space or place production (such as new cybernetic 
infrastructures); the opening of new markets and new sources of supply (such as 
funding from the EU and other non-nation state institutions); and redefining the urban 
hierarchy (or rescaling; see also Brenner, 1999). In addition, Jessop and Sum (2000) 
pay attention to the discursive dimension of entrepreneurialism. According to them, 
the entrepreneurialism espoused by entrepreneurial cities is not restricted to their 
strategies alone, but also to their discourses, narratives, and self-identity. Recently, 
some scholars (Beal and Pinson, 2014; Lauermann, 2018) have turned to investigating 
the diversified portfolios of entrepreneurial cities. Economic growth, or speculation, 
remains an important goal, but no longer the only one. Cities also conduct policy 
experiments (Lauermann, 2018) that are not necessarily associated with certain 
economic returns, but have the potential to export to other cities, thus widening their 
implications (McCann, 2013). Table 2-2 summarises some key features of the 
entrepreneurial mode of urban governance. 
Table 2-2 Key features of the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance 
l In response to increasing inter-city competition and the rise of neoliberalism 
l Place-making, city-branding and other innovative strategies to attract footloose 
capital. 
l Public-private partnership. The state acts as risk bearer, working in alliance 
with capital. 
l Speculative pursuit of profit. 
 
 
 
51 
The driving forces of the transformation 
A more critical issue for debate lies in the dynamics that led to the 
transformation from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. This transformation was a 
reaction to a series of changes that increased inter-city competition, both domestically 
and internationally (Harvey, 1989a; Jessop and Sum, 2000). As a result, the Keynesian 
welfare state that played a significant role in redistribution was regarded as 
“unproductive”, laying the foundation for neoliberalism to emerge (Brenner, 2004; 
Jessop, 2002; Harvey, 2005). 
According to Harvey(1989a), major industrial countries in the Western world 
witnessed in the 1970s the process of deindustrialisation, structural unemployment, 
and fiscal austerity at both central and local levels (see also Gaffikin and Warf, 1993). 
In terms of industry, the Western world also experienced a transition from Fordism to 
“flexible accumulation” (Harvey, 1987, 1989b; Schoenberger, 1988). With the 
annihilation of spatial barriers, capital becomes increasingly more footloose. The 
capacity of nation states to control capital flows sharply declines, replaced by a new 
mode of investment that obliges (international) capital to negotiate with (decentralised) 
local powers, with their special attractions (Harvey, 1989a; Short et al., 1993). In 
addition to these geo-economic factors, the change of geo-politics also intensifies this 
mode of international competition. As suggested by Jessop (1997), the termination of 
the Cold War redirected international competition from struggles between the capitalist 
camp and the communist bloc towards struggles in capitalist countries. Meanwhile, 
the means of competition also changed from military to civilian economic and 
technological measures. Globalisation, internationalisation, and the competitive threat 
posed by the rising economies in Asia have all contributed to fiercer international 
competition. 
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In general, as observed by Jessop (1997), the rise of the entrepreneurial mode 
of urban governance is driven by a set of intersecting economic, political, and socio-
cultural narratives that consolidate a series of “diagnoses and prescriptions for the 
economic and political difficulties now confronting nations, regions, and cities and 
their respective populations” (ibid.: 30) based on past failures and future possibilities. 
 
The rise of entrepreneurial governance in China 
In the Maoist era, despite the fact that the then regime of the Communist Party 
was far from being a democratice one and the Party State not having adopted a Western 
welfarist ideology, the operational logic of governance in China did bear some 
similarities to the managerial governance described above, which could be called 
‘socialist managerialism’. Under the central planning economy system, not only did 
the provision of social welfare hinge completely on redistribution by the state (Davis, 
1989), but the entire Chinese economy was considered a redistributive economy (cf. 
Naughton, 1996; for this concept, see Polanyi, 1957), which blurred the boundary 
between distribution and redistribution. In general, the overall social welfare system 
consisted of two tiers: the “upper deck” for urban residents and the “lower floor” for 
the peasantry (Wong, 2005: 3; see also Selden, 1988: 159-165). In particular, as noted 
above, workers and employees in the government and public sectors were the ones 
who benefited most from the state redistributive mechanism. They could obtain free 
or highly subsidised housing, education for their children, health care, labour insurance, 
etc. (Dixon, 1981; Whyte and Parish, 1984: Chapter 4; Davis, 1989) The peasants, 
although not fully covered by the welfare system, could still obtain food (grain), public 
education, clinics and relief for destitution (Dixon, 1982; Wong, 2005: 3). 
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Meanwhile, especially in the city, social redistribution was delivered through a 
sophisticated bureaucratic system, namely, the work unit (or danwei) system (Lu and 
Perry, 1995; Bray, 2005) through rational planning (Whyte and Parish, 1984: 100-101). 
Workers and employees in the public sector all served in a work unit. In return, all 
redistributive resources were allocated through the work unit that they belonged to. 
Workers had to rely on their work unit for most of the basic necessities of everyday 
life (Bray, 2005: 112). In this regard, the work unit was not only the workplace for 
Chinese urban residents in the pre-reform era, but constituted the foundation of urban 
China and thus became the locus of state power as it governed the day-to-day 
conditions of urban life (Bray, 2005; see also Walder, 1986,  as is shown earlier).  
In tandem with the overall economic reform in China from a central planned 
economy to a “socialist-market economy” and the implementation of the “open door” 
policy since 1978, the urban governance in China also changed dramatically (Croll, 
1999). On the one hand, the Chinese state no longer plays so significant a role in 
redistribution. A large share of the workers in state-owned enterprises, who once lived 
under the auspices of the socialist welfare system, has been laid off (Cai, 2006; Gold 
et al., 2009). The responsibility for providing social services such as housing (Wang 
and Murie, 2000; Man, 2010) has been transferred to the market. On the other hand, 
the state has turned to pursue more entrepreneurial strategies, as many scholars have 
thoroughly investigated (Wu, 2000, 2003; Duckett, 2001, 2006; Shin, 2009a, 2014b; 
Wu and Chien, 2011; Chien, 2013a; He et al., 2018). 
The entrepreneurial practices of the state, especially the local state, were 
encouraged by two factors. First, the strategising and commodification of business 
areas and urban services (Chien and Wu, 2011), especially land and housing, provided 
the local state with resources from which to generate economic profits (Duckett, 2001; 
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Zhu, 2004; He and Wu, 2009; Hsing, 2010). Second, with the reform of the taxation 
system in 1994, which aimed at fiscal recentralisation but left space for local autonomy 
(Zhang, 1999; Wu, 2002; Landry, 2008), the local state obtained more decision-making 
power and responsibility than it had had in the planned economy era to pursue the 
maximisation of economic growth, like any other entrepreneur subject to market forces 
(Zhu, 2004). To attract more free spending, local cadres are motivated to adopt the 
strategies of city branding and place marketing, such as developing various 
developmental zones and industrial parks (Cartier, 2010; Hsing, 2010), building 
university towns (Li et al., 2014) and eco-cities (Hoffman, 2011; Chien, 2013b), 
mobilising the historic heritage (Su, 2015), rescaling (Chien, 2013a; He et al., 2018), 
and so on. The changing behaviour of local cadres was also associated with the fact 
that their career was once closely associated with local economic performance (Li and 
Zhou, 2005; Chien and Woodsworth, 2018), and that they could at times make private 
profit from illegal activities (Duckett, 2006).In these ways, intercity competition has 
become increasingly intense. 
An important feature of the entrepreneurial change of urban governance in 
China is its intimate association with land (Shin, 2009a; Chien and Wu, 2011). In 1988, 
China formally established a market in land lease-holding. The state maintained its 
ownership of land in the cities, but land-use rights could be leased for a fixed period 
via state-authorised channels. The land reform had at its core the commodification of 
land (Hsing, 2010: 5; see also Lin, 2009; Lin and Zhang, 2015). Since then, land (or, 
more accurately, the land-use right) as a commodity has become a major source of 
extra-budgetary revenue for local governments (Hsing, 2006), in that local states 
(especially municipal and district governments as well as their affiliated institutions) 
who monopolise the power in land-use right transactions have become de facto 
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landlords (Shin, 2009a). Land finance, which indicates heavy reliance upon land-
leasing for local authority finance, has begun to take shape (Cao et al., 2008). 
Unlike what happens in the post-industrial cities of Western countries, where 
investment in the secondary circuit of capital, or real estate, is a kind of “spatial fix” 
when over-accumulation occurs in the primary circuit of capital, or industrial 
production (Harvey, 1978; Lefebvre, 2003), in China the process of industrialisation 
and urbanisation happen, as a rule, simultaneously and reinforce each other (Shin, 
2014a). According to Fulong Wu (2018), under the state-monopolised land system, 
land supply for industrial use is constrained at a very low price to ensure that it remains 
cheap. Meanwhile, the price of labour (mostly migrant workers from rural areas) is 
also kept at a low exploitative level, since they are excluded from social provision. The 
relatively cheap supply of land and labour was able to attract more (mostly overseas) 
investment in the primary circuit of industrial production (cf. Harvey, 1978). The 
model of the “world factory” thus constitutes the foundation for the entrepreneurialism 
in China (Wu, 2018: 1385). In addition, productive investment in the built environment 
(or fixed assets, such as high-speed railways, highways, airports and other items of 
infrastructure) both facilitated industrial production and generated an increase in GDP 
and therefore was used as a quick speculative route to economic growth (Shin, 2014a). 
In addition to this investment in the built environment, investment in 
commercial real estate property has also become lively. The real estate market was 
established in China by the end of the twentieth century after a series of reforms that 
brought the welfare housing system to an end (Wang and Murie, 1996; see also Chapter 
4). Finally, in 2004, the protection of private property was included in an amendment 
to China’s constitution (Hsing, 2010), followed in 2007 by the enactment of the 
property rights law. Unlike the cost of land parcels for industrial use, which has to be 
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kept low, the cost of leasing land parcels for residential and commercial use can be 
much higher (Cao et al, 2008; Wang and Murie, 2000; Shin, 2016b). Fuelled by the 
desire of Chinese people to find material comfort in the form of better private housing 
(Huang, 2003; Zhang, 2010), the real estate market in China has boomed dramatically 
(Glaeser et al., 2017). In the period 2003-2013, real estate prices in China’s leading 
cities grew by 13.1 per cent per year (Fang et al., 2015). Simultaneously, from 2004 to 
2015, land prices for residential and commercial use in 35 large cities increased nearly 
five-fold (Wu et al., 2015). Local states in China are now eager to seize more land, 
either by clearing urban land for redevelopment (He and Wu, 2005, 2009; Shin, 2009a), 
or converting rural land to urban for construction use (Hsing, 2010: Chapter 4). Land 
and real estate speculation has emerged as a significant characteristic of the 
entrepreneurialism in China, and even its rapid urbanisation can be called land-centred 
speculative urbanism (Li et al., 2014; Shin, 2014a, 2016). 
 
The difference between entrepreneurialism in China and that in Western 
countries 
Although there is much evidence that urban governance in China now bears 
entrepreneurial characteristics, scholars still emphasise that entrepreneurialism in 
China diverges critically from its Western counterpart, as outlined above (Chien and 
Wu, 2011). A critical element lies in the role played by the state. As noted above, 
Harvey regards the public-private partnership (PPP) as the centrepiece of urban 
entrepreneurialism (1989a: 7). With the transformation from managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism, the state is no longer the only policymaking authority, but has to 
work in coalition with other agents in the private market. In China, however, although 
the state in China still takes a direct part in market activities, it plays a dominant role 
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(Chien and Wu, 2011: 6; Huang, 2008), as may be partly revealed by the 
monopolisation of land discussed above. For this reason, Fulong Wu (2018) calls the 
entrepreneurialism in China “state entrepreneurialism”. According to Wu (2017, 2018), 
this is not a matter of the state integrating itself into the market mechanism, but rather 
the state selectively trying to internalise market tools in its repertoire. As Wu says, “the 
state apparatus, in particular the local state, demonstrates a greater interest in 
introducing, developing and deploying market instruments and engages in market-like 
entrepreneurial activities” (Wu, 2018: 1384; emphasis added). The maintenance of the 
state’s autonomy makes it capable of easily shifting its policy from market-friendly to 
market-regulating (Chien and Wu, 2011). Concepts like “local state corporatism” (Oi, 
1992, 1995), “local government as industrial firms” (Walder, 1995) and “urbanisation 
of the local state” (Hsing, 2010: 6) could all fit into the underlying logic of state 
entrepreneurialism. 
In addition to the dominant role persistently played by the state in market 
activities, especially in relation to land and real estate, some new tendencies in urban 
governance in China may further highlight the distinctiveness of entrepreneurialism in 
the Chinese context. With the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008, the model 
of the “world factory” was hard to maintain, but boosting domestic consumption 
instead became the engine for economic growth. The state has had to roll out social 
policies and take greater responsibility for the provision of social security and 
redistribution (Wu, 2017), such as affordable housing (Huang, 2012; Chen et al., 2014). 
This view may even make us wonder whether it marks the return of Keynesian 
principles (Liew, 2006; Wu, 2010, 2017), or the persistence of managerialism. 
Although urban governance in China bears some entrepreneurial features, it 
may not fit into the orthodox opinion that the transformation goes hand-in-hand with 
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the rise of neoliberalism (Laurenmann, 2018; Sbragia, 1996). In his profound work, 
David Harvey (2005) lists China’s experience since the economic reform as an 
example of the rise of neoliberalism. Although some researchers are inclined to accept 
Harvey’s proposition to describe China’s market transition as on a course leading to 
neoliberalisation (Ong, 2006; Zhang and Ong, 2008; He and Wu, 2009), they may also 
hesitate to do so because the co-existence of neoliberal economic policies with state 
authoritarianism clouds any certainty of neoliberal change (Liew, 2006; Ong, 2007: 4) 
This is in line with some global experiences that economic liberalism does not always 
to coincide with political liberalism (Künkel and Mayer, 2012; Eraydin and Taşan-Kok, 
2014). Other writers reject the idea that China is on an approach towards neoliberalism 
(Nonini, 2006); they believe that the authoritarian regime is maintained, and, what is 
more, the state does not retreat from market activities (Wu, 2017).  
Against this backdrop, especially the maintenance of a strong party state and 
some redistributive measures adopted by the state (such as the provision of affordable 
housing), it is necessary to reconsider the relationship between managerialism and 
entrepreneurialism. It may not be appropriate to regard welfare measures and 
entrepreneurialism or neoliberalism as mutually exclusive; rather they may converge 
with each other. As informed by the instrumental dimension of the redistributive 
measures, the state guided by entrepreneurial ideas could appropriate redistributive 
mechanisms to serve its demand on economic growth and capital accumulation.  In the 
next section, I will seek to define the idea of entrepreneurial managerialism. 
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2.4 Defining entrepreneurial managerialism 
In previous sections, by investigating the instrumental dimension of 
redistribution, I suggested the potential convergence of managerialism and 
entrepreneurialism. On the one hand, redistributive measures could be used to serve 
the goal of boosting economic growth and accumulation by stimulating domestic 
consumption. On the other, by promoting social integration or generating patron-client 
relationships in the process of allocating redistributive resources, redistribution could 
facilitate social control to better serve the purposes of accumulation. 
In practice, we can see many cases of redistribution playing a role when the 
entrepreneurial mode of urban governance prevails. In addition to the above cases of 
welfare provision under neoliberalism, according to Harvey (1989a), the redistributive 
mechanism does not cease to be fully functional, but rather maintains its importance 
in a narrower range. Either in Britain or in the United States, some cities still depend 
for their survival on military and defence contracts provided by the central or state 
governments, thus the competition for redistribution does not decline (ibid., 10). In the 
UK, when the New Labour government was elected in 1997, some efforts to “reinvent” 
the welfare state with managerial characteristics could also be recognised (Clarke et 
al., 2000). 
In the Chinese context, the convergence could be even more explicit, especially 
given the direct involvement of the state in entrepreneurial activities. For example, in 
his earlier observation on the entrepreneurial change in Shanghai, Fulong Wu (2003) 
notices that this change is buttressed by the close cooperation of the central state with 
the local (municipal) government. To procure an advantageous position in 
international competition is not only the goal of the municipal government, but also of 
the Chinese central state. Therefore, the central government devised a new fiscal 
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arrangement to deliver more resources to Shanghai. In this regard, the rise of 
entrepreneurialism in Shanghai is a sort of “redistribution of regulatory capacities in 
the state apparatus itself than building consensus at the societal level” (Wu, 2003: 
1685). In another case, Shin (2009) does not find that the affordable housing 
programme in China (in Beijing, particularly), which was designed to provide low- 
and middle-income households with better living conditions that they could afford, 
suggests less entrepreneurial zeal in the local government. On the contrary, in coalition 
with private developers (PPP), the local government strategically appropriated the 
redistributive measures to fulfil its urban renewal purposes. The persistence of 
redistributive measures even generates doubt whether the entrepreneurialism in China 
could be regarded as “true” in any sense. Based on the case of Guangzhou, Xu and Yeh 
(2005) argue that allowing the remains of “soft-budget constraints”, namely, any 
investment risk, to be transferred to the central state, thus exempting the local 
government from going bankrupt, allows renders local government to pursue 
development goals recklessly without a prudent calculation of cost and revenue such 
as a real “entrepreneur” would always make. 
Following this argument, rather than regarding managerialism and 
entrepreneurialism as exclusive of each other, or reading the change of urban 
governance as a sharp shift from one mode to another, I contend that it is better to 
regard managerialism and entrepreneurialism in a dialectical way and pose them on 
the two ends of the same spectrum of urban governance. An existing mode of urban 
governance may bear the features of entrepreneurialism and managerialism 
simultaneously (Shin, 2016a). Regarding the redistributive measures in China to cope 
with the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, such as the provision of affordable housing 
(Huang, 2012; Wang et al., 2014), I do not deem them a “return” of Keynesian 
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principles (Wu, 2013, 2017), but would rather term this mode of urban governance 
“entrepreneurial managerialism”. First, these redistributive measures may serve the 
purpose of capital accumulation and economic growth, which is in line with 
entrepreneurial practice. Meanwhile, the bureaucratic organisation in charge of 
redistribution can take full advantage of its discretion in the allocation of redistributive 
resources to satisfy entrepreneurial demand. In this thesis, by exploring the experience 
of the redevelopment of a penghuqu neighbourhood, I want to demonstrate the 
operation of entrepreneurial managerialism. 
 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, I first explored the instrumental dimension of redistribution. 
Although redistribution in capitalist societies may contribute to a more equal 
distribution and some degrees of social justice, it still serves the underlying purpose of 
capital accumulation, and, further, the survival of capitalism (Lefebvre, 1976). In 
addition, as suggested by the experience of (former) socialist states, redistribution may 
also be employed in an instrumental way, such as creating a mode of inter-personal 
dependence, or clientelism, which is made possible by the discretion of the bureaucrats 
who are in charge of redistribution. Then I reviewed in turn the managerial mode and 
entrepreneurial mode of urban governance and the dynamics of the transformation 
from managerialism to entrepreneurialism. Based on the instrumental dimension of 
redistribution, the managerial mode of urban governance can engage with 
entrepreneurialism. I defined the instrumental use of managerial strategy with the 
underlying intention of serving entrepreneurial purposes as “entrepreneurial 
managerialism”, which is elaborated below in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Before moving to 
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empirical discussions, I first outline the methodology of this thesis in Chapter 3, and 
provide some background information in Chapter 4. 
 
 
63 
Chapter 3 Research Method: Doing research in a Third Front city 
 
3.1 Brief introduction to the process of the fieldwork 
This thesis is based on my ethnographic fieldwork between 2015 and 2017, 
conducted in my home city, Luzhou, in Sichuan Province. From July to September, 
2015, I conducted two months of preliminary fieldwork, in preparation for the main 
fieldwork that lasted seven months from June to December, 2016. In August and 
September, 2017, I revisited the same site for some follow-up observations and 
interviews. The primary methods were qualitative, including interviews with both 
individuals and groups, participant observation and the archival research. 
As noted by Kevin O’Brien (2006: 27), doing interviews has become the 
fundamental method used by many researchers conducting fieldwork in China. For 
this research, I interviewed two groups of interviewees: local officials and local 
residents. I conducted four interviews with local officials at the municipal level, who 
are in charge of the redevelopment of Qiancao in general, and the sub-district level 
who are in charge of the practical expropriation of housing. I obtained from them a 
number of documents, both printed ones and electronic ones regarding the 
redevelopment project studied in this thesis. I also managed to interview an expert on 
local history (a visiting professor of history from Southwest University) with regard to 
the local practices of the Third Front Construction; and a cadre from Changqi, who 
told me the role played by the factory in expropriating housing and the industrial 
heritage project. 
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Regarding residents, I interviewed 70 of them in 42 interviews (see Table 3-1). 
Some interviewees were interviewed twice in different years to update their accounts. 
These interviews were all semi-structured ones, which lasted from half an hour to five 
hours. In the preliminary fieldwork, my interviews were more open, leaving more 
space for interviewees to tell their stories in their own words, whereas in the main 
fieldwork period, my interviews were more structured, based on the background of the 
interviewee. I raised different questions with different types of resident. When I re-
interviewed someone, I asked more personalised questions. With the permission of the 
interviewees, I audio-recorded some interviews. In other interviews, I took notes using 
keywords and wrote up the interview contents soon after each interview. 
In my participant observation, I regularly visited several neighbourhoods in the 
field site to figure out the constitution of the different types of housing. This also 
helped me formulate a plan for structuring the interviews. During these visits, I was 
able to trace the progress of the demolition and I used my cell phone to record my 
ideas and reflections at the time. After each visit, I transcribed these recordings as field 
notes. In addition, I took more than 1,000 photos, illustrating the various buildings in 
different conditions (e.g., before, during and after demolition) and the government 
documents posted in the neighbourhoods. The photos I took were sometimes used as 
visual data for this thesis or as guidance in writing field notes. Besides, these visits 
served as opportunities to encounter potential respondents. 
For archival and documented records, I collected data from two major sources, 
partly to provide background knowledge of the Third Front Construction and the 
trajectory of urban development in Luzhou. I went to Luzhou Library and Sichuan 
Library in Chengdu to collect information from statistical yearbooks, urban 
development yearbooks, local chronicles and monographs on the Third Front 
 
 
65 
Construction. The other source was government documents and new reports regarding 
the redevelopment of penghuqu. The government documents from departments of the 
central and provincial governments were collected from the Internet. The documents 
issued by the municipal government also came from the Internet, or else directly in my 
field interviews from local officials and local residents who had received brochures 
describing a detailed scheme for compensation as mentioned above. The results from 
the document collection are mainly presented in Chapter 4. 
In the remaining part of this chapter, I discuss the selection of the field site, and 
reflect upon difficulties I encountered while conducting field research. I believe these 
difficulties are not only critical for my research, but could also shed light on the major 
concern of this thesis. The final section describes my analysis of the collected data. 
 
3.2 The rationale of choosing the field site: the optic of ordinary cities approach 
To choose my home city as the field site was to a lesser degree motivated by 
the pragmatic consideration that my local knowledge and personal connections with 
potential respondents could facilitate my research. More importantly, it was due to the 
distinctiveness of Luzhou, particularly the redevelopment of Qiancao in Luzhou as the 
largest individual project of penghuqu redevelopment throughout Sichuan Province3 
(Sichuan Daily, 2016), which made it a suitable site in which to investigate the 
implementation of penghuqu redevelopment. 
In China, a “city” (shi 市; sometimes also translated as ‘municipality’) always 
encompasses built areas and rural areas. There are three levels of city: (1) provincial 
                                                      
3 In some cases, penghuqu redevelopment projects in several neighbourhoods could be combined in a larger project. 
The term “individual project of penghuqu” redevelopment refers to a project in one (extended) neighbourhood. 
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level city, or municipality, administrated directly under the central government (zhixia 
shi 直辖市) (there are four of these: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing); (2) 
prefectural-level city (diji shi 地级市), administrated by the province; (3) county-level 
city (xianji shi 县级市), administrated by the province or a prefectural-level city. 
Provincial level city and prefectural-level city are further divided into districts (qu 区; 
usually the city centre) and counties (xian 县) (see Chien, 2013a). Luzhou city or 
municipality contains 3 districts and 4 counties. My field site was located in Jiangyang 
District, the city centre of Luzhou. As a prefectural-level city in Sichuan Province, 
Luzhou has a population of 1.52 million within its urban area4 and a total population 
of 4.31 million in its municipal region (LMG, 2018). 
According to the most recent criterion set by the State Council to classify cities 
in terms of population within the urban area, Luzhou can be categorised as a “big city”5. 
However, although a “big city” in terms of its scale, Luzhou has hitherto been a city 
“off the map” (Robinson, 2002) of urban studies. It has been classified as a third- or 
fourth-tier city (sanxian/sixian chengshi 三线/四线城市) by an influential Chinese 
business journal6 , in some sense indicating the limited role it plays in the national 
                                                      
4 The “urban area” (chengqu 城区) here refers to all built-up areas (jiancheng qu 建成区) adjacent to the city centre 
within the administrative area of this city, but does not include those built-up areas isolated from the city centre 
(such as individual towns or the centre of a county under this city). The population of the urban area is used as the 
scale for measuring the size of a city in China. 
5 According to the criteria formulated by the central government in China, a city with a population in its urban area 
of more than 10 million is a super-megacity (chaoda chengshi 超⼤城市; such as Beijing and Shanghai); between 5 
million and 10 million is a megacity (teda chengshi 特⼤城市; such as Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan Province); 
between 1 and 5 million is a big city (da chengshi ⼤城市); between 0.5 to 1 million is a medium-sized city 
(zhongdeng chengshi 中等城市); under 0.5 million is a small city (xiao chengshi ⼩城市) (State Council, 2014). The 
city of Luzhou (or Luzhou Municipality) is made up of three urban districts and four counties. The population of 
the municipal region refers to all the residents (either urban or rural) within Luzhou Municipality, a total of 4.31 
million. Under the redistributive system in China, the more population a city has in its urban area, the more 
resources it may receive. For example, according to a very recent document issued by the central government 
(General Office of the State Council, 2018), only cities with a population of more than 3 million in its urban area 
are allowed to construct a metro system. 
6 This journal is called China Business Network Weekly (diyi caijing zhoukan 第⼀财经周刊), based in Shanghai. In 
2013, it started to rank Chinese cities using a series of criteria in relation to commercial activities (Yicai, 2013). It 
set up six levels: first-tier city, new first-tier city, second-tier city, third-tier city, fourth-tier city, and fifth-tier city. 
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economy. Moreover, the insignificance of this city, in the broader sense, may even 
explain why some of my respondents doubted the value of my research. Being 
influenced by the prevailing discourse setting the urban hierarchy, it is difficult for 
some of them to comprehend that their experience within their own neighbourhood 
deserves academic attention from a student affiliated to a foreign institution; hence 
they suspected that I had some underlying intention (see the next section). 
Undoubtedly, even “small cities” may also serve as the basis for theorisation 
(Bell and Jayne, 2006, 2009; for cases in China, see He et al., 2018). As suggested by 
Bell and Jayne (2009), it may be misleading to focus only on selected “big cities” in 
the Global North that are leading the trend of globalisation whilst ignoring “small cities” 
as theoretically irrelevant. According to these authors, “small cities” (even though the 
small-ness can be defined in different ways) are not “would-be cities” or “not [yet] 
cities” that lack city-ness. On the contrary, they are significant mediators “between the 
rural and the urban, the centre and the suburb as well as between the local and the 
global” (ibid.: 691). Furthermore, with an in-depth investigation of the complex 
network of economic and social relations within small cities, it is possible to 
understand the “real urban economy” (ibid.). 
Jennifer Robinson’s proposition is even more radical. Rather than differentiate 
cities as big and small, or according to any other hierarchy based on limited criteria 
                                                      
This ranking was also conducted in 2016, 2017, and 2018. In recent years, “first-tier city” and “new first-tier city” 
become disputed terms (see Yicai, 2016). In all these four rankings, the first-tier cities have been Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. In 2013, Luzhou was classified as a fourth-tier city (with another 75 cities; see Yicai, 
2013), in 2016 as a third-tier city (with another 69 cities; see Ifeng, 2016), and as a fourth-tier city in both 2017 
(with another 89 cities; see Yicai, 2017) and 2018 (with another 89 cities; see Ifeng, 2018). By coincidence, the 
term this journal uses (the third-tier city; sanxian chengshi) is the same as cities within the Third Front (sanxian 
chengshi 三线城市), which are discussed in the next chapter. In my interview with the official from the planning 
bureau, I used the term “erji chengshi” (⼆级城市 second tier city) to classify Luzhou – it actually refers to a 
prefectural-level city (one at the second level of cities under provincial level). The official identified this with 
“second tier city” (erxian chengshi) and sneered at me, which may indicate how influential this ranking system is. 
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that ascribe prominence to certain features of cities, such as the tiered hierarchy 
mentioned above, Robinson proposes to understand all cities as “ordinary cities” (2006, 
2008; see also Amin and Graham, 1997). In general, the ordinary cities approach takes 
the step of  regarding cities as “constituted through multiple and overlapping networks 
of varying spatial reach and as composed of a diversity of economic, social and 
political relations” (Robinson, 2008: 75). In this way, cities can be comprehended as 
internally differentiated distinctive entities with complex and diverse lives (Robinson, 
2006: 109). The ordinary cities approach can in particular be more constructive for 
research into inclusive and redistributive urban policies, which are normally 
implemented at the level of the city, in that this approach focuses more on the city per 
se to frame urban policies and no longer prioritises the study of globalising networks, 
as the world cities approach used to do (Robinson, 2008).  
These debates may in some sense justify my selection of the field site. They 
point up the key issue in this research as the need to focus on the complexity of the 
city per se, reading it as the node of multiple factors, including the Third Front 
Construction and the later experiences of Third Front migrants, the nationwide project 
of penghuqu redevelopment, the entrepreneurial motivation of the local state and the 
remains of the socialist legacy. 
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3.3 Overview of the field site 
 
Figure 3-1 Satellite Map of Qiancao 
Source: Illustrated by the author with ArcMap. Base map source: Esri, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, 
Earthstar Geographics, CNES/Airbus DS, USDA, USGS, AeroGRID, IGN, and the GIS Community. 
(taken in 2010) 
 
My fieldwork was conducted on Qiancao Peninsula. In terms of the 
administrative system, Qiancao is a sub-district (jiedao 街道) of Jiangyang District of 
Luzhou. In the course of housing and land expropriation, the Qiancao Sub-district 
Office (jiedao banshichu 街道办事处), the de facto government at this administrative 
level, had been transformed into the operating headquarter for the task of housing and 
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land expropriation. It was thus necessary to interview local officials at both the 
municipal level and the sub-district level. Before the redevelopment, Qiancao Sub-
district encompassed three residential communities (shequ 社 区) and seven rural 
villages. The three communities were roughly organised around three large-scale 
factories established during the Third Front Construction: Changqi (⻓起; short for 
Changjiang Qizhongji Chang ⻓江起重机⼚, The Changjiang River Crane Factory), 
Changwa (⻓挖; short for Changjiang Wajueji Chang ⻓江挖掘机⼚, The Changjiang 
River Excavator Factory), Changye (⻓液; short for Changjiang Yeyajian Chang ⻓江
液压件⼚, The Changjiang River Hydraulic Components Factory). According to the 
official statistics, 11,039 households of urban residents had been living in these three 
communities, comprising a population of nearly 30,000, of which the majority were 
the employees or former employees of the three factories and their family members. 
In addition, the seven rural villages contained 1,397 households and 5,209 persons 
(QSO, 2014a). 
 
3.4 “Doing it right”: gaining access to local officials 
As noted in the introduction of this chapter, an important component of my 
interviewees was local officials. Because I came from this city and had a few personal 
connections (or in O’Brien’s words, “idiosyncratic channels”) (2006: 27), it was not 
especially hard for me to make contact with local officials (for the importance of such 
connections for researchers, for example, see Hansen, 2006: 88; Solinger, 2006: 156-
158), except for two types of difficulties, both linked to what may be called the issue 
of “doing it right”. 
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First, it was not always easy to find the “right” person to interview, the one 
who was in charge of the specific project I was focusing on; indeed it was sometimes 
difficult to know exactly which local government department this person served in. In 
my case, the Municipal Bureau of Housing and Urban-rural Planning and Construction 
(zhufang yu chengxiang guihua jianshe ju 住房与城乡规划建设局; normally known as 
Zhujianju 住建局 or Guijianju 规建局) was known to take on the main responsibility 
for planning the redevelopment project in Qiancao. This was what some local news 
reports delivered regarding redevelopment projects. But I still could not tell which 
specific office of this bureau was in charge. I tried to find out from someone I knew 
who worked in the Zhujianju which office I should target and whether she could 
introduce me to its staff. However, at the beginning of 2015, before I started my 
preliminary fieldwork, Luzhou Municipal Government had had a major sectoral 
reshuffle. The previous Zhujianju had been divided into two new bureaux, the Bureau 
of Housing and Urban-Rural Construction (zhufang yu chengxiang jianshe ju 住房与
城 乡 建 设 局; still known as Zhujianju) and the Bureau of Urban-Rural Planning 
Management (chengxiang guihua guanli ju 城乡规划管理局; known as Guihuaju 规划
局). The person whom I contacted now served in the new Zhujianju and the Guihuaju 
was no longer part of her department but had moved somewhere else. Fortunately, she 
helped me to contact a local journalist who had interviewed me once before and still 
remembered me. The husband of this journalist was a close friend of the director of 
the new Guihuaju. With the journalist’s help, the director introduced me to the Office 
of General Planning (zonggui ban 总规办), where I was able to arrange an interview 
with the official in charge of the general planning of the redevelopment in Qiancao. 
When I tried to find out more about the industrial heritage site as part of the 
redevelopment project I encountered a similar situation. In summary, I discovered 
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from the public reports that the Municipal Bureau of Culture (Wenhuaju ⽂化局)7 was 
in charge of this project, so I sought the help of someone I knew who worked there. It 
was surprising to find that the Bureau of Cultural Relics (Wenwu ju ⽂物局; a bureau 
affiliated to Wenhuaju) had been put in charge of the initial phase of the industrial 
heritage project. My informant introduced me to the director of Wenwuju and then I 
managed to arrange an interview with the deputy-director, Mr Chen, an expert in 
ancient tombs, stone carvings bridges and similar items of historical heritage, who was 
temporarily in charge of the industrial heritage project awaiting the establishment of a 
special state-sponsored investment company to run this project. 
This process of finding the “right” person to interview may suggest something 
of the operational logic of local government in China, which is further discussed in 
Chapter 5. But my experience may entail some risk. In both cases, because I was 
introduced to the “right” person by the director of the bureau in question, it is hard to 
tell whether s/he might have been somewhat less than frank when talking with me. To 
cope with this situation, I tried to cross-check their narratives by referring to other local 
reports and the narratives of other respondents, especially local residents. 
Second, it was also necessary to ask the “right” questions when conducting an 
interview with local officials (see for example, Thunø, 2006). Local officials have their 
own concerns, probably not the same as those of researchers. For example, in the 
prologue of The Great Urban Transformation, You-tien Hsing (2010: 1) speaks of her 
frustration when interviewing local government officials. When she wanted to ask 
questions about the upgrading of technology programs, local officials always felt dull 
                                                      
7 The full official name of this bureau is the Municipal Bureau of Culture, Sport, News, Publication, Radio, and 
Television (wenhua tiyu xinwen chuban guangdian ju ⽂化体育新闻出版⼲电局). 
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and changed the subject of their conversation to such topics as industrial parks or the 
new town centres. 
In my case, since demolition and resettlement (chaiqian 拆迁) were always 
sensitive topics for local officials in China, potentially involving the use of coercive 
actions of some kind, which sometimes may even involve misconduct or corruption 
on their part (cf. Shao, 2013), local officials were generally reluctant to be interviewed 
on demolition-related topics. Therefore, when seeking access to local officials, I 
emphasised the industrial heritage project, with the demolition of residential buildings 
and the resettlement of residents admittedly as essential components. By doing so, I 
was able to get permission to interview them, especially the sub-district officials who 
interacted directly with local residents. One instance shows that this concern of mine 
was reasonable. The day after I had interviewed a sub-district official, I went to the 
First Village of Changwa, which stood next to the office building of Qiancao Sub-
district, for an interview with a resident. On my way back, around 7 p.m., I saw the 
same official again in his car. As soon as he saw me, he stopped the car, got out and 
asked me where I was going. He demanded that I should inform him before every 
interview I held and wanted to send someone each time to accompany me. This 
requirement had never been strictly applied, but it still suggests the sub-district 
officials were concerned about any possibility that I might cause trouble (such as by 
agitating local residents), or that these people might tell me something that the officials 
did not want me to know. 
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3.5 Interviewing local residents 
In line with the topic of my thesis, the local residents I interviewed were mainly 
urban residents. As noted above, Qiancao Peninsula has three residential communities 
(see Picture 3-1). Since the composition of residents varies in the three communities 
(see Chapter 4) and the housing expropriation had been conducted separately in each, 
I decided to recruit respondents from these three factories separately. 
In general, there are four different types of resident on Qiancao Peninsula: first, 
urban residents who own the property right of their dwellings. Their dwellings are 
either fanggaifang (房改房)8 or commodity housing built after the housing reform and 
nowadays they are all items of private properties that can be transacted on the market. 
The second type is urban residents who rent the public housing owned by the state. 
Their dwellings are called feichengtaofang (⾮成套房)9 . Most of this type and the 
previous one used to be or are still employees of the three factories, who had 
experience of living under the socialist redistributive system. In addition, the third type 
of resident was the land-occupying worker, who had lived there before the arrival of 
migrants during the Third Front Construction, when the greater part of Qiancao 
Peninsula was covered by farmland. As the factories expanded, so the farmland was 
converted to industrial or residential use. As compensation, some peasants who lost 
land were recruited by the factories, becoming “land-occupying workers” (zhandi 
gong 占地⼯). They are factory workers, but before the redevelopment, they still, like 
other peasants, owned the rural homes in which they lived. The fourth type of resident 
was the peasants who lived by subsistence farming. I interviewed the first three types 
                                                      
8 Literally, fanggaifang refers to flats privatised in the housing reform. Prior to the housing reform occurred by the 
end of the 1990s, this category of flats were owned by the state-owned enterprise on behalf of the state. They had 
been sold to their occupants in the housing reform at highly subsidised price later (Wang and Murie, 1996). These 
flats were mostly chengtaofang (or complete set of flats). I will explain this notion further in Chapter 4. 
9 Literally, feichengtaofang refers to incomplete set of flats. Unlike chengtaofang (成套房), this category of flats did 
not have independent kitchen, bathroom and balcony inside. I will explain this concept in detail in Chapter 4. 
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of resident, but merged the third type (one interview with three respondents) with the 
first type because they were both considered residents of chengtaofang and their 
schemes of compensation were similar. The number of interviews I conducted with 
each type of resident is shown in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1 Number of interviews in each category 
 chengtaofang feichengtaofang 
Changqi 9 | 16 4 | 11 
Changwa 13 | 17 5 | 9 
Changye 3 | 4 4 | 9 
Others 3 | 3 1 | 1 
Total 28 | 40 14 | 30 
Source: compiled by the author. Notes: In each cell of this table, the first number before the 
vertical bar indicates the number of interviews I conducted in each category. The second number is the 
total number of interviewees covered. Some interviewees were conducted with multiple interviewees. 
 
The Strategy of recruiting respondents 
As noted above, I could not rely on local officials to facilitate my research 
among the residents. Moreover, unlike other researchers, no local NGOs or research 
institutes were already active on this site for me to work with. I had to pursue it all by 
myself. I used two major methods to recruit respondents from the local residents. First, 
I employed a snowball sampling strategy, relying on my friends, former classmates, 
neighbours and my parents’ acquaintances living in Qiancao or working in the three 
factories. They could either be interviewed themselves or introduce somebody they 
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thought might be informative. Residents contacted in this way became an important 
element among my interviewees. 
The second recruitment strategy was “encounter”, which is a widely used 
approach in qualitative geography (Herbert, 2010). I first used the Internet to 
“encounter” potential respondents. I joined an online chat group formed by Qiancao 
residents, which had once been a major platform for local residents to exchange 
information and ideas. After observing for a while, I found several people who fairly 
actively expressing their opinions in this online chat group. I tried to contact them and 
got two positive responses. Mr Tian (see Chapters 6 and 7) was one of the interviewees 
I established contact with in this way.  
Concurrently, I paid frequent visits to neighbourhoods in Qiancao looking for 
physically encountering potential respondents. These neighbourhoods were not gated 
and anyone could have visited them. I did so to make sure that I would have some 
respondents for each of the categories shown in Table 3-1 to ensure triangulation. I 
frequently visited Qiancao carrying a SLR digital camera in order to take photos of 
buildings and let myself be seen by local residents. After some visits, I calculated, local 
residents would notice me and be curious who I was and what I was doing. Then, I 
could chat with them and find a chance to ask for an interview. For example, during 
the preliminary fieldwork, just before my arrival in the First Village of Changqi on the 
morning of 14 September 2015, an enforced demolition work was in progress. I met a 
resident of the First Village who still seemed taken aback after having witnessed the 
mighty use of the state power. Without any detailed knowledge of my purpose there, 
this woman invited me into her house and called in some of her neighbours to chat 
with me. This became an ad hoc group interview. She lived in a feichengtaofang flat. 
She and her neighbours lived in “nail-households”, having held out against compulsory 
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resettlement. Being awoken by the enforced demolition, they had much to complain 
about. This group interview lasted for more than five hours. By chance, one of the 
respondents in this group said that he had often seen me in this neighbourhood with 
my camera, thus endorsing my statement that the purpose of the interview was 
academic research. I noted down the contact details of some of these residents and held 
a second interview with them to update what I knew of their experiences. 
But, much to my surprise, the encounter approach that I was using generated a 
kind of anxiety among other residents. In the course of my fieldwork, I saw others 
taking photos, especially when demolition was taking place, or in the workshops as a 
record of local history. A local resident, whom I had a successful interview with later, 
questioned the purpose of my photography. After hearing my explanation, he did not 
ask me to stop but explained that the Sub-district Office had recently sent someone to 
take photos of their buildings, which the residents interpreted as a signal that the Sub-
district Office would accelerate the pace of expropriation and had complained about 
to the Sub-district Office. I realised it was highly likely that I was the person being 
complained about, because at that period, I always wandered around these 
neighbourhoods and took photos, but did not encounter anybody else doing the same 
as me. They had misunderstood what I was doing, but nobody had come to stop me, 
indicating how apprehensive these residents were and how tense was the relationship 
between the local state and local residents. 
 
The issue of insider/outsider 
Doing research in one’s home territory (either the home country or the home 
city) is not necessarily the exciting experience described by Ite (1997). For one thing, 
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the issue of positionality, which has long been a critical concern to field researchers in 
geography (Cupples and Kindson, 2003; Rose, 1997) is more keenly felt for a 
“returning-home” researcher. The researcher may not face some kind of antagonism 
between “insider” and “outsider” (Giwa, 2015; Rubin, 2012), but a “returning-home” 
researcher will inevitably bear two identities at once, or embodying a kind of “in-
betweenness” (Rubin, 2012; Till, 2001; Yawei Zhao, 2017). 
This situation is the one I was in. On the one hand, I was an insider. As shown 
in previous sections, my identity as a native of Luzhou helped me considerably when 
I was trying to find interviewees, either local officials or residents, by navigating 
within my personal network. Those who knew me in person would be clear about my 
background (as a local person) and my intention (working on my PhD thesis) and it 
would not be difficult to interview them. 
But on the other hand, I was an outsider. The identity of “outsider” itself is dual, 
an outsider in their neighbourhood and an outsider in the country (being affiliated to 
the LSE, a foreign university). Those residents who did not know me, especially those 
I came across, found it difficult to fully trust me and to understand the purpose of my 
research as an outsider in their neighbourhood, although they agreed to be interviewed. 
Moreover, even when I told them I was a student, some residents did not believe me. 
A common suspicion was that I might be a journalist. But as the press in China is under 
strict censorship of the Communist Party, the residents believed that a journalist would 
hardly be able to make their voices heard and therefore chatting with me would be 
pointless. In one case, a respondent even tried to persuade me to stop interviewing 
because picking up rubbish for recycling might earn me more money than this useless 
work would. To some degree, I was irritated by his words, but soon realised this 
reaction revealed how desperate these residents were. 
 
 
79 
However, their suspicions about my identity were not all negative. Some of 
them regarded me as the secretary of a high official, or as a member of an inspection 
group (xunshi zu 巡视组) who had been sent incognito to collect public information 
that might help alleviate their hardships; thus they were happy to be interviewed by 
me. In one case, hearing that I promised anonymity in using the information collected 
in the interviews, a respondent even asked if I could include his real name to better 
publicise his case. The suspicion that I was a member of the inspection group casts a 
somewhat bitter light on a very interesting story. 
Sending inspection groups to the lower level of party branches has been an 
important measure in the Communist Party’s nationwide anti-corruption movement 
since 2012 (cf. Yeo, 2016). The primary task of inspection groups is to collect 
information, including reports on the public, in relation to corruption or misconduct 
on the part of the leading local party cadres. According to one respondent who 
suspected me to be a member of an inspection group, he happened to see a television 
news item that the provincial party branch had sent an inspection group to Luzhou 
early in 2015. This group published its contact address and said that any report was 
welcome. The residents suffering home ownership issues saw this as a chance to get 
this persistent problem solved (see Chapter 7). Therefore, they made an appointment 
to meet the inspection group on a Monday, but got no confirmation until the following 
Thursday that the group would meet them the next day. On Friday, they duly sent some 
representatives with supporting documents to meet the inspection group. Much to their 
disappointment, the reception staff would not let them finish their statement, refused 
to take their documents and asked them to submit their case to the municipal 
government. Moreover, the staff even recommended them to compromise, take the 
compensation package and move to resettlement flats. 
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Such a lukewarm response irritated the residents. They did not leave the venue 
straightaway but spoke to other people who had also sought to report their cases to the 
inspection group. The second set of residents’ representatives had been told that there 
were two inspection groups, the real one sent by the provincial party committee, while 
another, a “counterfeit” organised by the municipal party committee to baffle people. 
For the first set of residents, the group they had met, which had adopted the arguments 
of the local government, was beyond question the “fake” one. 
There is some possibility that these residents did indeed meet a “counterfeit” 
inspection group, which may hint at an unusually sophisticated mode of local 
governance. But it is also possible that the inspection group they met was “authentic”. 
However, on the surface at least, what the group wanted to collect was clues suggesting 
the misconduct or corruption of local cadres, putting these residents’ specific appeal in 
relation to their housing outside its terms of reference. It is therefore understandable 
that the inspection group did not take serious account of the residents’ appeal. But the 
residents were inclined to accept the first possibility and believe that they had met the 
“counterfeit”. The “authentic” inspection group, wherever it was, could still, they 
believed, lend a hand in solving their problems. It was not so much that they suspected 
that I had concealed my identity as that they hoped I had done so. They wished me to 
be the kind of person who could help them (also see Liu, 2000: 19; Svensson, 2006: 
268-270), indicating how they were still relying on the managerial state. Although I 
had very often clarified that I was simply a doctoral student and I could do hardly 
anything to produce an instant effect on their situation, they still asked me to “make 
them heard”. 
My identity as a kind of outsider of this country brought me up against more 
barriers. In an extreme case, a respondent suspected that I was a spy. In another case, 
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a potential respondent turned down my request for an interview. Although I was 
introduced to him by his colleague, who knew me personally, he still believed that it 
was inappropriate to expose the misconduct of local officials to people with links 
abroad; it was too much like “washing your dirty linen in public” (jiachou buke 
waiyang 家 丑 不 可 外 扬). Others who accepted my interview were still not quite 
confident about whether it was “appropriate” to talk about these issues with me; hence 
they asked me to write impersonally and maintain anonymity. In addition to a general 
sense of obedience under the authoritarian regime, the residents’ cautiousness also had 
something to do with the background of the enterprise they served in, which was 
established during the Third Front Construction (see Chapter 4). As some products of 
these factories had been put into military use, they had long been disciplined to take 
care of any possibility that would leak the secret. In my interviews, some residents 
even emphasised that what he or she was talking about was no longer confidential, so 
he or she could share this information with me. 
 
To overcome the difficulty as an “outsider” 
I tried in several ways to reduce residents’ worry and suspicion. It was not 
difficult to tackle extreme cases, such as the suspicion that I was a spy. I merely asked 
the resident to think of any information she possessed that could endanger national 
security; she then realised that she had overreacted. In other cases, it was still my 
identity as an “insider” that helped me. First, I could speak both standard Mandarin 
(Putonghua) and with a local dialect. I used the Luzhou dialect with local residents to 
convince them that I was native to the place. With migrants of the Third-Front 
Construction who still spoke standard Mandarin or some other accents of Northern 
China, I tried to reduce the distance between us by using a mixture of standard 
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Mandarin and a Luzhou dialect. When I mentioned that I had studied in Beijing for 
seven years, a migrant born in Beijing even called me a “person from the hometown” 
(jiaxiang ren 家乡⼈). 
Second, I showed them my LSE student ID card, but this did not help much, 
since only a few of my interviewees could understand English. Those who could did 
not know the LSE and its academic reputation. I then presented my previous student 
ID card from Peking University, which I had obtained when I was a Master’s student 
there. Such an identity helped me gain more trust from the residents, since Peking 
University is one of the two top universities in China. 
Third, in my interviews, so long as I did not leak anyone’s privacy, I was able 
to refer to information I had obtained during my fieldwork when interviewing some 
residents. The information included the details of the compensation scheme, and the 
state policies on penghuqu redevelopment. Hearing these details, sometimes surprised 
the residents, who were convinced by the amount I seemed to know about what was 
happening in their neighbourhood and were more willing to give their own opinions. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Introducing the datasets 
As introduced in the previous sections, the five main sets of data collected in 
my fieldwork and used in this thesis came from: (1) interviews; (2) notes of 
observations; (3) government documents; (4) news reports; (5) background 
information collected from published books. Table 3-2 shows how each research 
question is to be dealt with what kind of data. 
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Table 3-2 How each research question is dealt with datasets 
1) How has the penghuqu 
redevelopment project taken in 
shape? 
l Review of policy documents 
l Review of news report 
2) How has penghuqu redevelopment 
been practiced locally? 
l Notes of participant observation 
l Interview with local officials 
l Interview with local residents 
3) The local trajectory of development l Review of books and news reports 
l Interview with local planning 
officials 
l Review of local planning 
documents 
4) The interaction of national project of 
penghuqu redevelopment and local 
development agenda 
l Interview with local officials 
5) The implication for local residents l Nots of participant observation 
l Interview with local residents 
The first set is unquestionably the most important source for this thesis. In total, 
I conducted 48 interviews, covering 76 respondents. Some interviews without 
recordings were summarised in writing as soon as the interviews were over. Those that 
were audio-recorded were transcribed by means of a mobile app called Ifly Voice 
Notes (Xunfeiyuji 讯⻜语记)10. The other four sets of data were also of great importance. 
                                                      
10 This is an automatic voice recognition app developed by the University of Science and Technology of China. I 
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As indicated in the introduction section, participant observation helped me to 
understand the field site better. From these visits, I decided to make a general typology 
of residents and conduct interviews according to it (see Table 3-1). In addition, I was 
also able to raise many questions about what I had seen, seeking answers in my 
interviews. The other three data sets not only provided background information for the 
redevelopment project implemented in Qiancao, but also equipped me with knowledge 
I could appropriate to deepen my communication with local officials and residents. 
 
Classifying and coding data 
I used two characters and four digits to register the 42 interviews with residents, 
mainly based on Table 3-1. Since the numbers of interviews with local officials, factory 
cadres and other professionals were limited, I would refer in this thesis to each 
respondent directly (these interviews were classified as “others”). The first two 
characters labelling the interviews with residents indicate which neighbourhood they 
are from (CQ for Changqi, CW for Changwa, CY for Changye and OT for others). The 
first digit indicates the phase of my fieldwork in which this interview was conducted 
(1 for preliminary fieldwork; 2 for the main fieldwork; 3 for the last revisit). The 
second digit indicates the type of housing the interviewee occupied (1 for 
chengtaofang, 2 for feichengtaofang). The last two digits compose the serial number 
of the interview sorted according to its sequence. Thus, “CW-2109” refers to the ninth 
interview, conducted with a resident living in chengtaofang in Changwa in the course 
of my main fieldwork. A further classification of the interviews I conducted in each 
category is shown in Table 3-3. In this thesis, when quoting interview material, I 
                                                      
listened to the recordings and repeated what I heard to my cell phone in standard Mandarin. It can automatically 
transcribe what is said into written words, with only minor errors. 
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further introduce some necessary background information about the respondent. All 
the (sur-)names I use in this thesis are pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. 
Table 3-3 Number of interviews in each sub-category 
 11** 12** 21** 22** 31** 32** 
CQ 1 2 8 2 0 0 
CW 2 2 10 3 1 0 
CY 0 0 3 3 0 1 
OT 1 0 2 1 0 0 
Source: compiled by the author. Notes: refer to the description in the previous paragraph for 
the explanation of each character and figure combination. 
 
In terms of data analysis, I followed the procedure of thematic coding approach 
(Robson, 2011: 474-489). I used Nvivo, a qualitative data analysis software program 
to code the interview data set. The initial coding was mainly based on the potential 
descriptive and theoretical implications of the data per se. After the initial coding, I 
group these codes into a smaller number of themes. These themes were identified 
either according to the similarity of codes I noticed in the coding process, or based on 
the research questions of this thesis. These themes are significant in that they can link 
the empirical materials with the theoretical concern of this thesis. Some samples of 
themes and codes are shown in Table 3-4. 
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Table 3-4 Samples of Themes and Codes 
Sample Theme Codes 
Policy changes of penghuqu 
redevelopment 
How long is the penghuqu redevelopment project? 
How many households of penghuqu to be 
renovated? 
How to compensate residents affected by the 
redevelopment of penghuqu? 
What sort of housing is considered as penghuqu? 
Housing as use value 
Size of previous housing 
Size of the resettlement housing 
Layout design 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter briefly summarised the process of my fieldwork. The difficulties 
I encountered during my fieldwork as both an “insider” and an “outsider” and how I 
attempted to solve them were not only a kind of academic trial for me, but more 
importantly, they also hint at some of the rationales of governance and residents’ 
reliance upon the redistributive system, which points to the key concern of this thesis. 
The next chapter describes the detailed context of Third Front Construction and the 
genealogy of penghuqu, based on the data that I collected. 
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Chapter 4 The Context of Penghuqu redevelopment in a “Third 
Front” city 
 
This chapter outlines the context for my enquiry in the present study. It contains 
three major parts; first, a general history of the Third Front Construction and the way 
in which it had been practiced in Qiancao; second, the physical context landscape in 
Qiancao and residents’ living experiences; third, the policy context in relation to the 
redevelopment of penghuqu. The three contexts not only provide the backdrop against 
which the discussions in succeeding chapters are understood, but also indicate the 
power of the state redistribution mechanism. 
 
4.1 The Third Front Construction: Historical Background 
The Third Front Construction (sanxian jianshe 三线建设) during the Cold War 
period was a large-scale project of industrial development for the interior provinces of 
China. Between 1964 and 1981, many manufacturing factories, military factories, and 
military-oriented research institutes were sent from the coastal regions and the 
northeast China to the western inland provinces. At its peak, more than 4 million 
people were mobilised to migrate inland for this purpose. It was a major event of 
industrial construction and economic investment amid the political turmoil caused by 
the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Naughton, 1991). For some researchers, it is 
considered to have ended in failure, particularly in that it was economically unwise 
(Naughton, 1991; Chan, Henderson and Tsui, 2008: 818-819; Li and Wu, 2012: 62-63; 
Wu and Zhang, 2010: 62); for others, especially some Chinese scholars (Chen, 2003, 
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2014; Zhou, 2014a, 2014b), this project left a profound economic, social and spatial 
legacy in China’s inland regions. 
The Third Front Construction was motivated mainly by the drastic changes of 
geopolitics in East Asia in the early 1960s (Chen, 2003; Chen, 2014). During this 
specific period of the Cold War, the Vietnam War to the south of China had escalated 
in 1961 because of the United States’ direct intervention, sending troops to assist South 
Vietnam (Jian, 1995; Lüthi, 2008). Some researchers hold that two major battles 
between the United States and Socialist Vietnam in 1964 were the direct catalyst for 
the Third Front Construction (Chen, 2014: 7; Naughton, 1988: 353). Moreover, to the 
north of China, the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, its former 
socialist ally, had increasingly deteriorated from the late 1950s. In 1963, the Soviet 
Union dramatically expanded the scale of its forces deployed on the Sino-Mongolian 
border (Chen, 2014: 4). Besides the threats from the two major super-powers, the risk 
of war between China and India, and between Mainland China and Taiwan also loomed. 
For instance, in 1962, the border conflict between China and India escalated into a 
battle (Chen, 2014: 4). 
The change of geopolitics convinced the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP), especially Mao Zedong, that China would soon be invaded (Chen, 2003). 
But the distribution of industry in China at the time was grossly unbalanced. Most 
industrial bases were located in the northeast (close to the Soviet Union) and coastal 
regions, thus jeopardising the national security. This created an urgent need to balance 
the distribution of industry for defence purposes. 
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Launched in August 1964 (Chen, 2014: 9), the Third Front Construction was 
meant to create a complete supplementary industrial system in naturally remote but 
strategically secure regions (Naughton, 1988: 354). The CCP leadership decided to 
abandon its previous version of planning, which had prioritised the existing industrial 
bases and civic industries (Ji, 2016). A newer version of its planning divided the entire 
country into three “fronts”11. There are different versions of the division, but in general, 
the coastal region was the First Front, the mountainous inland region (except for two 
provinces on the border, Xinjiang and Tibet) was the Third Front, and the region in-
between was the Second Front (Chen, 2014: 8; see Figure 4-1). The central planning 
authority would reduce the resources allocated to the First Front (even if within the 
First Front, the remaining investment would be allocated to its interior regions. For the 
situation of Guangdong, see Bachman, 2001), but the Third Front would be prioritised 
when new construction projects were planned. More importantly, all the factories in 
the First Front, especially those producing machineries and arms, etc., together with 
all the universities and research institutes, were to be entirely or partly relocated to the 
Third Front for defence purposes (Chen, 2003: 57; 2014: 8-9). Millions of employees 
and their family members were to migrate with these organisations, as well. A slogan 
during the Third Front Construction, “sending more talented staff and best equipment 
to the Third Front” (haoren haoma shang sanxian 好 ⼈ 好 ⻢ 上 三 线), may reveal 
something of the then guidelines in deploying people and facilities. 
                                                      
11 The Chinese word for “front” is xian (线), which literally means line. Some researchers translate sanxian jianshe 
as “Third Line Construction” (such as Lüthi, 2008; Chen, 2018). But other English writers (such as Meyskens, 
2015; Naughton, 1988) translate ‘xian’ as “front”, which in Chinese is “qian xian” (front line). In this thesis, I have 
adopted the latter version. 
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Figure 4-1 The division of the three “fronts” 
Source: illustrated by the author. Notes: The railway indicated in this map is the Beijing-
Guangzhou Railway (Jing-Guang tielu 京⼲铁路). In another version of the division into three fronts, 
the region to the west of this railway was designated as part of the Third Front, so part of the region 
mapped here as the Second Front was in practice also treated as the Third Front. 
 
In an era characterised by scarcity, the investment in the Third Front 
Construction was enormous. By and large, China devoted 205.2 billion yuan to this 
project, accounting for 39.01 per cent of all the national investment in capital 
construction in this period (AROTFC, 1991: 32). During its peak years from 1964 to 
1970, this percentage may even have reached as high as 50 per cent (Zhou, 2014a). As 
the province with the largest population in the Third Front12, Sichuan was a key site of 
                                                      
12 From 1954 to 1997, Chongqing was part of Sichuan Province. According to China’s third population census in  
1982, directly after the termination of the Third Front Construction, Sichuan Province had more than 99.7 million 
inhabitants, nearly one tenth of the national population (1.032 billion). Sichuan had the largest population of any 
province not only in the Third Front, but also in China (see National Bureau of Statistics, 1982). 
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the Third Front Construction. In general, the national investment in Sichuan Province 
during the entire period was 41.1 billion yuan, accounting for 20 per cent of all the 
investment in the Third Front (ibid.). At its peak in 1966, the investment in Sichuan 
alone accounted for more than 15 per cent of the national total (Naughton, 1988). 
With the redistribution of these funds, the Third Front completed more than 
1,000 industrial projects, scattered across the Third Front region (Meyskens, 2015: 
238). As noted above, some existing factories and institutes were divided and moved 
to the Third Front, either entirely or in part. Naughton hence describes it as a process 
of “mitosis” (1988: 356). In this movement when rapidly duplicated new facilities 
were needed, China had to resort to its existing industrial capability. But in view of its 
motivation, as the process continued, the factories evacuated from the First Front 
should not necessarily be relocated to a limited number of metropolises. Their 
distribution had to comply with the principles of “disperse (fensan 分散), conceal (yinbi
隐蔽), near mountains (kaoshan 靠⼭), inside caves (jindong 进洞)” (Chen, 2014: 9, 14; 
Meyskens, 2016: 239). Therefore, many evacuated factories were resettled in 
relatively remote sites (Wu, 2015: 27), which in some ways reflects the “anti-urban” 
ideology in the Maoist China (Kirkby, 2018; Ma, 2002: 1558). They became isolated 
non-rural settlements scattering across the territory. 
While the Third Front Construction did not last long, it had two climaxes, one 
from 1964 to 1966, and the other from 1969 to 1971 (in the wake of another major 
clash between China and the Soviet Union; see Bachman, 2007) (Chen, 2014: 12). In 
1972, with the rapprochement of the Sino-America relationship marked by President 
Nixon’s visit to China, one of the greatest threats that had motivated the Third Front 
Construction no longer existed. After this, although the central planning authority had 
not officially terminated the Third Front Construction, it ceased to give it priority in 
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terms of resource redistribution (Naughton, 1988: 362). Around 1979, when Deng 
Xiaoping took power and the economic reform was officially initiated, the Third Front 
Construction was eventually abandoned (Naughton, 1988: 379). With the termination 
of the Third Front Construction, some of the factories evacuated to the Third Front 
were restored once again to their original places. Others stayed where they were in the 
Third Front. Since, these factories have experienced a major reform and now make 
goods for the commercial market instead of militarily-oriented products 
(Brömmelhörster and Frankenstein, 1997; Gurtov, 1993). 
The Third Front Construction has widely been believed to have failed, whether 
or not the intention behind it had been to narrow down the country’s regional 
disparities for a while (Chan, Henderson and Tsui, 2008: 818-819; Li and Wu, 2012: 
62-63; Wu and Zhang, 2010: 62). According to Naughton (1988: 379), it is 
economically unwise to allocate resources to geographically disadvantaged places as 
the ratio of output to input was fairly low. Moreover, because the Third Front 
Construction was not well prepared, its scale was more grandiose than the capital-
starved central state could afford (Naughton: 1988: 380; see also Li, 2002). In addition, 
its implications for reducing interprovincial disparity may not have endured either 
(Chan, Henderson and Tsui, 2008: 819). In Naughton’s view (1988: 379), the central 
state should have invested the diverted resources it allocated to the Third Front in the 
coastal region to boost their economic growth. 
Naughton could perhaps be right. However, it may not be appropriate to assess 
the result of the Third Front Construction only by its economic performance. 
Meyskens (2015: 240) emphasises that the Third Front Construction was driven by 
anxiety about national security, whereas its economic effectiveness was not a major 
concern. Since no war ever occurred, it is impossible to conjecture how the newly-
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built industrial base in the Third Front would have operated in wartime, but it still 
leaves major legacies. First, the construction of transport infrastructure, especially 
railways, incorporated the Third Front, or the entire Western China in the nationwide 
industrial networks (Meyskens, 2015). 
Second, the Third Front Construction deeply influenced industrialisation in 
Western China. After the formal termination of the Third Front Construction, some 
factories and research institutes that had relocated from the First Front, have remained 
in the Third Front, thus constituting the pillars of industrialisation of western China. 
For example, the only research institute for nuclear weapons in China (the China 
Academy of Engineering Physics) is still located in Sichuan Province, where it moved 
in 1969 as part of the Third Front Construction13. 
Third, the Third Front Construction also has implications for urbanisation of 
western and central China (Zhou, 2014a). Even though the guidelines for factory 
resettlement advised “disperse, conceal, near mountains, and inside caves” as noted 
above, not all projects were built in remote areas. Existing cities increased in scale 
when factories or factory complexes, some of vast size, settled nearby (Naughton, 
1988: 361). With their affiliated amenities, such as hospitals, schools and shops, these 
factories could be seen to have constituted independent cities or at least independent 
towns in themselves. Cities such as Panzhihua in Sichuan Province (accommodating 
the Panzhihua Steel Factory; for a detailed discussion on Panzhihua, see Kinzley, 
2012), Liupanshui in Guizhou Province (accommodating the Shuicheng Steel Factory 
and coal mines), and Jiayuguan in Gansu Province (accommodating the Jiuquan Steel 
Factory) exemplify this point (Xu and Chen, 2015; Zhou, 2014a, 2014b). 
                                                      
13 See the history of CAEP, available at http://www.caep.ac.cn/zjzwy/index.shtml. 
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In sum, the Third Front Construction was a large-scale industrial, economic, 
and political campaign launched by the Chinese Party State to secure national security 
at all costs, which undoubtedly manifested the capacity of the socialist regime to 
implement its plan in the era of the planned economy. The Third Front Construction 
exemplifies one mode of “landscapes of priority” (Sjöberg, 1999) under central 
planning by means of which the redistributive authorities (central planners) 
endeavoured to ensure that the most important tasks would in fact be carried out in the 
face of shortages. Some principles applied to the Third Front Construction were 
economically or technically irrational, even if we take its defence motivation into 
account, but we should not regard it as a total failure since it still has critical 
implications for the development of Western China. 
 
4.2 The Third Front Construction in Qiancao 
The establishment of factories in Qiancao 
As a city in Sichuan province14, Luzhou too received its “quota” of relocated 
factories to host from the First Front. In the original plan of the planning authority 
formulated in1964 (Feng, 2017: 1-5), a large-scale engineering machinery complex 
was to be established in Luzhou, turning this city into a hub of production for 
engineering machinery in the Third Front. In terms of the loci of this industrial 
complex, Qiancao Peninsula turned out to be a good choice. This peninsula faces the 
city centre of Luzhou on the opposite bank of the Changjiang River, providing the 
proposed industrial complex with a shipping channel and easy access to an established 
city. In addition, some factories had already been built on the Qiancao Peninsula, 
                                                      
14 Between 1960 and 1983, Luzhou was a county-level city, under the administration of Yibin Prefecture. In 1983, 
it was upgraded to a prefectural-level city, under the direct administration of Sichuan Province. 
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including a factory for small hardware items, a steel factory, since abandoned, and a 
power plant, all of which occupied industrial land that could be appropriated by the 
new factories. The new industrial complex would consist of the following four 
factories: (1) the Changjiang Crane Factory (based on part of the Beijing Crane 
Factory); (2) the Changjiang Excavator Factory (based on part of the Fushun 15 
Excavator Factory); (3) the Changjiang Hydraulic Component Factory (based on the 
factory that made items of hardware and given technical support by a workshop 
relocated from Shanghai for this purpose); (4) the Changjiang Piledriver Factory 
(based on part of the Shanghai Construction Machinery Factory). There was also a 
research institute, the Luzhou Research Institute of Machinery Engineering (moved 
from Changde, in Hunan Province). These factories and the institutes were designed 
to cooperate with each other as a machinery “trust”16, and not to operate independently. 
According to the plan noted above, in 1965, the first three factories were 
established. Between 1965 and 1967, 1,357 workers from Fushun, 1,100 from 
Beijing17, and 65 from Shanghai arrived in Luzhou. Their families either came with 
them or arrived later. After a year of preparation, in 1966, these factories started to 
operate. (Feng, 2017: 4) 
However, the original plan was not yet completely fulfilled, but the Third Front 
Construction in Luzhou was soon seriously interrupted, despite the claim that the Third 
Front Construction received the top priority from the Party State. In the summer of 
1966, the Cultural Revolution broke out. From June 1967, for a period of one and a 
half years, hostile factions armed with weapons continued to fight each other in 
                                                      
15 Fushun is a prefectural-level city in Liaoning Province (not the provincial capital). It is famous for coal industry. 
According to my interviewees, Fushun Excavator Factory mainly served coal mines in Fushun. 
16 “Trust” is an agglomerated mode of industrial complex, proposed by Liu Shaoqi, Vice-Chairman of the CCP. See 
Lyu, 1993. 
17 Some workers of Beijing Crane Factory are from Tianjin and Hebei Province. 
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Luzhou. Qiancao became the site of fierce battles. For six months, as the risk of 
becoming a casualty grew, many migrants decided to flee back to their hometown 
again, against all the odds18. Moreover, the fourth factory listed above and the research 
institute cancelled their plan to move to Luzhou (ECCMFL, 1994: 225-226)19, putting 
the original plan to build a machinery “trust” beyond fulfilment. Only at the end of 
1968, when the factories were taken over by military forces, was normal production 
restored. Nevertheless, the three factories could no longer operate as a united complex 
due to internal tensions, but divided into three independent factories, namely, Changqi, 
Changwa, and Changye as noted in Chapter 3 (ibid., 5). The three factories occupied 
different levels in the administrative hierarchy. Changqi and Changwa were bushu qiye 
(部属企业), that is, enterprises under the direct administration of the First Ministry of 
Machinery. Their general managers were as high in rank as the mayor of Luzhou. 
Changye, meanwhile, ranked lower. 
 
Workers’ views of the city and other citizens 
The unique history in Qiancao had great implications for the workers’ views of 
the members of other factories and other citizens in Luzhou. First, as noted above, the 
factories in Qiancao had different hierarchical status, according to which the workers 
held different views of each other. The workers of Changqi were relocated from the 
capital, and their factory went on to outdo the others. This made them have a tendency 
to look down upon workers from the other factories. The workers of Changwa were 
                                                      
18 According to some of my interviewees from Changqi, under the planned economy system, they could receive 
their grain quota and salary only from their work units, which were still in Luzhou. After fleeing back to Beijing, 
they had no source of subsistence, but relied on help from parents or their friends, also surviving under austerity. 
19 Part of the Shanghai Construction Machinery Factory later moved to Changde, still within the range of the Third 
Front. Along with the research institute, this factory later moved to Changsha, the capital city of Hunan Province. 
They were merged with other enterprises and eventually became Zoomlion (zhonglian zhongke 中联重科; based in 
Changsha), a leading engineering enterprise in contemporary China. 
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proud that their factory was the largest in scale. The place of origin and the status of 
factories were also potential source of disputes, as indicated by some of my 
interviewees who reported that people from Beijing were not easy to get along with. 
The workers were split into several camps. This fissure impeded a kind of alliance 
when cooperation was needed in the face of housing expropriation, which will be 
shown in Chapter 6. 
In terms of their views of Luzhou, in the early stages of the move, the workers 
of the three factories, especially the migrants, enjoyed the highest social economic 
status in Luzhou, which was at the time quite a poor and under developed place, 
significantly contrasting with their place of origin. Even Fushun, not to mention 
Beijing and Shanghai, was more “advanced” than Luzhou at this time in terms of urban 
appearance and economic development. Some of my interviewees still remember how 
astonished they felt when they arrived in Luzhou: 
“You can’t imagine how good our life was! In our kindergarten (in Fushun), 
they served milk every day. My mother worked in the state-run grocery and could buy 
goods at discounted prices. So when I was young, I had biscuits to eat that were 
imported from the Soviet Union. … When I arrived in Luzhou, I wept aloud. There 
was nothing here. We took a small wooden boat to cross the Changjiang River. We 
even had to paint our home by ourselves.” (Interview CW-2101) 
“I arrived here in 1966. When we arrived here, to be frank, there was nothing 
in Luzhou! Handcart pullers everywhere! Most people were too poor to buy shoes and 
went around bare foot. What did these people eat? A bowl of porridge, pickled 
vegetables – that was a meal … At the time my salary was 37 yuan per month. That 
was the standard salary. But this sum meant a lot here. An entire family in Luzhou 
could get by on just 10 yuan per month!” (Interview CQ-1201) 
Despite the tremendous adversities they faced, the workers in the Third Front 
claimed that they had totally devoted themselves to maximum production, motivated 
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by a kind of “progressive naivety” (Interview CQ-2107) 20 . As one interviewee 
explained, the workers “were not [merely] complying with the command of the party, 
but were sincerely complying with the command of the party” (Interview CQ-2104, 
emphasis added). They believed that they had been sent to the Third Front by Chairman 
Mao (Interview CQ-1201). Therefore, although the working and living conditions in 
Luzhou were poorer than in their hometown, it was still glorious for them to participate 
in the Third Front Construction. They worked hard to continue production day and 
night under harsh conditions. Furthermore, they “contributed not only [their] youth, 
but also [their] whole lives and even offspring” (xianle qingchun xian zhongshen, 
xianle zhongshen xian zisun 献了⻘春献终⾝，献了终⾝献⼦孙) (interview CQ-1101) to 
the country’s good. 
 
The relationship between Luzhou citizens and the workers of the three factories 
Workers’ contributions were not unpaid. As noted above, the workers of the 
three factories in Qiancao could earn the highest average salaries in the city. They also 
enjoyed other services and the provision of material welfare by their factories. Like 
many other work units in China (cf. Bray, 2005), these factories were equipped with 
natural gas, canteens, hospitals, schools, cinemas, and even funeral parlours, which 
exclusively served their employees at no or very little cost. In some senses, workers 
formed a privileged social class. As discussed in Chapter 2, when material production 
(or the primary circuit of capital) dominates, the redistributive system serves to repay 
those who contribute to the production process, namely, workers. To some degree, 
                                                      
20 The original words used by this interviewee are “zuo de ke ai”(左得可爱), which may literally be translated as 
“being naively left-wing”. In Maoist vocabulary, “zuo” (left-wing) means progressive, whilst “you” (right-wing) 
means conservative, or even reactionary. 
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these workers were also proud of their status. Even now, some elderly workers in 
Qiancao still like to describe that their directors once refused to be transferred to be 
the Mayor of Luzhou, partly because the official vehicles in their factory had been 
imported from the Soviet Union, and so were superior to the mayor’s form of transport 
(Interview CW-2107; Feng, 2017: 64). 
The workers who lived a “privileged” life in Luzhou were envied by other local 
residents. This is attested by the fact that, according to some interviewees, the cadres 
of Luzhou city liked to send their children to work in the factories in Qiancao 
(Interview CQ-2107). A ballad composed in the peak years of the three factories in 
Qiancao, had the refrain, “Little girl, grow faster! When you grow up, you might marry 
into the three ‘Chang-’ factories” (CCTV, 2012; Feng, 2017: 63). In this regard, 
Qiancao in the earlier years of the Third Front Construction had more advantages than 
the city centre on the opposite bank. 
Nevertheless, not everyone was fond of or envious of the workers in Qiancao. 
According to an expert in local history, Professor Zhao, at least two kinds of people 
held a more conservative attitude toward them (Interview OH-2003). The first kind 
was local leaders, even when they may have been eager to send their children to these 
factories. Unlike their successors, who are more entrepreneurial and welcome external 
investment (see Chapter 5), it was a huge burden under the planned economy for the 
local leaders to host massive factories, with their large personnel, such as the three 
factories in Qiancao. Under the planned economy system, factories of this kind were 
only accountable to the central planning authority. They produced as allocated by the 
redistributive centre. All their production would in turn also be transferred to the 
redistributive centre for reallocation. Although these factories were located within the 
administrative boundary of Luzhou city, they were not in the territory of the local state 
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in Luzhou (cf. “socialist land master”, Hsing, 2010: 35). Moreover, local leaders had 
to provide these factories with goods, such as vegetables and other foods. The extra 
supply was not very easy to organise in an era of shortage. According to Professor 
Zhao, Mayor Xu, the then mayor of Luzhou, never welcomed this investment. To 
relocate so many workers to Luzhou was for him troublesome (tian mafan) (Interview 
OH-2003). 
The second group consisted of other local residents. Their attitude is clear from 
the way they used to call the migrant workers in Qiancao, who did not speak any of 
the local dialects, that is, “miaozi” (苗⼦; literally people of Miao ethnicity). This 
nickname infuriated some migrant workers, since they were mostly of Han ethnicity. 
They regarded this term as a kind of discrimination (Interview CQ-1201). According 
to Professor Zhao, this nickname may have appeared first during the war against Japan 
(1931-1945), when many asylum seekers who did not speak the dialect of Sichuan fled 
there from the lower reaches of the Changjiang River. It is better interpreted as 
reflecting a mixed attitude combining envy and discrimination against strangers of a 
higher socio-economic status who have “invaded” one’s land (Interview OH-2003). 
 
Qiancao after the Third Front Construction 
After the termination of the Third Front Construction, the factories (in fact, 
Changqi and Changwa, as most workers of Changye were Luzhou natives) remained 
in Luzhou. The administration of these factories then passed to the Luzhou Municipal 
Government in 1981. They became pillars of local industry until the mid-1990s, when 
state-owned enterprises began to be reformed. Their performance was even better in 
the 1980s, when the economic reform started. Because the employment in these 
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factories often guaranteed relatively high wages and other welfare provisions, workers 
were inclined to ensure that their children also got a position in their factory, either by 
“replacement” (dingti 顶替, meaning that a child may take their parent’s position in the 
factory after their parents had retired) or by “recruitment” (zhaogong 招⼯; recruit new 
workers from high school graduates, employees’ offspring, etc.). As a result, some of 
my interviewees in their 40s or 50s, as the second generation of Third Front migrants, 
had spent almost their entire life in the same factory: they were born in the hospital 
affiliated to their factory, educated in an affiliated school, and worked in the factory 
following their parents; this all generated a very strong personal dependency upon this 
factory. In addition, these factories also recruited college graduates assigned to them, 
as well as veterans, “educated young people” (zhishi qingnian), and local peasants 
whose land had been expropriated when the factories expanded. With these people 
(mainly local) joining in, the staff composition of these factories became more 
variegated. 
However, some Third Front migrants, particularly those from Beijing and 
Shanghai, never lost contact with their personal ties and always looked for a chance to 
return. Even if they could not get back to Beijing or Shanghai, because of the strict 
system of household registration, getting much closer to their places of origin could 
still be an acceptable prospect. For instance, in 1983 Changqi founded its only branch 
in Gu’an county, Hebei Province. Gu’an county is located just outside the 
administrative boundary of Beijing Municipality. Many employees of Changqi who 
migrated from Beijing moved to this branch. 
The desire to get back was not only driven by an attachment to their hometown, 
but also by the lure of the higher standard of living in the metropolis. In contrast, the 
Changwa employees from Fushun, a middle-sized city like Luzhou, were less likely 
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to pursue their return. The unrealised dream of getting back becomes a source of 
grievance, as remarked by Master Xi, a Beijing native (Interview CQ-1201): 
“Some people fleeing back to Beijing during the chaotic period refused to 
return. They lost their jobs, even had to earn their living collecting rubbish for 
recycling. We sneered at them as deserters of the Third Front Construction. But, in the 
redress offered after the Cultural Revolution, they eventually got jobs and registered 
their households in Beijing. Now, as retired workers, they may get a pension of 5,000 
to 6,000 yuan per month, whereas I have just over 2,000 yuan. One of my colleagues 
from Beijing has a monthly pension even lower than 2,000 yuan. When he got back to 
Beijing and talked about this, his relatives asked, ‘Are you being laogai (劳改) like 
prisoners21? How can your pension be so low?’ They could not believe it! … (Sigh.) 
We were following the command of Chairman Mao. May that even be a mistake?”  
The later experience of the three factories during the reform of state-owned 
enterprises initiated in late 1990s gives off an even wider sense of frustration and 
betrayal. Like many other SOEs in China, the three factories were all “privatised”22 
and their performance grew worse and worse. Huge numbers of their employees were 
laid off. Except for still living in Qiancao close to their factories, the workers’ ties with 
their factories were cut off and the local government took over the responsibility for 
paying them a subsistence allowance (rather than a relatively high salary). The 
pensions of retired workers also decreased sharply. Similar things happened all over 
China (Cai, 2002, 2006; Chen, 2003; Gold, et al., 2009; Lee, 2007): at first, the workers 
of Qiancao, as privileged workers with high standards of living also refused to accept 
the indignity of being “laid-off”, a social status associated with stigma. Workers 
                                                      
21 Laogai, literally meaning “reform through labour”, is a Chinese way of punishing prisoners. Therefore, to call 
somebody “laogai” indicates that this person is in some sense a captive. See Wikipedia entry on laogai, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laogai. 
22 Interestingly, in 2012, Sinomach (guoji zhonggong 国机重⼯), a state-owned enterprise, became the holding 
company of Changqi, indicating the renationalisation of Changqi. 
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protested by petitioning the City Hall, or blocking the traffic at Qiancao Cross23 
(Interview CW-1202). 
But all their efforts were in vain. The laid-off workers were forced to face the 
bitter reality and look for jobs in the city centre. Those with expertise might find it no 
longer in demand, and had to accept a poorly-paid job such as a gatekeeper, rickshaw 
driver, or peddler selling handmade steamed-rice buns (Interview CW-2110). 
According to Mrs Hu (who was laid off in 2004, at the age of 41), in the peak years of 
her factory job in the early 1990s, she sometimes received an end-of-year bonus of 500 
yuan, with many other material rewards such as canned beef or cutlass-fish. Her 
monthly salary had been around 300 to 400 yuan. Ten years later, when she worked as 
a cleaner in Luzhou Grand Hotel (in the city centre), the monthly salary was just 300 
yuan, but her workload was much greater than that of her previous job in Changwa 
(Interview CW-1202). An interviewee gave me his explanation of this deterioration 
(Interview CW-2110): 
“In the course of the reform, how did the workers lose our advantages? When 
I saw the peasants who had got rich, I tried to talk with them My one question was how 
they had got so much money so quickly. They answered, ‘Everybody had their own 
approach. Some  people work as peddlers selling jeans or belts. Which of us workers 
would do that? We worked in the factory, went to the factory and got back at the same 
time every night routinely, rarely interacting with anyone outside, and thus knowing 
nothing about what was happening outside. When the reform arrived, we were 
extremely helpless and quickly got kicked out. We could not find a way to get rich.  
(I: Do you get an answer to your questions now?)  
He: I’m still looking for them.” 
In general, the reform of the state-owned enterprises in China has made the 
workers, who once enjoyed the benefits of the socialist redistributive system, suffer 
                                                      
23 Qiancao Cross (Qiancao shizi 茜草⼗字) is the only land entry point to Qiancao Peninsula from the city centre. 
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traumatic experiences. In Ching Kwan Lee’s (2000) words, this is a kind of “revenge 
of history”. But the Third Front migrants, especially those and their offspring who have 
been relocated from a metropolis, have been “betrayed” by the socialist system in two 
ways: on the one hand the Third Front Construction has distanced them from their 
hometown (or the chance of a better life), and on the other, the termination of the 
socialist redistribution system after the reform of the state-owned enterprises. In the 
discussion in the following chapters, I will show how the sense of betrayal plays a role 
in the redevelopment project. 
 
4.3 The Landscape of Qiancao: Physical Context 
In terms of the landscape in Qiancao, there was no significant change since the 
reform of the three enterprises, making its contrast to the city centre more evident. As 
demonstrated earlier, Qiancao used to represent the highest standard of living in 
Luzhou, which was envied by local residents. In the late 1980s, the three factories all 
constructed their main office buildings. These high-rise blocks were once the tallest 
buildings in Luzhou (see Figure 4-2). But now, the balance of power between the two 
banks is reversed. As “laid-off” workers living on a subsistence allowance, the 
residents in Qiancao had smaller incomes than other citizens. Former workers in the 
three factories now had to make a living in the city centre. The appearance of Qiancao 
remained mostly unchanged after 2002, whilst more high-rise blocks appeared in the 
city centre on the opposite bank (see Figure 4-3). This “degradation” of Qiancao and 
its residents has since been appropriated as evidence to legitimise the labelling of 
Qiancao as penghuqu. 
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Figure 4-2 A view of Qiancao Peninsula from City Centre across the Changjiang before demolition 
Source: Photo by the author (1 August 2015). Notes: The high-rise block on the right is the 
main building of Changqi (demolished in January 2017), the one on the left is the main building of 
Changwa (demolished in August 2016). 
 
Figure 4-3 Contrast of Qiancao and Luzhou City Centre 
Source: Photo by the author (12 September 2015). Notes: Qiancao is on the left bank and the 
city centre is on the right bank. Only two high-rise blocks stood on the Qiancao side. The blocks far 
away on the left bank are the resettlement buildings under construction. 
 
Figure 4-4 A bird’s-eye view of Qiancao Peninsula 
Source: Photo by the author, 7 Sepermber 2015. 
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The landscape of Qiancao also reflects its history over the past 50 years. As 
noted above, the Third Front Construction was prepared relatively quickly, in order to 
cope with the drastic changes in geopolitics. As in all other work-units in China, the 
residential buildings were close to the workshops in all three factories (see Figure 4-
5). However, the buildings in Qiancao were not planned very well. They were built 
rapidly in a somewhat expedient way. For example, as noted above, one reason to 
choose Qiancao as the site for the three factories was that the Changjiang River could 
serve as a waterway. According to Master Tao, who once worked in the construction 
section of Changwa (Interview CW-2108), in 1965, a wharf with full facilities was 
built, but never came into use. Products of the Changqi and Changwa, such as mobile 
cranes and excavators, had to be dismantled into smaller parts and transported by truck 
to the nearest railway station, 60 kilometres away, and then to their destinations by 
train. Different workshops that should have been arranged to follow the specific 
processes of production were also arranged in a somewhat random way. 
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Figure 4-5 Different types of buildings on Qiancao Peninsula 
Source: Illustrated by the author with ArcMap. Notes: The base map was drawn around 2010. 
By “Non-industrial buildings”, I refer to buildings for residential use (the majority), commercial use 
and public facilities. 
 
So were residential buildings. In Qiancao, most residential buildings were built 
by the factories to accommodate their employees. Residential buildings were 
constructed in batches, whenever the factories obtained funds allocated for 
construction (see Figure 4-6). To minimise the amount needed to compensate the 
peasants for occupying their land, any accessible of land, especially uncultivated, on 
Qiancao Peninsula, was used. Therefore, the buildings constructed in different periods 
were inextricably mixed and mingled also with peasants’ dwellings (see Figure 4-5). 
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Figure 4-6 Residential Buildings Constructed in different periods 
Source: Illustrated by the author with ArcMap. Notes: This map indicates only the residential 
buildings put up by the three factories before 2002. Because the base map was drawn in 2010, some 
buildings demolished before the present fieldwork may not be precisely identified. 
 
In addition, the residential buildings constructed in different periods were not 
only varied in appearance, but also in the types of house types. During the Third Front 
Construction, one guiding slogan was “production first, then living” (xian shengchan, 
hou shenghuo 先⽣产，后⽣活), indicating that more resources should be used in the 
production sectors then to improve the living conditions of workers. Demonstrated in 
the construction of residential buildings, this ideology created a crude approach to 
building. According to the interviews with some elderly workers, their first dwellings 
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in Qiancao were state-owned. They were of such poor quality that they were called 
shaky buildings (yaobai lou; buildings that might shake in wind). Soon, a batch of new 
buildings succeeded them. These were blocks of flats (danyuan lou 单元楼) or tube-
shaped buildings (tongzi lou 筒⼦楼). In both types, individual families might live in 
an independent flat (sometimes a single room). But in these conditions of austerity, 
households had to share facilities, such as kitchens and bathrooms, to maximise their 
use. Thus the individual flats did not contain all the elements (bedrooms, kitchens, 
bathrooms, and sometimes balconies) that would constitute a “fully independent” flat, 
they were called feichengtaofang, namely, “incomplete” flats as noted in Chapter 3. To 
accommodate families of different size, each block held flats with different amounts 
of sleeping space. In terms of appearance, the façade of these buildings remained raw 
red brick, therefore, they were called red-brick buildings (hongzhuan fang 红砖房) or 
red bricks (hong zhuantou 红砖头) as well. These buildings were constructed between 
the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. Only a few were demolished to make space for other 
constructions. Most of them were standing until the redevelopment. 
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Figure 4-7 A red-brick building of Changwa 
Source: Photo by the author (4 January 2017). Notes: On the wall of this building, there was 
still a slogan that had been painted during the Third Front Construction, saying “In preparation for war” 
(yao zhunbei dazhang 要准备打仗). 
 
When the guiding ideas of residential design changed in the late 1970s, 
kitchens and bathrooms became incorporated inside dwellings, turning flats into 
chengtaofang, namely, “complete” flats. The later a batch of flats was constructed, the 
better its quality was. (see Figure 4-9, 4-10) The last batch of residential buildings 
provided to employees by factories were constructed around 2000 (see Figure 4-10), 
immediately before the reform of the state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, real estate 
developers put up several buildings along Qiancao High Street, which was the last 
major development in Qiancao, although the great urban transformation changed the 
landscape of more remote parts of Luzhou dramatically (see Chapter 5). The mixture 
of heterogeneous buildings that characterises the landscape of Qiancao has also been 
used by the local state to justify the label of penghuqu for the entire peninsula. 
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Figure 4-8 A residential building of Changye built in the 1970s 
Source: Photo by the author (5 August 2015). Notes: In the 1970s, chengtaofang appeared. 
Individual flats each contain their own kitchen, bathroom and balcony. These buildings were constructed 
of grey bricks (no longer red ones) but the façades remain unplastered. 
 
Figure 4-9 The Second Village of Changwa, a typical neighbourhood constructed in the 1980s 
Source: Photo by the author (18 September 2015). Notes: This photo may also indicate the 
mixed land use in Qiancao. Between this row of buildings and the main road, there were still some 
parcels of cultivated land where peasants would grow vegetables. 
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Figure 4-10 Qianxiyuan of Changqi 
Source: Photo by the author (6 September 2017). Notes: Qianxiyuan was built around 2002. It 
is the last batch of residential buildings that Changqi constructed for its employees. The façades are 
covered by beige and pink tiles. For the experience of the residents in Qianxiyuan, see Chapter 7. 
 
4.4 Archetypical Penghuqu in China 
As noted above, the redevelopment of Qiancao was conducted in the name of 
penghuqu. In the introduction chapter, I made a brief description of penghuqu, which 
generally refers to decrepit urban neighbourhoods. Penghuqu, which could be literally 
translated as “shack household area”, or as “hutment” following Christian Henriot 
(2012), usually refers to a sort of indecent housing, mainly in urban areas. As straw 
hut is a traditional dwelling style in Chinese rural areas (ibid.), the term penghuqu can 
establish a linkage with that mode of dwelling, and leave people an impression of plain, 
outmoded, and dilapidated. 
Penghuqu appeared in Chinese cities in tandem with the rapid industrialisation 
process (Lu, 1995). Due to housing shortage, labour poured into cities from rural areas 
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had to reside in bad and overcrowded dwellings, or even needed to put up huts 
themselves, which is exactly the same as Engels’ description of working class’s living 
conditions in Germany at its earlier period of industrialisation (Engels, 1970). In this 
regard, penghuqu is similar to slum (see Davis, 2006) or urban informality (Roy, 2005). 
Some researchers on the issue of penghuqu translate it directly as shanty town (see Lu, 
1995; Wu and He, 2005; Huang, 2012; Shi et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018). However, as I 
will demonstrate later in the next chapter, the term penghuqu was employed to refer to 
a wide range of urban dwellings and serve different policy targets. To translate it as 
shanty town, as well as slum, squat, or any other English expression with similar 
meanings may be misleading. Therefore, I will use the original expression penghuqu 
in this thesis. In this section, I will first introduce the archetypical mode of penghuqu 
in China. 
 
The origin of penghuqu in urban China 
The appearance of penghuqu in Chinese cities could be dated back to the 1840s, 
when Shanghai was opened up as the treaty port and modern industry started to 
develop (Lyu, 2003: 37-38). Prior to that, dwellings in Shanghai were mostly formal 
and decent (Cai, 2009). When the opening up of Shanghai initiated its industrialisation 
process, penghuqu started to appear with the influx of growing numbers of migrant 
workers. These workers were mainly originating from poor rural areas in the northern 
part of Jiangsu Province next to Shanghai (Honig, 1992). They came on small wooden 
boats through the dense net of canals in Jiangsu. The boat served not only as the means 
of transportation, but also as the newcomers’ temporal dwellings in the city (Lu, 1995; 
Perry, 1993: 26). Migrants parked their boats along waterways in Shanghai, especially 
at the locations close to job opportunity and settled down on the boat as they were 
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unable to afford a formal dwelling. When their boats decayed and could no longer float, 
these migrants moved to spare space on land, and built dwellings with what they could 
salvage their boats and any other material they could obtain (Lu, 1995: 566-567; 
Henriot, 2012: 505-507; see also Figure 4-11). The mode of construction earned this 
type of dwelling the name of “penghu” in the literal sense. Areas where penghu 
concentrated became “penghuqu”. 
Figure 4-11 A Creek in Shanghai clogged with boats
Source: Henriot, 2012: 506; original source: Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
 
Needless to say, living conditions in this type of dwelling were poor. According 
to Hanchao Lu (1995: 571), as residents were too poor to afford substantial building 
materials, their initial dwellings might even not have walls, limiting its size (smaller 
than a king-size mattress) and height (lower than an average man). After saving money 
for years, residents could improve their dwellings a little bit as shacks with bamboo as 
walls and straw as roof (Lu, 1995: 572; also see Figure 4-12). Even so, their condition 
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would improve remarkably. Within each penghu, it was inevitably dark, damp, and 
smelly without appropriate ventilation. Outside, to meet the high demand of decrepit 
penghu to lean against each other to avoid collapsing, and of people for living space, 
residents were inclined to occupy any available space to construct their dwellings, 
leaving no sufficient space for proper passages. Moreover, public utilities like 
electricity, running water, and fire hydrants were also scarce in such neighbourhoods 
(Lu, 1995: 573). In general, early penghuqus in Shanghai were vulnerable to fire and 
many other sanitation and public hygiene problems. In addition, residents of penghuqu 
also suffered a high rate of unemployment (Lu, 1995: 585). Due to the high rate of 
unemployment, foreign settlers even called penghuqu as “beggars’ villages” that 
constituted potential threat to public health (Henriot, 2012: 509). 
Source: Henriot, 2012: 510; original source: Shanghai Municipal Archives. 
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Once appeared, penghuqu continued to sprawl in Shanghai. Two major reasons 
drove the expansion of penghuqu in Shanghai. First, in the century after 1840, China, 
especially the coast region, suffered a series of wars, especially the invasion of 
Imperial Japan (1937-1945) and Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). Wars turned many 
people around Shanghai to refugees. They flooded into Shanghai for asylum (Lu, 1995: 
575). In the meantime, Shanghai itself was under attack, rendering a large part of this 
city devastated during the wartime (Henriot, 2012: 517). Increasing need for dwellings 
and decreasing housing supply made penghuqu the expedient (and later, long-term) 
solution for the housing crisis. Short of building materials, penghuqus formed in the 
wartime had even worse conditions than their predecessors (Lu: 1995: 575). In 
Henriot’s words (2012: 518), the Civil War eventually turned Shanghai into a “squatter 
city”, and penghuqu became the “regular mode of housing” for newcomers rather than 
a transitory mode. Second, administrative authorities in Shanghai, be the Municipal 
Council run by foreign settlers, or the Chinese civic authority, all lacked the capability 
to eradicate penghuqu in Shanghai, despite they made a lot of efforts (Cai, 2009). 
When the Communist Regime established in 1949, more than one million Shanghai 
citizens lived in penghuqu, which was nearly one fifth of Shanghai’s population (ibid.: 
29). 
 
Penghuqu under the Communist Regime 
Under the Communist regime, penghuqu did not physically disappear. On the 
contrary, it continued to expand in the early years of the Communist regime. In 
Shanghai, according to the official statistics, the size of simple house and penghuqu 
remained 3.23 million square metres from 1949 to 1957, but increased sharply to 4.59 
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million square metres in 1958. Only by 1982 did this figure drop below 3.23 million 
again (2.91 million) (SSB, 2001), indicating the persistence of penghuqu for decades 
However, penghuqu became mute in public discourses for a long period. The 
frequency of penghuqu mentioned People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), the mouthpiece 
newspaper of the Communist Party can be used as an indicator24. From 1950 to 2017, 
2475 reports mentioned the term penghuqu. It was mentioned in 29 reports in the 1950s, 
13 in the 1960s, and only 7 in the 1970s. In comparison, in 2014 alone, when the 
national project of penghuqu redevelopment had been initiated, 301 reports in this year 
mentioned this term. Even if penghuqu was mentioned, it was likely to be a report on 
the accomplishment of a penghuqu redevelopment project (For example, People’s 
Daily, 1959). Some earlier monographs on penghuqu in Shanghai took similar tone 
(Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 1962; SPPH, 1971). They admitted the 
existence of penghuqu in socialist Shanghai, but accused foreign imperialists and 
governments of the “old” China for generating the sprawl of penghuqu in Shanghai, 
whilst eulogising the success of penghuqu redevelopment by the new socialist regime. 
As suggested by Henriot (2012: 501), as a social problem, penghuqu “seemed to have 
been settled once and for all thanks to the effort of the new regime and the mobilisation 
of the masses themselves under the guidance of the CCP”. The “disappearance” of 
penghuqu in public discourses was due to both the intentional or unintentional 
ignorance (ibid.). 
It is true that penghuqu was being renovated or redeveloped. The socialist 
regime built new residential villages for workers, and refurbished constructions within 
existing penghuqus, which in some sense provided the socialist regime with legitimacy 
                                                      
24 These figures are based on the database of People’s Daily (http://data.people.com.cn/rmrb/). It is necessary to 
emphasise that the figure may not be precise, as some reports may be divided into two parts and published on 
different pages. Some reports are counted twice. But this situation does not have great impact on the general trend. 
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(Chen, 2012). But more penghuqu-like dwellings were being built in Mao’s era, as the 
earlier years of the socialist regime was characterised by scarcity (Lu, 2006). To 
achieve rapid industrialisation, the socialist regime maximised accumulation and 
prioritised production over consumption (Chan, 1992; Wu, 1997). Investments in non-
productive sectors, say the construction of residential buildings, were limited (Lu, 
2006: 14-15). Decent dwellings were allocated mainly to cadres and “model workers” 
(Wu, 2015: 31-35). For the rank and file, individual work-units might have to bypass 
the central planning institutions, hoard land and construction materials, and build 
accommodation to meet the housing demand of their employees (Lu, 2006: 92-94). 
This is particularly true for some less affluent state-owned enterprises. In the 
face of resource scarcity, some of these constructions were just humble huts without 
deliberate planning, which meant to be transitory shelters but later turned out as 
“permanent” (Ni et al., 2012: 11; Li et al., 2018). In some old industrial cities in 
Liaoning Province, from which the current round of penghuqu redevelopment 
originated, penghuqu neighbourhoods were never fundamentally renovated since their 
formation, some decrepit buildings built decades ago were still in use (Ni et al., 2012). 
As a result, living conditions in these penghuqu were quite poor. The majority of 
residents in these neighbourhoods were laid-off workers. Being unable to afford to 
move to new flats, residents of these penghuqu neighbourhoods had to suffer poor 
living conditions, insufficient utilities, and sometimes risks, such as land subsidence 
after extracting mineral resources (Ni et al., 2012: 17-22) (see Figure 4-13). 
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Figure 4-13 Penghuqu in Liaoning 
Source: Ni et al., 2012: 20; original source: Liaoning Provincial Government. 
 
But some features of this mode of penghuqu deserve more attention. These 
penghuqu neighbourhoods were built on state-owned land by the legal occupants of 
the land, that is, the state-owned enterprises, or “socialist land master” (Hsing, 2010: 
35-38). Although they might be built “illegally” as the SOEs took advantage of the soft 
budget constraint (Kornai, 1986; for its impact on urban China, see Xu and Yeh, 2005), 
the SOEs were still part of the state power. Buildings in these penghuqu 
neighbourhoods could be recognised by the authority. In this regard, this mode of 
penghuqu is different from the aforementioned mode in Shanghai (residents illegally 
occupying land and putting up dwellings themselves [Lu, 1995]), village-in-the-city 
(built on collectively owned land by villagers themselves or village collective, for 
example, see Wang et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2010), or informal urban settlements 
elsewhere (Roy, 2006; Wu, 2016). In addition, as (formal) members of state-owned 
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enterprises, residents used not to be the urban poor, but privileged urban dwellers, like 
those in Qiancao. 
Despite having some differences, penghuqu of these two types still share some 
similarities, making them constitute what I call the archetypical mode of penghuqu. 
When the term penghuqu has been mentioned, it would be natural to remind people of 
the plain, outmoded, dilapidated and decrepit form of dwelling. Meanwhile, public 
perception of penghuqu may not only be associated with its physical appearance, but 
also with the disadvantaged social-economic status and stigmas of residents in 
penghuqu. 
 
4.5 Policy Context: the redevelopment of penghuqu as a national project 
As mentioned in the previous section, the redevelopment of penghuqu has been 
implemented as a local practice sporadically for long. But only until 2007, when China 
started to establish a new affordable housing system25 after the housing reform in the 
1990s, did penghuqu redevelopment gradually become a national project. From then 
on, the redevelopment of penghuqu has received growing importance and finally 
become the main body of the new affordable housing system in China. According to 
official statistics, from 2010 to 2016, the nationwide expenditure on penghuqu 
redevelopment increased steadily by more than seven-fold from 23.13 billion yuan to 
172.24 billion yuan (with a minor decrease in 2017). In 2017, this expenditure 
accounted for more than 40 per cent of all governmental expenditure on the new 
affordable housing project (see Figure 4-14). In this section, I will review the 
emergence of the new affordable housing system in China, and national policies on 
                                                      
25 This system is called baozhangxing zhufang. Some scholars translated it literally as “indemnity housing” (Huang, 
2012). In this thesis, I call it affordable housing with regard to its function. 
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penghuqu redevelopment, which may indicate that the Chinese state started to retake 
some responsibilities on social redistribution. 
 
Figure 4-14 Nationwide Governmental Expenditure on affordable housing project 
Source: Illustrated by the author, based on the statistics published by Bureau of Budget, the 
Ministry of Finance, P. R. China (http://yss.mof.gov.cn). 
 
The establishment of China’s new affordable housing system 
In 2007, China started to establish its affordable housing system after a ten-
year vacuum since the watershed termination of the welfare housing allocation system 
in 1998 (Wang and Murie, 2011). Prior to the housing reform, an employee in China 
who served in public sectors (e.g., state agencies and state-owned enterprises) could 
obtain a flat for the entire family allocated by the employer (Wu, 1996; Wang and 
Murie, 1996). This type of welfare housing was owned and managed by public agents. 
Residents only needed to pay a fairly low rent to secure their residency (Wang and 
Murie, 1996). This mode of welfare housing constituted the pillar of the entire welfare 
system in China (Wu, 1996), but it also caused serious housing shortage due to the 
Penghuqu Redevelopment 
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limited fiscal capability of the state (Wang and Murie, 1996; 1999). In addition, as the 
rent was too low to meet the requirement of maintenance, the quality of this mode of 
urban housing also deteriorated overtime (Wang and Murie, 1996). In 1998, as part of 
the overall economic reform (Wang et al., 2005), the reform of urban housing, which 
is characterised by the privatisation of public housing (ibid.), was launched. From then 
on, within several years, millions of public housing units were sold to their sitting 
tenants at heavily subsidised prices (Adams, 2009), soon making China one of the 
countries with the highest homeownership (Man, 2011). 
The retreat of the state from housing provision fuelled the rapid development 
of China’s housing market (Chen et al., 2011), but also triggered a serious housing 
affordability crisis and wide dispute (Chen et al., 2010; Man, 2011; Yang and Chen, 
2014). To cope with this situation, in August 2007, the State Council of China issued 
a document titled “Suggestions on resolving housing difficulties of low-income urban 
households” (guowuyuan guanyu jiejue chengshi dishouru jiating zhufang kunnan de 
ruogan yijian) (State Council, 2007), marking the commencement of a new affordable 
housing system (Wang and Murie, 2011). From then on, the central government issued 
a series of policy documents, incorporating different types of affordable housing into 
this system (Huang, 2012; Shi et al., 2016), including cheap rent housing (lianzu fang 
廉 租 房; introduced in 2007, targeting the urban poor with local urban household 
registration), public rental housing (gongzu fang 公租房; introduced in 2010, targeting 
lower-income urban residents, including migrants without local household 
registration), “economic comfortable housing” (jingji shiyong fang 经济适⽤房; the 
local state will charge no or a little land transaction fee when leasing land for its 
construction, thus limiting its unit price. ), the redevelopment of penghuqu, etc. (Shi, 
et al., 2016). 
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This new affordable housing system in China bears some features of the 
Keynesian redistribution. First, unlike the previous welfare housing system that 
offered dwellings to all entitled urban residents in general, this new system focuses 
mainly on low-income (and later, lower middle-income) urban residents (Huang, 2012; 
Chen et al., 2014). Second, the establishment of this affordable housing system 
occurred during the period of recovering from the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. The 
investment in affordable housing constitutes part of the measures to boost domestic 
consumption26 (Huang, 2012; Li et al., 2018). According to Wu (2017: 169), the 
provision of basic social security and redistribution may hint at the possibility of the 
return to the Keynesian principles. 
 
The growing importance of penghuqu redevelopment 
In 2007, the government document that marked the starting point of China’s 
new affordable housing system mentioned briefly, the redevelopment of penghuqu. 
Since then, it has become increasingly important with a series of changes to state 
policies on the new affordable housing system. Currently, new reports (NYT Chinese, 
2013; Southern Weekly, 2014a) and research outputs (Ni et al., 2012; Ni et al., 2014; 
Li et al., 2018) are inclined to trace the contemporary penghuqu redevelopment in 
China to the pilot practices in Liaoning from 2005. As mentioned earlier, Liaoning, as 
an old industrial base in China, saw the prevalence of penghuqu. The pilot practices of 
penghuqu redevelopment in Liaoning was led by Li Keqiang27, who was then the party 
                                                      
26 In 2008, the central government in China proposed a “4000 billion yuan” (4 wan yi) investment projects to boost 
domestic consumption to cope with the Global Financial Crisis. According to the original plan, the investment on 
affordable housing would be 400 billion yuan, accounting for 10 per cent (NDRC, 2009). 
27 Mr Li Keqiang served as the Party Secretary of Liaoning Province from December 2004 to October 2007, then 
first deputy-premier of the central government from March 2008 to March 2013, and became the Premier since 
March 2013. 
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secretary of Liaoning Province. When Li Keqiang became the Premier of China’s 
central government, the redevelopment of penghuqu was upgraded to an important 
policy of the central state as advocated by him, whilst the pilot practices in Liaoning 
became the model for the nationwide practices. Below I discuss how the penghuqu 
redevelopment project kicked off in Liaoning Province. 
In 2005, officials in Liaoning decided to prioritise the redevelopment of 
penghuqu as the primary task of the local state to improve public welfare (minsheng 
民生, or translated as people’s livelihood). The provincial government of Liaoning 
exerted great pressure on municipal governments, and introduced some innovative 
measures to finance the penghuqu redevelopment project (Li et al., 2018). Within a 
very short period, this project managed to provide residents that used to live in 
dilapidated urban neighbourhoods with newly-built resettlement flats (see Southern 
Weekly, 2014a). 
The pilot practice of penghuqu redevelopment soon entered the agenda of the 
central state. In August 2005, a conference on the redevelopment of penghuqu in the 
three provinces in northeast China (Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang, all old industrial 
bases on China) was held in Liaoning (State Council, 2005). This conference was 
chaired by the then deputy-premier Zeng Peiyan, who promised that the central state 
would offer more support to assist local governments to implement penghuqu 
redevelopment projects. In 2006, the then premier Wen Jiabao (Wen, 2006) included 
penghuqu redevelopment as an important task for the central government in his annual 
report. 
From then on, the redevelopment of penghuqu entered the policy discourse of 
the central state on the new affordable housing system. In 2007 and 2008, the central 
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government issued two documents on the new affordable housing system, all 
mentioning the redevelopment of penghuqu (State Council, 2007; General Office of 
the State Council, 2008). In 2009, five key departments of the central government28 
(MOHURD et al., 2009) collectively issued a policy document specifically on 
penghuqu redevelopment. This was the first central policy on penghuqu 
redevelopment in particular, and provided detailed guidelines for its practice. 
According to this document, the redevelopment of penghuqu was officially 
incorporated into China’s new affordable housing system (MOHURD et al., 2009). 
The central state promised to provide different kinds of aid for local governments to 
implement penghuqu redevelopment projects. In 2013, when Li Keqiang had become 
the Premier of China’s central government, the State Council issued a policy document 
specifically on penghuqu redevelopment (State Council, 2013). This was the first 
policy document on penghuqu redevelopment issued by the State Council itself, rather 
than its constituting departments, thus having the highest level of authority. In 
particular, this document highlighted penghuqu in the factory complexes constructed 
as part of the Third Front Construction for redevelopment. Since then, the budgetary 
investment in penghuqu redevelopment has begun to assume the largest share in the 
entire budget for affordable housing. Table 4-1 below summarises key policy 
documents and practices on penghuqu redevelopment, discussed thus for. 
 
 
                                                      
28 The five departments are the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources, and People’s Bank of China (the central 
bank). 
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Table 4-1 Key policy documents and practices on penghuqu redevelopment 
Year Key documents or practices 
2005 Pilot practices of penghuqu redevelopment was conducted in Liaoning 
Province. 
2005 A conference chaired by a deputy-premier on the redevelopment of penghuqu 
in the northeast provinces was held, indicating it drew the attention of the central 
state. 
2006 The redevelopment of penghu appeared in the annual report of governmental 
work of the State Council. 
2007 Suggestions on resolving housing difficulties of low-income urban households 
was issued by the State Council. It was the starting point of establishing a new 
affordable housing system in China. It mentioned the redevelopment of 
penghuqu without details. 
2008 Suggestions on promoting the healthy development of property market was 
issued by the General Office of the State Council. It mentioned the 
redevelopment of penghuqu with some details. 
2009 Guiding suggestions on advancing the redevelopment of penghuqu in cities and 
state-owned factories and mines was issued by five constituting departments of 
the central government. It was the first document issued by the central 
government specifically on the redevelopment of penghuqu with many details. 
The redevelopment of penghuqu officially became part of the new affordable 
housing system. 
2013 Suggestions on accelerating the redevelopment of penghuqu issued by the State 
Council. It was the first policy document issued by the State Council itself on 
the redevelopment of penghuqu. 
2015 Suggestions on further works on the redevelopment of urban penghuqu and 
dilapidated housing in urban and rural areas and the construction of ancillary 
infrastructures was issued by the State Council. 
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Even though the redevelopment of penghuqu becomes increasingly significant 
in the new affordable housing system, the penghuqu redevelopment is different from 
other modes of affordable housing provision. A crucial difference is what they target. 
While affordable housing politices such as the cheap rent housing and public rental 
housing all target specific social groups (low-income urban residents), the 
redevelopment of penghuqu targets specific urban areas, that is, land. As the definition 
on penghuqu was quite ambiguous in those policy documents mentioned above and 
was ever-changing, it left a huge space for the local state to steer the practice of this 
policy to serve their own purposes, which constituted the first aspect of what I termed 
as “entrepreneurial managerialism”. This issue will be further examined in the next 
chapter. 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter provides the context for the research in three dimensions. First, I 
reviewed the history of the Third Front Construction from its origin to its termination 
and how it had been practiced locally in Qiancao. The experience and views of local 
residents in Qiancao were also included. Second, I outlined how the landscape in 
Qiancao was gradually shaped since the Third Front Construction, which provides this 
research with the physical context. As I will demonstrate later, space is not merely the 
container of what was happening, but rather a dynamic constituting factor. Third, I 
reviewed the efforts made by the central state in China to establish the new affordable 
housing system. Within this system, the redevelopment of penghuqu became 
increasingly important with a serious of policy change. In the next chapter, I will 
scrutinise these policy changes and show how the local state of Luzhou had taken 
advantage of such policy changes to serve its entrepreneurial purposes.
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Chapter 5 Orchestrating Penghuqu: Appropriating redistributive 
resources for entrepreneurial purposes 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In July 2015, when I first paid a study visit to Qiancao Peninsula, a notice board 
erected by the Qiancao Sub-district office at Qiancao Cross caught my eye. It said, 
“You have entered the region of penghuqu redevelopment” (see Figure 5-1). 
 
Figure 5-1 A notice board at Qiancao Cross 
Source: photo by the author, 13 September 2017. Notes: It said: “You have already entered the 
region of penghuqu redevelopment. Please take care of your safety. Notice by the Party Branch and 
Office of Qiancao Sub-District”. 
 
This notice made me feel somewhat confused, because the Qiancao I 
remembered was quite different from the archetypical penghuqu described in Chapter 
4. Later in my research, I found out that the redevelopment of the residential part of 
entire Qiancao had been carried out in the name of penghuqu redevelopment. Why did 
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the local state redevelop Qiancao under the aegis of penghuqu? In this chapter, I 
address this question. I argue that appropriating the title of penghuqu for urban 
redevelopment perfectly manifests what I define in Chapter 2 as “entrepreneurial 
managerialism”. 
The remaining part of this chapter is in five sections. Section 5.2 will continue 
the discussion in Chapter 4 on national policies of penghuqu redevelopment. The ever-
changing central policies met the desire of the local state for resources redistributed by 
the central state. Section 5.3 investigates the local practices in Luzhou to show how 
the local state orchestrated Qiancao as penghuqu. Section 5.4 reviews the trajectory of 
the local state in Luzhou towards entrepreneurialism and how its motivations to 
redevelop Qiancao have been generated. Being limited in its financial capacities, the 
local state in Luzhou had to pursue the capturing of external resources, for which the 
national project of penghuqu redevelopment seemed to offer such an opportunity. In 
Section 5.5, I discuss how the local practices in Luzhou can be interpreted by the idea 
of entrepreneurial managerialism and what further implications this idea may have. 
 
5.2 The ever-changing nature of penghuqu: entrepreneurial appropriation of 
penghuqu enabled by the central policies 
In Chapter 4, I have reviewed how the redevelopment of penghuqu gradually 
became the spine of China’s new affordable housing system. Despite its great 
importance, none of those policy documents issued by the central government 
contained a clear definition of penghuqu. It seems that penghuqu is like a policy doxa 
(common sense) (Bourdieu, 1996: 21). A relatively clear version could be found in a 
document issued by the Ministry of Finance (MOF, 2010), which defines penghuqu as 
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“a concentrated area of housing built on state-owned land, with crude structure, high 
density, long usage years, incomplete utilities, and inappropriate infrastructures”. This 
version of definition was in line with the broad image of those archetypical penghuqu 
mentioned earlier. In 2013, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
reconfirmed this definition (MOHURD, 2013), and further divided penghuqu into five 
categories, namely penghuqu neighbourhoods in urban areas, in state-owned factories 
and mines separated from urban areas, in state-owned forestry zones, in state-owned 
reclamation areas and in state-owned coal mines (ibid.). While these policy documents 
clarified that penghuqu was associated with state-owned land (rather than rural land 
owned by village collectives; for the dual-track land ownership system in China, see 
Lin and Ho, 2005; Wu, 2016: 634; Zhu, 2013), this definition remained flexible. 
In fact, I hope to demonstrate that the vagueness of the definition on penghuqu 
is somewhat intentional. Within the series of policies on penghuqu redevelopment, the 
length of the penghuqu redevelopment project, the scale and range of penghuqu, and 
the policy purpose were ever-changing. These changes not only enabled the local 
appropriation of penghuqu, but to some degree encouraged the strategic exploitation 
of penghuqu redevelopment for entrepreneurial purposes by the local state. 
 
The length of penghuqu redevelopment project 
In the policy document issued in 2008 (the General Office of the State Council, 
2008), the central government declared its schedule for the penghuqu redevelopment 
project. It set an ambitious goal of three years (from 2009 to 2011) for solving existing 
housing difficulties for all urban residents, including penghuqu redevelopment. Later, 
this goal was reconfirmed by the policy document issued in 2009 (MOHURD et al., 
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2009) with minor space for compromise. In general, it required the project of penghuqu 
redevelopment to be accomplished within three years. Regions with fiscal difficulties 
had their deadline extended by another two years until 2013. 
In 2013, the State Council (2013) issued its first policy document on penghuqu 
redevelopment. The year of 2013 was supposed to be the deadline for penghuqu 
redevelopment in all areas as stated above. This document, nevertheless, did not 
declare the termination of this project. On the contrary, it proposed a new tranche of 
penghuqu redevelopment for the next five years (2013 – 2017). Most recently, in May 
2017, the State Council (2017) proposed new task of penghuqu redevelopment again. 
The duration of the project would be further extended to 2020. 
It seems that the redevelopment of penghuqu has become an everlasting project 
that will never reach its end. In fact, even until 2014, when the national project of 
penghuqu redevelopment had been conducted for years, the central state was still 
urging local governments to figure out the remaining stock of penghuqu 
neighbourhoods within their administrations (General Office of the State Council, 
2014), suggesting the flexibility of this project. 
 
The Scale of penghuqu 
In tandem with the extension of the period scheduled for penghuqu 
redevelopment, the scale of penghuqu also expanded by nearly four-fold. According 
to the policy document issued in 2008 (General Office of the State Council, 2008), the 
number of all existing low-income urban residents with housing difficulties (including 
residents in penghuqu neighbourhoods) was estimated to be 7.47 million households. 
The number of residents in three other non-urban penghuqu, namely, penghuqu in 
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forestry zones, reclamation areas, and mines, was 2.4 million households. In 
combination, the figure was 9.87 million households altogether, or around 26.6 million 
people29. 
In 2013, the State Council summarised what had been achieved in the 
document it issued (State Council, 2013). According to this document, from 2008 to 
2012, penghuqu redevelopment had benefited 12.6 million households altogether, 
which is 27.7 per cent higher than the figure estimated in 2008 (General Office of the 
State Council, 2008). Furthermore, this document proposed another scale of penghuqu 
to be renovated in the next five years, which was 10 million households. This new goal 
indicates that a large number of additional neighbourhoods had been identified as 
penghuqu. 
Later, the scale of penghuqu further expanded for another two times. In 2015, 
the State Council issued a second document on penghuqu redevelopment (State 
Council, 2015). It indicated the aggregated number of renovated penghuqu households 
in 2013 and 2014 to be 8.2 million, and dramatically added another 18 million 
households to be subject to redevelopment in the next three years from 2015 to 2017 
(the original plan for this five years was 10 million). In May 2017, the State Council 
included another 15 million penghuqu households to be renovated until 2020 (State 
Council, 2017). In sum, the penghuqu redevelopment project will have affected 53.8 
million households from 2008 to 2020. This goal could be confirmed by the policy 
document issued in 2014 that promised to renovate penghuqu for 100 million people 
(General Office of the State Council, 2014). 
                                                      
29 The estimation of the total population is based on the sixth census of China’s population conducted in 1 November 
2010. According to the figure of this census, the average size of household in Chinese cities was 2.69 persons (see 
National Statistics Bureau, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rkpc/6rp/indexch.htm). 
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The changing definition of penghuqu 
The expanding scale of penghuqu could be partly explained by the extension 
of its definition. More and more categories of urban dwellings were counted as 
penghuqu. In 2007 (State Council, 2007), penghuqu and old residential areas (jiu 
zhuzhaiqu 旧住宅区) in cities were regarded as two separate categories. But in 2008, 
old and dangerous urban dwellings (weijiufang 危 旧 房) and “tube-shaped” flat 
buildings (tongzilou) 30  were informally incorporated into penghuqu and applied 
policies on penghuqu redevelopment 31 . “Tube-shaped” flat buildings, albeit 
dilapidated and condensed, were quite different from those archetypical modes of 
penghuqu. They were not temporary huts but formal residential buildings. But as 
feichengtaofang buildings, they also became the target of this policy.32 
A more significant change of the range of penghuqu was made in 2013. 
According to the policy document issued by the State Council (State Council, 2013), 
the redevelopment of village-in-the-city (chengzhongcun 城 中 村) 33  was also 
incorporated into the redevelopment of penghuqu. That is, village-in-the-city was 
regarded as a subcategory of penghuqu, which dramatically extended the scope of 
penghuqu redevelopment. As mentioned earlier, penghuqu was defined as dilapidated 
                                                      
30 Tube-shaped flat building is a kind of multi-storey residential buildings with a long corridor through the middle 
of each floor, by the side of which line domotories. Neighbours had to share kitchens and lavatories (Xia and Yin, 
2007: 22). Flats in tube-shaped buildings are a kind of typical feichengtaofang. Tube-shaped flat building was 
widely adopted as a standard style by public sectors to construct residential buildings for their employees in China 
since 1949. 
31 In the previous document issued in 2007, penghuqu was juxtaposed with old residential areas (jiu zhuzhaiqu 旧
住宅区), indicating they are two separate categories. However, in this document, dangerous and dilapidated urban 
housing and tube-shaped apartment buildings were put into a bracket associated to penghuqu [“实施城市棚户区（危
旧房、筒⼦楼）改造”], indicating that policies on penghuqu redevelopment could also be applied to these two types 
of buildings. 
32 In a conference I attended in December 2016 (2016 Asia Pacific Network for Housing Research Conference), 
Mr Feng Jun, the former chief economist of MOHURD, confirmed in his keynote speech that in the broadest sense, 
they could define feichengtaofang as penghuqu and include feichengtaofang in penghuqu redevelopment. 
33 For village-in-the-city in China, see Lin et al., 2011. 
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residential buildings on state-owned land. However, for many villages-in-the-city, 
their land is owned by rural collectives (Tian, 2008). To incorporate village-in-the-city 
into penghuqu further indicate the flexibility of this category. 
 
Policy purpose of penghuqu redevelopment 
It could not be denied that the redevelopment of penghuqu is an important 
redistributive measure to improve the living conditions of low-income urban residents. 
But from the beginning, the goal of improving social welfare was mixed with some 
other policy purposes. As mentioned earlier, the entire new affordable housing system 
in China was driven by the Keynesian ideology to cope with the financial crisis in 2008 
by boosting domestic consumption (Wu, 2017: 169). The policy documents repeatedly 
emphasised boosting domestic consumption (General Office of the State Council, 
2008; MOHURD et al., 2009). For Huang (2012: 944), the conflict between different 
policy goals associated with affordable housing provision, namely, boosting economic 
growth and maintaining political stability, could lead to the failure of this policy. 
The changing methods of compensating residents whose dwellings were to be 
demolished as part of penghuqu projects can serve as another evidence of the multiple 
policy purposes associated with penghuqu redevelopment. In 2008, the document 
encouraged local governments to provide residents with resettlement flats, rather than 
monetary compensation (General Office of the State Council, 2008). Later, according 
to the document issued in 2009 (MOHURD, 2009), the central state set monetary 
compensation parallel with the provision of resettlement housing without any 
preference. In 2015, however, the central government prioritised monetary 
compensation so that residents could purchase any suitable housing in the real estate 
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market within a short period as the construction of resettlement flats might take long 
(State Council, 2015). This dramatic reverse should be understood in a broader context. 
Years of heavy investment in the construction sector had oversupplied the real estate 
market. In 2015, the destocking of real estate became a new critical issue for the central 
government (Ma et al., 2016). The redevelopment of penghuqu, which could generate 
new heavy demand for housing, was regarded as a solution for this glut in the real 
estate market. As confirmed by a deputy-minister of the MOHURD (CE, 2016), the 
U-turn in methods of compensation was deliberately designed to serve the destocking 
of real estate. In 2015, the rate of monetary compensation reached 29.9 per cent, and 
increased to 50 per cent in 2016 (ibid.). 
 
The institutional arrangements for penghuqu redevelopment 
The ever-changing central policies on penghuqu redevelopment both enable 
and constrain the practices of the local state. Under the pressure of the central state, 
the local state had to conduct more penghuqu redevelopment projects to fulfil the 
requirement and ambition of the central state. In the meantime, as the central policies 
leave some flexibility, such as the vague definition of penghuqu, the local state could 
strategically appropriate the national project of penghuqu redevelopment for other 
purposes, such as entrepreneurial land grab. 
On the one hand, to secure its purposes of affordable housing provision, 
including penghuqu redevelopment, the central state introduced a kind of “central 
planning means” (Wang and Murie, 2011; Chen et al., 2014). To be specific, the central 
state would sign a “work task and responsibility contract” (gongzuo mubiao zerenshu 
⼯作⺫标责任书) with each local provincial government. Each province and, further, 
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each municipality, and county was allocated with a specific task of affordable housing 
provision. The situation of how the task had been achieved would become a 
determinant of local officials’ career advancement (Huang, 2012), making local 
officials under huge political pressure. 
On the other hand, the central state also provided various support to aid local 
practices (MOHURD et al., 2009). The central state promised to arrange specific 
subsidy funds for penghuqu redevelopment, along with tax exemptions. Financial 
institutions were authorised to lend money to penghuqu redevelopment projects. More 
importantly, for construction projects that were used to accommodate formers 
penghuqu residents, complicated administrative procedures, especially in relation to 
land supply, could be simplified. This was a very important incentive for local states 
with ambitions to profit from land, because the controls on land-use conversion 
became considerably stricter (Lin, 2015: 866-867). 
An important aspect that deserves more attention is the role played by financial 
institutions. In the pilot practice of penghuqu redevelopment in Liaoning Province, a 
key to its success that moved residents hastily to resettlement neighbourhoods was 
how these projects were being financed. A special long-term loan from the China 
Development Bank (CDB) was provided to cities in Liaoning to implement 
redevelopment projects (Southern Weekly, 2014a). The term of this loan could be as 
long as 15 years, with the potential revenues generated from land being made available 
for lease after the redevelopment of penghuqu as pledges (Ni et al., 2012: 113). In this 
regard, the redevelopment of penghuqu as a kind of redistribution, is inevitably linked 
with entrepreneurial land speculation. When the pilot practice in Liaoning extended 
nationwide, this model of financing and the role of the CDB became more significant. 
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In addition to the general institutional arrangement shown above, the central 
state also made some specific stipulations on the local practices. According to central 
policies (MOHURD, 2009), the redevelopment of penghuqu should adopt real 
“renovation” measures in neighbourhoods with acceptable conditions, such as 
enhancing construction frames, adding lifts and step-free accesses, and introducing 
environmentally friendly facilities. Redevelopment that entailed extensive demolition 
regardless of the actual conditions of neighbourhoods was strictly forbidden. The 
central state also required the local governments to preserve historic neighbourhoods. 
But in practice in Qiancao, this ban had been completely ignored. 
 
In this section, I reviewed how penghuqu gradually mutated from several 
standpoints. The redevelopment of penghuqu manifests what I defined as 
entrepreneurial managerialism. As part of the new affordable housing system, the 
redevelopment of penghuqu was designed by the central state as a critical redistributive 
measure to improve public welfare, particularly amongst the urban poor who had 
housing problems. 
However, some intrinsic features of the central policies on the redevelopment 
of penghuqu suggest that such a redistributive measure could be easily appropriated to 
serve entrepreneurial purposes upon implementation. First, the “definition” of 
penghuqu was somewhat vague and highly flexible. Many categories that deviated 
more or less from the archetypical modes of penghuqu were identified as penghuqu. 
In this way, tube-shaped flat buildings, dangerous and dilapidated urban housing, and 
villages-in-the-city, were gradually incorporated into penghuqu. Therefore, many 
practices of urban regeneration in China that were not first seen as “penghuqu 
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redevelopment”, such as the regeneration of old urban areas (jiucheng gaizao 旧城改
造) (Shin, 2009a), the renovation of the “three olds” (old urban areas, old factories, 
and old villages; sanjiu gaizao 三旧改造) (Li and Liu, 2018; Shin, 2013; Wu, 2018), 
and the redevelopment of villages-in-the-city (chengzhongcun  gaizao 城中村改造) 
(Shin, 2016a), could all come under the banner of penghuqu redevelopment and take 
advantage of those central state’s support measures.  
Second, the central state ambitiously expanded the scale of penghuqu 
redevelopment several times over, from approximately 10 million households to more 
than 50 million households. The expanded scale may demonstrate a broad 
accountability of the socialist state, but at the same time, it lends itself to the inclusion 
of some ineligible projects. Not only in the case of Luzhou, which I discuss below, but 
also in many other cases throughout China (NYT Chinese, 2013; Southern Weekly, 
2014b), many “ineligible” neighbourhoods were demolished and redeveloped in the 
name of penghuqu. 
Third, as indicated by the Liaoning case, the financial resources provided for 
the redevelopment of penghuqu were buttressed by the logic of land finance. The major 
sources of finance for projects of penghuqu reform were loans provided by the 
financial institution (CDB), rather than direct funding by the central government, 
suggesting a trend to financialisation of fiscal measures, or “financialisation of the 
state” (see Aalbers et al., 2017) in general. Therefore, the redevelopment of penghuqu, 
which by and large was a redistributive measure, merged with the land-centred 
entrepreneurial practices of the local state. 
Fourth, the central state tried to use the redevelopment of penghuqu, or more 
broadly, the entire affordable housing system, to serve several policy purposes 
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simultaneously (Huang, 2012). From the beginning, the new affordable housing 
system by the central state was designed not only to improve public welfare, but also 
to expand domestic consumption and therefore, boost economic growth. 
In this regard, the redevelopment of penghuqu would exemplify what I refer to 
as entrepreneurial managerialism: a mechanism that makes use of redistribution to 
serve entrepreneurial purposes. As discussed in the following section, the 
redevelopment of Qiancao, within which the local state in Luzhou orchestrated all the 
residential areas on Qiancao Peninsula as penghuqu, demonstrates how the 
redevelopment of penghuqu as entrepreneurial managerialism is put into practice. 
 
5.3 Orchestrating Qiancao as Penghuqu: the practice of entrepreneurial 
managerialism 
Becoming penghuqu 
As illustrated at the beginning of this chapter, the actual redevelopment of 
Qiancao strategically commandeered the national project of penghuqu redevelopment. 
The redevelopment of the entire peninsula, both industrial and residential areas, was 
conducted in the name of the relocation and reform of the old industrial zones 
(laogongyequ banqian gaizao ⽼⼯业区搬迁改造). In 2013, the central government 
scheduled a 10-year national programme (2013-2022) focusing on the reform of old 
industrial bases (NDRC, 2013). This programme identified 120 cities throughout 
China, in which key factories built in the early years of the socialist regime (including 
the Third Front Construction period) were located. Luzhou was listed among these 120 
cities. This programme not only provided guidelines on the transformation of industry 
per se, but also emphasised that the redevelopment of penghuqu was a critical part of 
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this programme and would improve public welfare (NDRC, 2013: 8, 24-25). In 
addition, just like the national project of penghuqu redevelopment, the central 
government would also support local governments in different ways to facilitate the 
implementation of this programme. 
In accordance with the guidelines, after a series of preparatory work, the local 
government of Luzhou issued a document in October 2014 on the redevelopment of 
Qiancao and an adjacent region identifying the area as an old industrial zone in need 
of modernisation (LRDC, 2014). This document reemphasised the local history in 
relation to the Third Front Construction, stating that (ibid.: 7):  
“Luzhou is a typical old industrial city in western China. Thanks to its 
abundant natural gas resource, Luzhou became the origin of China’s chemical industry 
of natural gas and was listed by the central government as a key region during the Third 
Front Construction period. Being fuelled by several factories under the direct 
administration of the central government, which had been relocated here, Luzhou 
started to establish its complete and independent industrial system and achieved great 
success.” 
In fact, while the Third Front Construction had long been absent from local 
narratives, such reemphasis gave the zones some priority for their redevelopment as 
stipulated by the State Council (State Council, 2013). The Luzhou document provided 
reasons to justify wholesale demolition in Qiancao. On the one hand, it identified the 
lack of sufficient space as part of the operation difficulties for the three factories in 
Qiancao (LRDC, 2014: 1-2). Surrounded by urban areas and without additional space, 
these factories could not expand, rearrange their work flows more scientifically to 
improve performance and add facilities to abate pollution. At the same time, the 
existence of these factories so close to the city centre prevented the expansion of the 
city and brought pollution to the city centre, which was regarded as ecologically 
 
 
141 
unfriendly. The only solution, therefore, was to relocate these factories away from the 
city centre to a suburb. 
On the other hand, all the residential buildings in Qiancao were generally 
described in the document as penghuqu (LRDC, 2014: 2), thus legitimising their 
demolition for redevelopment. According to the document, most residential buildings 
in Qiancao had been built between the 1950s and the 1970s. They were primarily 
single-storey or low-rise buildings. They were described as roughly constructed, thus 
not structurally sound to resist disasters such as earthquakes. It was also said that with 
several decades passing by, they had also become dilapidated and were in urgent need 
of refurbishment. These descriptions reflected the “official definition” of penghuqu 
provided by the central government (MOHURD, 2013). The document even included 
a survey by the district government to buttress its claims (LRDC, 2014: 98). In 2012, 
the District Government hosted a meeting of residents’ representatives34. Surprisingly, 
according to the 431 questionnaires collected, 428 of the respondents (99.30 per cent) 
answered that they were aware of the penghuqu redevelopment project, and all of them 
were willing to be relocated. 
Such a description of its residential buildings, however, deviated from the 
actual situation in Qiancao, as shown in Chapter 4. Admittedly, some of its residential 
buildings had been built in the 1960s and 1970s, and that limited by the prevailing 
conditions during the Third Front Construction, their quality might not have been very 
high (more on this in Chapter 7). Most dwellings were also feichengtaofang. From this 
perspective, they might be regarded as penghuqu. However, contrary to the document’s 
description, most of the residential buildings in Qiancao were built after the 1980s, 
                                                      
34 No details of these representatives were provided. 
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and some had even been built in this century (see Figure 4-6). They were not yet 
obsolete. But according to this document, all 15,248 households, or more than 35,000 
people, could be called penghuqu residents. 
Unlike such mega-cities as Shanghai and Guangzhou, Luzhou, a middle-sized 
city in Western China without too many factories, had no prominent penghuqu (tube-
shaped flat buildings, or villages-in-the-city) of any kind. According to official 
statistics, in the 1980s, the whole municipality’s stock of housing units categorised as 
“dangerous dwellings” (weifang 危房) (not penghuqu but bears quite similar meaning) 
was decreasing. In 1986, its total size was 100,000 square metres, while in 1989, the 
number was 81,000 square metres35. These numbers were in sharp contrast with the 
size of penghuqu dwellings as mentioned in 2010. According to a local chronicle, the 
entire municipality of Luzhou occupied 235,600 square metres of penghuqu, inhabited 
by 5,494 households (OLC, 2010: 255). This chronicle also stated a modest plan to 
provide resettlement housing for 1,138 households living in penghuqu residents (ibid.). 
In 2013, the local state had a separate plan to conduct penghuqu redevelopment for 
3,840 households (OLC, 2013: 304), and in 2014, the original plan for penghuqu 
redevelopment was 3,056 households (OLC, 2014: 309). 
Nevertheless, fuelled by the wholesale redevelopment of Qiancao, the actual 
figure of penghuqu redevelopment throughout Luzhou in 2014 reached 26,191 
households (OLC, 2015: 300), more than eight times as large as originally planned. 
Qiancao alone had 15,248 households, covering more than 600,000 square metres, 
                                                      
35 According to official statistics, the number was 100,000 square metres in 1986, 98,000 in 1987, 91,000 in 1988, 
and 81,000 in 1989 (LBS, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990). Due to the change of statistics criteria, no successive figures 
are available. 
 
 
143 
significantly higher than the number identified in 2010 (OLC, 2010: 255), even if the 
latter included all the penghuqu neighbourhood throughout the entire municipality. 
Both the sharp increase in the numbers according to the official statistics, and 
the fact that many “ineligible” residential buildings in Qiancao were categorised as 
penghuqu, may demonstrate that, in order to procure the support redistributed by the 
central government to redevelop Qiancao, the local state in Luzhou strategically took 
advantage of the flexible definition of penghuqu. By reemphasising the history of 
Qiancao as it related to the Third Front Construction and exaggerating the negative 
aspects of the living conditions in Qiancao, the local state managed to discursively 
invent the largest penghuqu in Luzhou. Moreover, as noted above, the redevelopment 
of Qiancao was also the largest single project of penghuqu redevelopment in the entire 
province of Sichuan (Sichuan Daily, 2016). By doing so, earlier in 2013, Luzhou 
municipal government had borrowed 6.2 billion yuan that could be used only for the 
redevelopment of penghuqu from the China Development Bank to redevelop Qiancao. 
This sum of money was enough to fulfil the entrepreneurial ambition of the local state 
to acquire land in Qiancao (see Section 5.4). With this money, in 2013, even before the 
redevelopment of Qiancao was officially initiated, the local state hastily started to build 
resettlement housing to accommodate residents being evacuated from Qiancao, even 
without a clarification of how many people it needed to accommodate (Sichuan Daily, 
2016). Equally, this money also allowed the local state in Luzhou to carry out its 
allotted task of penghuqu redevelopment. 
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Designating an industrial heritage site in Qiancao 
Another part of the plan for redeveloping Qiancao, although not directly linked 
to penghuqu, may indicate more of the essence of entrepreneurial managerialism; that 
is, the designation of an industrial heritage site in Qiancao. The emergence of this 
project in the course of Qiancao’s redevelopment was unexpected even for local 
officials. As said by a high-level cadre in the Qiancao Sub-district Office, “only until 
the municipal leaders came to pay a visit to the industrial heritage site in Changqi 
earlier this year [2015] did we know some workshops would not be demolished.” 
(interview OH-1001) Some earlier plan to redevelop Qiancao meant to demolish all 
the existing buildings on this peninsula (See Section 5.4). But the detailed plan of 
redeveloping Qiancao issued in 2014 implies further revision that allowed some 
buildings previously for industrial use to be transformed into an industrial heritage site 
for conservation. 
The industrial heritage site in Qiancao owes its appearance to several factors. 
First, the national programme on reforming old industrial bases issued in 2013 (NDRC, 
2013) included the need of preserving industrial heritage. This programme encouraged 
local government to preserve industrial buildings that exhibited local features and 
transform them into cultural use (for example, museums, industrial heritage parks, 
studios, and sites for creative industries) (ibid: 16). As a localised practice of this 
national programme, the redevelopment of Qiancao needed to follow the guideline and 
add an industrial heritage site. Second, according to a local official in charge (interview 
OH-2002), some reputable “insightful persons” suggested the preservation of some 
old workshops as industrial heritage sites, a representative of whom was Mr. Wang 
Guoping. Mr Wang, the former Party Secretary of Hangzhou, the capital city of 
Zhejiang Province, began to serve as a planning consultant for the Luzhou municipal 
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government from 2013. When in power, he had been an active promoter of the 
industrial heritage (ZJOL, 2009). He and the think-tank of which he was a member 
suggested that the municipal government of Luzhou should include this industrial 
heritage site in the planning of Qiancao (interview OH-2002), transferring the practices 
of Hangzhou. This would be equal to what critics refer to as a Chinese version of 
“policy mobility” (He et al., 2018; cf. McCann, 2011). 
The plan for the redevelopment of Qiancao (LDRC, 2014) endowed the 
industrial heritage site with great significance. It evaluated the industrial heritage sites 
in Qiancao, the products of the three factories, and associated culture, were important 
ingredients of the city’s industrial heritage (both tangible and intangible) (ibid.: 62). 
They “recorded and witnessed the industrialisation and economic development of 
Luzhou from ancient times to the modern age, authentically reflected the role of 
Luzhou in the social economic life of different eras, and demonstrated the contribution 
made by this old industrial city to human civilisation, scientific improvement, and 
cultural development” (ibid.). The official whom I interviewed (interview OH-2002) 
and some of the official documents he left with me also drew attention to the 
importance of the three factories as part of the Third Front Construction and to their 
unique position in Luzhou’s history. All these discourses tried to testify the great 
cultural value of the industrial heritage site. 
But in practice, this site reflected the entrepreneurial essence of this project. 
First, the industrial heritage site was very selectively marked out. Since these industrial 
workshops had in no sense been identified as historical buildings, the urban planners 
could select any site to preserve, whilst demolishing others, according to the needs of 
its redevelopment and with no regard to the value of the buildings per se. According 
to a local official (Interview OH-2002), the proposal provided by Mr Wang was based 
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on the ideology of “preserving all that should be preserved” (yangbao jinbao 应保尽
保), which Mr Wang had advocated in Hangzhou (UrbanChina, 2014). In his proposal, 
the area that merited preservation would reach 50 ha. The party secretary of Luzhou, 
Mr Jiang, agreed with Mr Wang’s suggestion only up to a point and in its final version, 
the area in the plan identified for preservation had reduced to 9.9 ha, retaining only 
some workshops of Changqi. All buildings of Changwa and Changye, although they 
shared a similar history to Changqi’s, were scheduled for demolition. Within Changqi, 
only the industrial buildings constructed during the 1970s were classified as Type One 
(valuable) buildings (see Figure 5-2, left). An additional round of selection continued 
in all the buildings identified as Type One: Those that could not fit into the future street 
pattern in Qiancao after redevelopment could not survive, either (see Figure 5-2, right). 
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Figure 5-2 The plan of the industrial heritage site 
Source: planning documents provided by the local planning authority. Notes: the planned street 
pattern was also included in this design plan. The rightmost building, although indicated was to be 
preserved here, had been demolished later (see Figure 5-10). 
 
Figure 5-3 The remaining buildings in Changqi after demolition (some would be further demolished) 
Source: extracted from google map. Note: satellite photo taken on 26 July 2017. 
Criteria of classification 
History of buildings Type One Two Three Four 
Buildings suggested to be preserved 
Buildings suggested to be demolished 
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Second, the selection of sites to be preserved was based on some simple and 
rigid criteria proposed by the planners (how long ago they had been built, whether or 
not they would fit into the planned street pattern), while the opinions of the public, 
especially those who had worked and lived in Qiancao for more than half a century, 
were completely ignored. According to some (former) workers of Changqi whom I 
interviewed (interview CQ-2101, CQ-2014, CQ-2018), they more or less agreed that 
preserving some buildings of value was welcome36 . But when asked about which 
specific buildings they thought should be kept, they all mentioned the main building 
of Changqi, whilst holding a conservative attitude towards those old workshops that 
were to be kept. Some employees of Changqi even called these dilapidated workshops 
as dilapidated “peng” (hut) without any value (Interviews CQ-2101, CQ-2014), or the 
right target of the penghuqu redevelopment policy. As a local feature of the built 
landscape in the 1980s, the main building of Changqi had once been the highest 
building in Qiancao, symbolically serving as a significant icon of the workers’ 
collective memory. As one respondent commented (interview CQ-2108): 
“In my view, our main building was peerlessly solid! In my heart, looking at 
it emotionally, I feel it should be kept. That building could resist a scale 8 earthquake. 
It was very well constructed. In our office, we once wanted to put an extra door in the 
wall, so I had a chance to see the internal structure and how thick the steel thread used 
in this building was. In my opinion, industrial heritage could be preserved first as a 
physical thing, second as a shared memory. You (the government) could convert this 
building into a shopping mall, or into an office building. Why is the government’s only 
option to demolish it?” 
But this building had been classified merely as a Type Two building and it was 
eventually reduced to rubble in January 2017 (see Figure 5-4). 
                                                      
36 I mentioned the issue of industrial heritage in many interviews, but most respondents were indifferent to it. 
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Figure 5-4 The final days of the main building of Changqi 
Source: Photo by the author, 31 December 2016. 
 
Third, the proposed main function of this industrial heritage site in the future 
would be to serve the real estate complexes nearby. Following the practice in other 
cities37 , these industrial workshops would be converted into an industrial heritage 
complex, including a Third Front Construction museum, a Third-Front-Construction 
themed hotel and restaurants, venues for branding and exhibitions, a centre for micro-
film, workshops for artists, and a shopping space with Sichuan characteristics, et cetera. 
According to a local official in charge (interview OH-2002), based on a more realistic 
appraisal, after redevelopment, these facilities would mainly serve nearby residents, 
but would have limited potential to attract tourists from other cities. 
In general, although the industrial heritage site in Qiancao had the support of 
discourses about the value of industry, its underlying motivation was still a kind of 
                                                      
37 When I conducted my fieldwork, the detailed design for this industrial heritage site was not completed yet. But 
the local planning officials provided me some documents of the preliminary design schemes. These design 
institutions were based in Guangzhou. Their scheme referred to some industrial heritage projects in Guangzhou, 
and in Ruhr. 
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entrepreneurialism. The local history as regards industry, especially the Third Front 
Construction, was strategically mobilised to justify this project, making it more 
eligible for the resources redistributed by the central state. As I have shown, the 
planning of this site demonstrates the “politics of selection” as observed by many 
scholars on (historic) heritage preservation (Yeoh and Huang, 1996; Zukin, 1982), 
although its true purpose was more closely related to real estate speculation than 
cultural politics. In this regard, the preservation of the industrial heritage is still a mode 
of “symbolic urban preservation” in China (Zhang, 2008). But its underlying logic is 
in line with land-centred entrepreneurialism (Shin, 2010; Su, 2015). In this regard, the 
survival of some workshops as industrial heritage and the clearance of most of the on-
site buildings in the name of penghuqu redevelopment or the reform of an old industrial 
base actually serve the same entrepreneurial purpose of capital accumulation through 
land development, in spite of the face that they suggest opposing destinies of buildings 
in the same region. 
 
5.4 The entrepreneurial ambition for land accumulation in Qiancao 
To redevelop Qiancao has long been embedded in the local state’s 
entrepreneurial desire for land, just like many other cities in China (Wu, 2003; Qian, 
2011; Zheng, 2011; Chien, 2013a; He et al., 2018). In fact, driven by growing benefits 
accumulated from land, the local authority in Luzhou revised its plan several times. In 
this regard, it seems that the entrepreneurial local state had a well-prepared project for 
long. When the financial resources redistributed by the central state offered the 
opportunity for its realisation, the local state would strategically appropriate those 
resources to achieve its ambitions. In this section, I explore Luzhou’s trajectory 
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towards entrepreneurialism featured by land accumulation and the evolution of the 
redevelopment planning for Qiancao. 
 
Luzhou’s trajectory towards urban entrepreneurialism 
Luzhou is an “old industrial base” in Sichuan Province, partly because the 
Third Front Construction brought in machine industries and enhanced the local natural 
gas industry. When Luzhou was upgraded to a prefectural-level city in 1983, the local 
government was making four sectors of industry the pillars of local economy, namely 
natural gas (tianranqi 天然⽓), machinery manufacturing (notably in the three factories 
named after the Changjiang River), underground natural resources (dixia ziyuan 地下
资源, mainly coal), and Chinese liquor (baijiu ⽩酒). As the abbreviation of the four 
industries (Tian-Chang-Di-Jiu 天 ⻓ 地 酒) is pronounced the same as the word 
“everlasting” in Mandarin (tian chang di jiu 天⻓地久), it was at one time used as the 
name card of the city (Luzhou Daily, 2010). 
However, since the 1990s, when the system of planned economy came to an 
end, these industrial sectors, especially machinery manufacturing, increasingly 
performed so poorly that their products could hardly compete with their rivalry except 
under the auspices of the redistributive system (ibid.). The local state tried many ways 
of revitalising the local industry, such as promoting the chemical industry, the energy 
industry, and investing in transportation infrastructure. In 2001, the local state adopted 
as Luzhou’s new brand name “the City of Chemical Industry in Western China” (xibu 
huagongcheng ⻄部化⼯城) (People’s Daily, 2001); this still centred on the city’s 
efforts in industry, and reemphasised the pillars of the local economy as “coal, 
electricity, highways, the chemical industry, and the harbour” (Luzhou Daily, 2010); 
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however, machinery manufacturing had completely disappeared. Unfortunately, apart 
from investment in the built environment (or, in Harvey’s term (1978), the secondary 
circuit of capital), these measures to boost industrial production and extract natural 
resources were not altogether effective. 
The final remedy was the land-centred entrepreneurial mode of urban 
governance (see Chapter 2) (Wu, 2018), or “managing the city like entrepreneurs” 
(jingying chengshi 经营城市)38 in line with those successful models that had emerged 
from some metropolitan cities in the 1990s (Hsing, 2006). In Luzhou, the local 
government adopted a series of entrepreneurial measures. First, the old name card, “the 
City of Chemical Industry” was abandoned, partly because of the poor impression any 
reference to the polluted chemical industry might make (Zhong et al., 2003). An older 
name card, “China City of Liquor” (zhongguo jiucheng 中国酒城) was reinstated for 
city branding, but this time, liquor did not refer to the brewing industry, but was used 
symbolically to make the city unique, and therefore, attractive. Second, plans for 
boosting the local economy did not focus on industries only, but were extended to the 
creation of industrial parks and new urban areas, as well as the construction of 
transportation infrastructure (Luzhou Daily, 2010; for the replacement of industry by 
industrial parks, see also Hsing, 2010: 6). Third, the state-run land transaction centre 
was established in 2000 (OLC, 2001: 188). From then on, the revenues from land 
transaction have constituted a critical portion of extra-budgetary revenue for Luzhou. 
In 2017, the peak year, the fees for land-transfer reached 18.23 billion yuan (CHYXX, 
2018), which was nearly 25 per cent higher than the budgetary fiscal revenue (14.6 
                                                      
38 In Sichuan Province, the city of Nanchong is the model city of the entrepreneurial management of city. According 
to a deputy mayor of Nanchong, jingying chengshi means “treating city as economic entity and participant in the 
market. The urban government can mobilise its power to utilize physical resources such as land, mines, public 
facilities, and space, and symbolic resources of a city for capital accumulation and the improvement of the city” 
(Fu, 2003; also see Zhao, 2017, Chapter 2 for a discussion). 
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billion yuan) (LZEP, 2018). To make the massive land leasing possible, the size of 
Luzhou’s urban area increased dramatically (see Figure 5-5). While the size of Luzhou 
hardly changed at all in the 1990s, the city expanded nearly three-fold within the ten 
years from 2007 to 2017, making Luzhou the third largest city in Sichuan after 
Chengdu, the provincial capital, and Mianyang, a key industrial base during the Third 
Front Construction (cf. Chapter 4). Meanwhile, many spectacular buildings were 
constructed to demonstrate the “modern” façade of this city (see Figure 5-6). 
 
Figure 5-5 The expansion of Luzhou’s Urban Area 
Source: City Chronicles of Sichuan, Sichuan Statistic Yearbook (1999-2016), and Annual Work 
Report of the Luzhou municipal government (2018). Notes: The number for 2000 is not available. These 
numbers, although all are published by the government official reports, may not be fully reliable. The 
reason for the numbers in the three years from 2006 to 2008 being smaller than those from 2003 to 2005 
cannot be verified. However, the general trend of urban expansion is evident. 
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Figure 5-6 The Crossing near Luzhou Theatre, an angle widely used to show urban spectacles in Luzhou 
Source: Sichuan Daily (http://epaper.scdaily.cn/shtml/scrb/20170504/162342.shtml). 
 
The evolution of planning for Qiancao driven by entrepreneurialism 
Amid the drastic urban transformation in Luzhou, Qiancao Peninsula remained 
quite inactive, despite its proximity to the city centre. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the appearance of Qiancao remained almost unchanged after 2002. It seemed 
a poorly planned mixture of dilapidated industrial plant and old residential buildings. 
The lagging behind of urban construction in Qiancao may have been due to two 
reasons. In the first place, although Qiancao faces the city centre of Luzhou on the 
opposite bank of the Changjiang River, the lack of a bridge made easy access 
impossible. It would take more than half an hour for vehicles to reach the other end by 
using the only narrow route via the southern suburb. Second, the intensive mingling 
of industrial and residential uses of land rendered any redevelopment (that had to be 
large in scale) costly. 
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But the potentially superior location of Qiancao Peninsula made it impossible 
for the local state to give up further attempts at (re-)developing it. In my interview with 
the local planning officials, as the time spanned for a quite long period, no one could 
introduce me in details how the planning for the redevelopment of Qiancao had 
gradually changed, but the planning documents they provided me could still reveal this 
trajectory. 
In 2003, the local planning authority formulated a way of developing the 
peninsula (see Figure 5-7). This plan was relatively conservative, keeping most of its 
existing urban fabric intact. It would convert only the parcels of land under agricultural 
use. To lift the transportation barrier, it was planned to build a bridge directly 
connecting Qiancao with the city centre. The northernmost part of this peninsula, 
where the three factories were standing, was still designated for industrial use. Heavier 
redevelopment would occur in the southernmost part of Qiancao Peninsula, converting 
rural land to use into residential, commercial and industrial purposes. 
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Figure 5-7 Land Use Planning for the Regulatory Planning of Shawan-Qiancao (August 2003) 
Source: provided by the Urban Planning Bureau of Luzhou Municipality. Notes: Yellow 
represents for residential land use, red for commercial use, and brown for industrial use. 
esign 
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However, such conservative planning was soon replaced by a more radical 
version. Two years later, the local planning authority revised the master plan of Luzhou 
(see Figure 5-8). This version attempted to further transform the urban landscape in 
Qiancao, that is, to convert industrial land for use in real estate development. Although 
China’s urbanisation process is in general characterised by a mode of urbanisation 
occurring in tandem with industrialisation (Shin, 2014a), rather than acting as a 
“spatial fix” for the over-accumulation in the primary circuit of capital, the 
deindustrialisation of specific places (normally inner cities) and the shift in capital 
accumulation from industrial-based circulation in the socialist period to an urban-
based development in post-reform China (Wu, 2015: 203; see also Shin, 2016b) could 
also occur. 
In Qiancao, a “rent gap” (Smith, 1987) generated by two factors made the 
deindustrialisation profitable (see also Shin, 2006). On the one hand, with the 
performance of the three factories becoming poorer, the land in Qiancao, which had 
been primarily used for industrial purposes, became underused. On the other, as the 
real estate prices went up, the land in Qiancao Peninsula, which is close to the city 
centre, revealed its potential to earn increased ground rents. Consequently, this version 
of urban planning proposed to relocate the three factories for another time (after the 
Third Front Construction) to an industrial park designated in the suburbs (see Figure 
5-8). This would release more land for residential and commercial development, and 
in the meantime, augment Luzhou’s urban area. 
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Figure 5-8 Urban Master Plan of Luzhou (2004-2020) 
Source: provided by the Urban Planning Bureau of Luzhou Municipality. Notes: Yellow 
represents for residential land use, red for public facilities use, and brown for industrial use. 
 
Five years later, in 2010, when the local planning authority formulated 
regulatory planning for Qiancao Peninsula in particular, the redevelopment plan for 
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Qiancao became even more ambitious (see Figure 5-9). As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
different types of land usage in Qiancao are highly mixed (see Figure 4-5). Removing 
only industrial would leave fragmented areas available for redevelopment, limiting the 
amount of ground rent that might be yielded. Therefore, to maximise the revenue that 
might be reaped from Qiancao, this version of the plan, like many other wholesale 
demolition projects in the Global East (Shin et al., 2016: 460; Shin, 2016b), proposed 
to clear almost all existing buildings in Qiancao, reorganise the road net into well-
arranged blocks, and allocate land parcels in a more rational way (see Figure 5-9). 
Nevertheless, this ambitious plan would have cost a great deal to realise. Not 
only have the three main factories and some smaller factories required to be relocated, 
but also around 30,000 residents also had to be relocated. Constrained by its fiscal 
capability, the local state in Luzhou initiated no redevelopment work for years. In 2008, 
it began to construct a new bridge to shorten the distance between Qiancao Peninsula 
and the city centre of Luzhou. Although the main work finished in 2012, one of its 
approach bridges leading to the central area of Qiancao remained incomplete (see 
Figure 5-10), pending the initiation of redevelopment in Qiancao, which had later been 
launched in 2014. 
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Figure 5-9 Land Use Planning for the Regulatory Planning of Shawan-Qiancao (September 2010) 
Source: provided by the Urban Planning Bureau of Luzhou Municipality. Notes: Yellow 
represents for residential land use, red for commercial use. No industrial land any more. 
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Figure 5-10 The imcomplete approach bridge above Qiancao Peninsula 
Source: photo by the author, September 2015. Notes: The photo below is the end of the 
approach bridge. The tall building ahead is the main office building of Changqi. 
 
After 2014, the planning for Qiancao was further revised (see Figure 5-11). An 
evident change was the incorporation of the industrial heritage site. In all, the 
redevelopment of Qiancao promised to provide a bright future for its three struggling 
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factories, and better living conditions for the “penghuqu” residents. More importantly, 
it also aimed to transform Qiancao Peninsula into a modern urban core of Luzhou, 
characterised by such sectors as “modern finance, commercial service, creative 
industries, urban tourism, and eco-inhabitancy” (LDRC, 2014: 1) (see also Figure 5-
12). When we take the entire course of the changes of the redevelopment plan for 
Qiancao into consideration, it becomes evident that the third purpose, namely the 
property-led redevelopment, is the major motivation. 
 
Figure 5-11 Regulatory Planning for Qiancao Peninsula 
Source: provided by the Urban Planning Bureau of Luzhou Municipality. Notes: Although the 
time marked on this planning was December 2016, I obtained it in 2015. The section circled out in 
yellow is the proposed industrial heritage site. 
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Figure 5-12 Design Sketch of Qiancao 
Source: extracted from a document (August 2016) provided by the local planning authority. 
Notes: those low-rise buildings under the highest building is the industrial heritage site. 
 
The evolution of Qiancao’s planning demonstrates the entrepreneurial urban 
governance now centring on land use in China. Planning is adopted as a governing tool 
to serve the local growth machine (Wu, 2015: 116). Motivated by anticipation of ever-
increasing economic returns from land speculation, the local state has become steadily 
more ambitious to transform existing landscapes, even beyond its current financial 
capability. When the central state provides some redistributive resources, either as 
direct funds, or such non-material support as the relaxation of some strict regulations, 
the local state in desperate need of external resources would actively seize the 
opportunity, and appropriate these resources to meet its entrepreneurial goal. In 
Qiancao’s case, the national project of redeveloping penghuqu and the revitalisation 
of old industrial bases provided the long-awaited opportunities. 
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5.5 Discussions 
The decline of an urban neighbourhood is not such a process determined purely 
by the market, but rather the result of the collective works of different agents (Aalbers, 
2006; Weber, 2002). In terms of the role played by the state, to justify the 
redevelopment of specific (modes of) neighbourhoods in the city, it can take various 
measures. First, it may directly intervene to make the conditions of the neighbourhoods 
physically deteriorate. For example, as shown by Fulong Wu (2016) with a case in 
Shanghai, the state did not provide satisfactory facilities and services for migrant 
neighbourhoods, but enforced stringent control over spontaneous housing 
development, such as size expansion and facilities improvement, rendering a thriving 
neighbourhood to decline and eventually deteriorate. By dominating the right of 
redevelopment, the state could maximise its revenue and replace informal urban 
neighbourhoods to state-sanctioned formal properties. 
Second, the state can manipulate policy tools and adjust the definition on what 
neighbourhoods are targeted for demolition and redevelopment, making them more 
responsive to redevelopment. As revealed by Rachel Weber (2002), in the United 
States, the justification for urban redevelopment project entailed a gradual change from 
“blight” to “obsolescence”. The former has been framed around a state in which the 
built environment was deteriorated or physically impaired beyond normal use, which 
is concerned more with the compromised use value (Weber, 2002: 526). In comparison, 
the proof for obsolescence is tightly associated with exchange value. Even if the built 
environment has not been deteriorated physically yet, its decreasing profitability in the 
market serves as a neoliberal alibi for creative destruction (ibid., 532). Such a change 
also reflect the overwhelming priority of exchange value over use value (Purcell, 2002). 
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Third, the state can also make the neighbourhoods worsen in a more discursive 
manner to defame specific (modes of) urban neighbourhoods (Gray and Porter, 2014). 
When discussing some recent policy changes associated to public housing in the UK, 
that is, the emerging discourse of “sink estate”, Tom Slater (2018) referred to 
Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power. According to Bourdieu (1991: 170), symbolic 
power is: 
“[T]he power to constitute the given through utterances, to make people see 
and believe, to confirm or to transform the vision of the world and, thereby, action 
upon the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power that enables one to 
obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (physical or economic) by 
virtue of the specific effect of mobilisation. … What makes for the power of words and 
watchwords, the power to maintain or to subvert order, is belief in the legitimacy of 
the words and those who utter them.” 
Or according to Wacquant’s interpretation (2017: 57), symbolic power is: 
“… the capacity for consequential categorization, the ability to make the 
world, to preserve or change it, by fashioning and diffusing symbolic frames, collective 
instruments of cognitive construction of reality.” 
For Slater (2018), “sink estate” is such a discursive reality constituted by 
symbolic powers. It condemned social housing estate in the UK as the incubator of 
poverty, family fissure, unemployment, welfare dependency, antisocial behaviours, 
rife and all social ills. With such symbolic frame, the powerful institutions can control 
public (un)awareness and justify the demolition of social housing estates, or even the 
abandonment of entire social housing system, and release more space for the real estate 
speculation (ibid.). 
As manifested by the policy mutations and Qiancao’s case, the Chinese concept 
of penghuqu is also a kind of discursive reality, or in the Lefebvrian sense (Lefebvre, 
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1991: 31-39), the “spaces of representations” conceived by people in power. Being 
informed by its archetypical mode, penghuqu became a doxa (Bourdieu, 1996: 21), a 
self-evident category not only among policymakers, but also among academics. As 
noted in Chapter 4, researchers on affordable housing policies in China usually 
translate the term penghuqu as shanty town without in-depth query of its essence (Chen 
et al., 2014; Shi et al., 2016; Li et al., 2018), or differentiate this round of penghuqu 
redevelopment, of which the scale is dramatically larger, from previous ones in terms 
of their locations (interpreting this round of penghuqu redevelopment as being 
conducted in non-prime locations) (Huang, 2012: 943). The project of penghuqu 
redevelopment has been justified in a somewhat self-evident way by discourses on the 
detrimental living conditions within this kind of neighbourhood. 
But if viewing from the perspective of stigmatization or symbolic defamation, 
the case of penghuqu is interestingly different from the practice as described by Slater 
(2018). Within the discourse of “sink estate”, not only the neighbourhood per se has 
been stigmatised, but more importantly, the residents of these neighbourhoods as well. 
They were condemned for being welfare dependent. This manifested the retreat of the 
state from social provision as guided by the neoliberal ideology. However, the 
stigmatisation of penghuqu entails a more paternalist discourse. Penghuqu residents 
are not directly stigmatised. On the contrary, their urgent desire for an improved living 
condition was used to buttress the redevelopment. Redistribution serves as the remedy, 
rather than the cause, of their plight, which manifest the persistence of managerial 
mode of urban governance. 
In Luzhou, the local authority also orchestrated Qiancao as penghuqu in a 
discursive way that highlighted selective facts and intentional ignorance of some 
others (or following Slater (2018: 879), agonotology). On the one hand, the negative 
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aspects of the living conditions in Qiancao that fitted the archetypical mode of 
penghuqu were exaggerated; its special linkage with the Third Front Construction, 
which could allow the local state to obtain priority in the resource redistribution, was 
rejuvenated. On the other, the heterogeneous conditions of different types of housing 
in Qiancao, which could render the wholesale redevelopment of Qiancao collide with 
central policies that forbid indiscriminate demolition, were intentionally bypassed. 
Those buildings in acceptable, or even decent, conditions were also designated as 
penghuqu, even though they were not “blight” in functional sense; they were regarded 
as obsolete that constituting obstacles for higher exchange value, which dominated the 
agenda of the entrepreneurial local state. By doing so in such a strategic way, the local 
state could fullfill its long-lasting purpose of redeveloping Qiancao. 
The local appropriation of central policies on penghuqu redevelopment can be 
regarded as a kind of policy innovation within entrepreneurialism. It demonstrates the 
agency of the local state, which is in line with the growing local autonomy in China 
since the economic reform, especially the reform of the taxation system and 
decentralisation (see for example Saich, 2011: Chapter 7; Wong, 1991; Zhang, 1999). 
But it had only been made possible (if not explicitly encouraged) by the vagueness and 
flexibility of the central policy, particularly its ever-changing nature of penghuqu. To 
call this mechanism as entrepreneurial managerialism illustrates a dynamic 
relationship between the central state and the local state in China. The central state not 
only exerts political pressure upon the local state as the political control through the 
party-sanctioned cadre appointment system never decayed (ibid.; Chung, 2008). By 
doing so, the central state could distribute task through a kind of “central planning 
means” (Wang and Murie, 2011), but also redistributes resources to assist local state. 
In this way, the ambitious goal of the central state to redevelop an enormous scale of 
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penghuqu could be achieved, in tandem with the fulfilment of entrepreneurial ambition 
of the local state. 
It is true that such a mechanism reflects the tension between the central and the 
local state, within which the central state is believed to be concerned more about social 
stability (perform redistributive functions to disadvantaged social groups), while the 
local governments are more aggressive and entrepreneurial to pursue land revenues 
(He and Wu, 2009). But as shown by the policies on penghuqu redevelopment, such a 
contradiction may just be the two sides of the same coin. On the one side, the 
entrepreneurial local state has to align its practices with the demand of the central state 
and turns to resources redistributed by the central state for help, which is an essential 
dimension of managerial mode of urban governance; on the other, the implementation 
of redistributive policies also hinges on entrepreneurial local practices, which can be 
revealed explicitly by the way to finance local practices of penghuqu redevelopment. 
In this regard, there is no such a split between the “benign” central state and the 
“malign/predatory” local state (Guo, 2001: 435; So, 2009) as widely perceived by the 
public. On the contrary, the project of penghuqu redevelopment that can serve dual 
purposes simultaneously emerges out of the collusion between the central and the local 
state. The term entrepreneurial managerialism captures such a mechanism.  
By highlighting such a mechanism that social redistribution has been 
appropriated for entrepreneurial purposes, or the generation of surplus, the idea of 
entrepreneurial managerialism also shares to an extent some features of Holliday’s 
concept of “productivist welfare capitalism” (Holliday, 2000). Holliday extends 
Esping-Anderson’s typology of welfare regimes (1990) beyond the typical welfare 
state to consider the situation in the productivist world, East Asia in particular. For 
Holliday (2000: 709), the key to the “productivist world of welfare capitalism” is its 
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two major aspects, namely, a growth-oriented state and the subordination of all aspects 
of state policy, including social policy, to economic/industrial objectives. The five 
states on which Holliday focuses are not typical welfare states, and even hold a hostile 
attitude to the very idea of them (ibid.: 715), and instead depend for welfare provision 
more on the function of the market (Aspalter, 2006). Social policies in the productivist 
world, although they exhibit some internal divergences (which result in there being no 
single “welfare model” in East Asia), are subordinated to, and serve the purpose of, 
economic growth. After the economic crisis in 1997, East Asian states made some 
policy changes to their welfare systems, and even challenged the predominance of 
economic growth in response to growing domestic pressure (Gough, 2001; Wong, 
2004), but the underlying rationale that subordinates social policy in general to 
economic development remains unchanged (Holliday, 2005; Kwon, 2005). My 
discussion around the entrepreneurial managerialism based on the case of penghuqu 
redevelopment, while dealing only with one redistribution policy in China rather than 
the entire welfare system, is very much in line with Holliday’s concept in its diagnosis 
of the dominance of economic growth. 
Furthermore, the idea of entrepreneurial managerialism may in fact extend 
Holliday’s concept. With the shift of capital accumulation from the primary circuit to 
the secondary circuit (Harvey, 1978; Lefebvre, 2003), the secondary circuit of capital, 
namely, the investment in the built environment is now a major (if not the primary) 
source of surplus (Lefebvre, 2003: 160; Merrifield, 2013: 914). Therefore, although it 
is not production in a classical sense, but land and real estate speculation that becomes 
the goal to which social policy must be subordinated to. Appropriating redistribution 
to serve land-centred entrepreneurial practices, as shown by the case of penghuqu 
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redevelopment in Qiancao, thus demonstrates how the shift of capital accumulation 
may have implications for the mode of distribution and redistribution. 
 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I have investigated how the local state in Luzhou strategically 
appropriated the national policy on penghuqu redevelopment to achieve its long-
lasting ambition of land acquisition in Qiancao. I reviewed in detail the change of 
national policies on penghuqu redevelopment. In fact, in light of the national policies, 
penghuqu is an ever-changing category in terms of its range, scale, and policy objective. 
In consequence, the flexibility of national policies on penghuqu leave space for the 
local state to manipulate and cater for its entrepreneurial goal. The practice of 
penghuqu redevelopment exemplifies what I term “entrepreneurial managerialism”. In 
the next chapter, I will show another layer of entrepreneurial managerialism related to 
the operation of the bureaucratic system in charge of redistribution.
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Chapter 6 Reward and Punishment: Manipulating redistributive 
resources to accelerate expropriation 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A movie called Red Amnesia (Chuangruzhe 闯⼊者, literally meaning intruder) 
directed by Wang Xiaoshuai, a Chinese director having grown up in Guiyang in a 
family of Third Front migrants from Shanghai, was on show in 2014. It tells the story 
of Mrs Deng, now retired, whose daily routine in Beijing is interrupted by the arrival 
of a young man. She gradually realises that this man is the grandson of a former 
colleague when she was serving in the Third Front, who has come for revenge. 
Decades ago, some of the workers sent to the Third Front had had an opportunity to 
return with their family to Beijing and she and one of her colleagues had competed for 
the precious privilege. To secure it, Mrs Deng had written many letters reporting her 
rival’s misdeeds to those in charge of her factory. Eventually, her tactics were 
successful: she was restored to Beijing, whereas the colleague had to stay in the remote 
Third Front for the rest of her life. 
Although this story, based partly on Wang’s own experience in the Third Front, 
is fictional, it provides a vivid illustration of the redistributive system operating to 
achieve social control, as indicated by Andrew Walder’s idea of “neo-traditionalism” 
(1986) mentioned in Chapter 2. Competition within the rank and file generated by the 
redistribution of scarce resources could create social division. To obtain these 
resources, workers would look for ways to collaborate with the gatekeepers in charge 
of redistribution. In exchange for these resources, those workers would either support 
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the goals of the party state, or supply the personal needs of the gatekeepers. The 
relationship between the two groups resembled the patron-client relationship. 
Such a mechanism is linked with the second layer of managerialism (see 
Chapter 2; or Griffith, 1998), that is, the dominance of bureaucratic organisational 
forms in the delivery of services. Beyond infusing personal preference into the process 
of redistribution, as the “urban managers” did (see Forrest and Wissink, 2017), 
redistributive bureaucrats, or the entire redistributive system, could strategically 
employ the redistribution of scarce resources to meet contingent purposes. This 
constitutes the second dimension of what I termed “entrepreneurial managerialism”. 
When entrepreneurial purposes, particularly land accumulation, dominate the agenda 
of the local state, not only the provision of public welfare per se, as shown in Chapter 
5, but also the redistribution process itself could be used to serve entrepreneurial 
purposes. 
Under the circumstances as above, this chapter investigates the allocation of 
resettlement housing in Qiancao. This component of redistribution was deliberately 
designed by redistributive bureaucrats to serve their purpose, that is, to accomplish the 
expropriation of housing as fast as possible. The local officials devised a mode called 
“residents’ autonomous redevelopment”, which took advantage of residents’ 
dependence upon existing redistributive mechanisms to accelerate housing 
expropriation and land assembly. In this regard, I argue that what the local residents 
could contribute to the process of land-based revenue generation was both the land 
they occupied at the time, which they could later vacate for redevelopment, and their 
readiness to surrender their housing. In this regard, resettlement housing was used not 
only as the compensation for residents’ expropriated dwellings, but also as the reward 
for their speedy cooperation. Moreover, those who had been reluctant to cooperate 
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might be punished by being located in a disadvantaged position in the course of 
redistribution, or exerting pressure upon them. 
The rest of this chapter is in five sections. Section 6.2 explores the change in 
the logic of housing allocations. I explain how the size of residents’ housing and their 
speed in surrendering them become their two major contributions to the production of 
surplus in the form of land-based revenue. Resettlement housing of better quality was 
used for rewarding these two kinds of contribution from residents. Section 6.3 and 6.4 
investigate how the residents who resisted surrendering their dwellings were 
correspondingly punished. Two mechanisms, namely, residents’ autonomous 
redevelopment and the dependence upon the existing redistributive system, were 
devised for use as means of punishment. The last two sections present the discussion 
and summary respectively. 
 
6.2 Housing allocation as a reward 
In my interviews, when talking about the housing allocation, some residents 
would use the expression, “choosing resettlement flat” (xuanfang 选房) to indicate that 
they had played an active part; whereas others used “housing allocation” (fenfang 分
房), which was an expression originating from the pre-reform era. The latter expression 
suggested their passive position in this process. It is true that the allocation logic of 
resettlement housing in Qiancao nowadays differs significantly from the housing 
allocation logic in the pre-reform era, in that residents had more initiatives. But if we 
probe more deeply, we can find that the two logics shared some similarities: The 
allocation of housing still served as a reward for people who had contributed to the 
generation of surplus, be the surplus value from industrial production, or land revenues. 
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What made them different was the change in the dominant mode of capital 
accumulation (see Harvey, 1978). 
 
The logic of housing allocation in the pre-reform era 
Before China’s housing reform, the allocation of public housing essentially 
reflected the way in which production determined distribution. The public housing 
provided to workers by their work-units was part of the workers’ de facto salary, or a 
kind of compensation for their low wages (Wu, 1996; Zhu, 2000). In general, those 
who made a greater contribution, or held a greater credential to make a bigger 
contribution (for instance, by having a better educational background, or seniority, thus 
gaining more expertise and experience) in the production process were entitled to the 
allocation of housing in better conditions. Taking the case of the system of housing 
allocation in a large university in Xi’an, Wang and Murie (2000) show in detail how 
such a system worked. In this case (ibid.: 401-402), five factors determined housing 
allocation: (1) the ranking in the hierarchical system (such as high-level cadre, low-
rank cadre and ordinary workers); (2) educational background; (3) the total number of 
years at work; (4) the number of years of serving in the current work-unit, (5) special 
allowances and distinction awards (such as a special title honoured by a higher level 
of authority). 
A similar system could be found in Qiancao. As shown in Chapter 4, residential 
buildings there were constructed in batches. Once a new batch of housing had been 
constructed by an enterprise, the entreprise would initiate a round of housing allocation. 
In addition to new flats just built, some flats would become vacant when their existing 
tenants moved to new flats and these would be added to the housing stock for allocation. 
Eligible applicants received a score based on several factors pertaining to their 
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personal and familial condition, including total years of employment, professional 
rank (zhicheng 职称) and posts (zhiwu 职务), household size, whether the partner of an 
applicant also served in the same enterprise, any honour obtained by the applicant, etc. 
Applicants were then sorted based on the total score. The higher an applicant was 
ranked, the higher priority the applicant would enjoy for selecting an available flat, 
which means this applicant would have a wider choice of flat. For those whose ranking 
was too low and hence unable to secure a new flat, they would still be able to select 
one of the second-hand flats vacated by people higher in the rankings and did so when 
they considered the advantages of moving were greater than those of remaining (most 
importantly, whether they could move to a larger flat). The rankings were displayed in 
public for transparency. 
In Qiancao, the allocation of housing was a memorable experience for residents: 
After more than ten years, their recollections were still fresh. For example, Master Xu, 
aged 70, was a native of Tianjin who had worked in Changqi as an ordinary worker. 
When asked how he got his flat in Qianxiyuan (the last batch of residential housing 
built by Changqi), Master Xu emphasised his high ranking in the housing allocation 
process (Interview CQ-2104): 
“Your housing allocation is based on your score in the factory. Only those 
who were eligible could obtain a flat. People were put into order according to their 
professional ranking, the length of their working lives and many other criteria, one by 
one. In terms of professional ranking, medium-level, senior-level, everything counted 
towards the score. Several hundred applicants were sorted, amongst whom I ranked 
the number four in the entire factory! Number Four! It was so rare! … I had worked in 
Changqi my whole life long. Eventually, what I got was this flat.” 
From this standpoint, each time housing was allocated it involved a 
comprehensive assessment of every worker’s level of contribution. This allocation 
scheme recognises workers’ unique features in multiple respects, in particular their 
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contribution to the working process. Beyond question, abuses traceable to corruption 
and nepotism were inevitable. Cadres in charge of the redistribution process could also 
use their discretion to benefit themselves and their superiors, resembling the behaviour 
of those officials in former socialist CEE countries had done (Szelenyi, 1978), such as 
increasing the weight given to posts in all factors (cadres could get far higher scores 
to raise their positions in the ranking higher than those of ordinary workers). But in 
general, the workers were inclined to accept this system because it maintained some 
kind of fairness. 
 
The allocation logic of resettlement housing in Qiancao in general 
In the allocation of resettlement housing in Qiancao, the local state adopted a 
new scheme that appeared fundamentally different from the previous practice. Workers’ 
personal attributes, especially those associated with their working experience, would 
no longer be considered. Instead, the main determinants of their compensation became 
the condition of their current dwelling (size and homeownership status) and the speed 
at which they surrendered them to the expropriation office sponsored by the local state. 
Despite this wide difference, however, as I have argued, the underlying logic that 
buttressed this new scheme of housing allocation shares with the previous one the 
feature of being determined by the dominant mode of surplus production. Distribution 
serves as the reward for people’s contribution to the production of surplus, be the 
surplus from industrial production, or land-based accumulation. 
The case in Qiancao was, that the compensation for residents would differ 
based on the property ownership of their current dwellings (QSO, 2014a, 2014b). The 
households who owned their current home were entitled to two ways of compensation: 
monetary and in-kind compensation. If they chose monetary compensation, the state-
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sponsored housing expropriation office would hire an assessment company to evaluate 
the market value (yuan per square metre) of a current dwelling. The market value of 
housing would differ based on the building age and which floor it was located. But the 
difference was quite slight (see Chapter 7 for more details). The amount of monetary 
compensation was calculated by multiplying the size of residents’ current dwelling by 
the assessed unit price of their house. Upon this base, the local state would add 20 per 
cent of the final sum as a bonus for their cooperation. 
If a household chose in-kind compensation, they would be provided with a flat 
in a newly built neighbourhood not far from Qiancao, The official term for the in-kind 
compensation was “the exchange of the property right” (chanquan diaohuan 产权调
换), indicating the relocated residents could also obtain the property right of the new 
flat. In principle, residents could be resettled in a flat as big as their previous flat plus 
20 per cent of the size as a bonus from the local state, which was the same as those 
who chose the monetary compensation (the 1:1.2 policy). If the resettlement flat they 
chose was more than 20 per cent larger than their previous home, they had to pay for 
the excess at the market price level (around 4000 yuan per square metre); if not, the 
housing expropriation office had to provide some monetary compensation to make up 
the difference. The method of calculation was the same as that for general monetary 
compensation.39 If residents’ current dwellings occupied less than 50 square metres, 
their dwelling would be calculated as 50 square metres. 
In addition to size, another determinant of the kind of resettlement housing 
residents could finally obtain was the speed at which they surrendered their current 
                                                      
39 For example, if the size of a resident’s current housing was 100 square metres, this resident should obtain a 
resettlement flat of 120 square metres. But if the resident selected a 110-square-metre flat, the expropriation office 
needed to provide some monetary compensation for the unused 10 square metres. If a flat was evaluated at 3,100 
yuan per square metre, residents could obtain an extra 31,000 yuan as compensation for their current flat. 
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accommodation. In general, the earlier a family surrendered its dwelling, the sooner it 
could select its resettlement flat (“first come, first served”). 
It should be necessary to note that size is merely one dimension of a flat. In 
addition to size, individual houses have qualitative differences in terms of the number 
of storeys, equipment and the like (Zhang, 2017: 205). The residents in Qiancao were 
concerned with the house structure (huxing 户型), the direction that it faced (chaoxiang 
朝向), the view, location and certain other features. Some flats where all these qualities 
were better combined thus became scarce resources that residents would compete for. 
For local residents in Qiancao, as reported by some interviewees (Interview CQ-1101; 
CQ-2101; CW-2104), the earlier a household could select their resettlement flat, the 
more would be available to choose from and therefore, the higher the possibility that 
the family could obtain a satisfactory flat. Precedence in housing selection thus became 
another reward for the contribution made by the residents. To procure such a reward, 
residents might compete with each other to surrender their dwellings soonest. If they 
did, it would speed up the housing expropriation. 
Meanwhile, Qiancao residents who did not own their current dwellings could 
choose only a resettlement rental flat as compensation (QSO, 2014b). The dwellings 
of these residents (mostly feichengtaofang residents) were still owned by the 
Municipal Commission of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration (shi 
guoyou zichan jiandu guanli weiyuanhui) on behalf of the state. To ensure that the 
public ownership of housing remained unchanged after resettlement, the resettlement 
housing provided to this group of residents was constructed as public rental housing 
(gongzufang 公租房, see Chapter 4)40. In order to obtain the property ownership of this 
                                                      
40 As shown in Chapter 4, now there were only two types of rental housing in the new affordable housing system: 
cheap rent housing and public rental housing. Only those low-income urban residents who are confirmed by the 
government are entitled to apply for cheap rent housing. Therefore, public rental housing is the only proper category. 
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kind of resettlement housing, residents had to wait for five years and then purchase it 
at the market price. Because such residents did not own their housing, in some sense, 
all that they could contribute to the generation of land revenue was to accelerate the 
land expropriation process, namely, to accept the compensation scheme as quickly as 
possible and move to the resettlement rental housing. Hence, the allocation of 
resettlement rental housing completely ignored the condition of the families and their 
previous dwellings and applied the principle of “first come, first served” in all cases. 
Residents would be ranked according to the order in which they had signed the consent 
agreement with the expropriation office. According to this, the representative of a 
household could draw lots for a flat which would be one of two kinds, either a 49-
square-metre one (in a block with no lift) or a 59-square-metre one (in a block with a 
lift). The kind of resettlement rental flat that a household could eventually obtain (not 
only different in size, but also in all the other qualities noted above) in fact depended 
on luck (Interview CW-1202). This could be exemplified by the experience of Mrs 
Zhang. Before the redevelopment, Mrs Zhang and her 90 year old mother lived in two 
neighbouring feichengtaofang flats, so she could look after her mother. In the selection 
of resettlement rental housing, as she was “unlucky”, Mrs Zhang drew a flat which 
was quite far from her mother’s. She asked the expropriation office to exchange it for 
one closer to her mother’s, but her request had been turned down. As reported by Mrs 
Zhang (Interview CY-2201): 
“They (the expropriation office) did not pay attention to my case. They said, 
it was not their business, just because I was unlucky. I had to contact my mother’s new 
neighbours for exchanging housing by myself.” 
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In this section, I compared the two logics of housing allocation in Qiancao. 
Viewed from the perspective of the workers, the two logics are fundamentally different. 
In the socialist era, public housing was part of workers’ de facto reward for work. The 
allocation of housing, therefore, was determined by workers’ contribution to the 
process of production. Any housing allocation process served as an opportunity to 
comprehensively evaluate a worker’s performance and family conditions. The new 
logic of housing allocation, on the contrary, paid attention only to questions of housing 
per se, namely, questions of property ownership and size. Residents were differentiated 
according to the condition of their property ownership and their speed of surrendering 
their dwelling. Any aspect in relation to their personal qualities was no longer 
considered. 
But if viewed from the perspective of the dialectic (though somewhat 
structuralist) relationship between production and distribution, the two logics converge. 
The logic by which distribution is determined by production (Marx, 1973: 95-96) and 
serves as a kind of reward for people’s contribution to the production of surplus 
remains unchanged. What has changed is the dominant mode of production (or capital 
accumulation). As revealed by theorists like Harvey (1978) and Lefebvre (2003), the 
secondary circuit of the built environment, that is, “capital flows into fixed assets and 
the formation of consumption fund” (Harvey, 1978: 107), has moved to a more 
important position in the production of surplus in the contemporary world; the logic 
of distribution would also change accordingly. In the secondary circuit of capital, what 
people could contribute to the generation of a surplus would no longer be limited to 
the effect of their labour (as with construction workers); One can also participate by 
offering the land they now occupy for redevelopment. In addition, the faster they 
surrender the land parcel, the faster the land-based accumulation process would run. 
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This is part of the reasons for the state exercising its eminent domain or compulsory 
purchase power to facilitate urban development (see Christophers, 2010; Shin, 2016b). 
What people could be distributed is therefore based on their contribution in these two 
dimensions. In the new mode of housing allocation, the redistributive bureaucrats 
manoeuvred the allocation of resettlement housing to facilitate expropriation and thus 
meet their entrepreneurial desire for land, which constituted the second dimension of 
“entrepreneurial managerialism” as proposed in Chapter 2. 
The scheme of housing allocation stated above, however, was sometimes not 
sufficient for achieving the purpose of speedy expropriation. On the one hand, some 
residents questioned the legitimacy of housing expropriation due to their emotional 
ties with their dwellings (cf. Shao, 2013; Li, 2014) or their property ownership (cf. Lee, 
2008), or they were discontented to find their personal qualities completely ignored by 
the new logic of housing allocation. On the other, some residents were inclined to 
believe that they ought to have a larger share in the distribution process (see Chapter 
7 for further discussion). A common strategy for these discontented residents was to 
refuse to be relocated and to become “nail households” (Erie, 2012; Shin, 2013). To 
cope with such sort of situation, the redistributive bureaucrats further complicated the 
housing allocation scheme to allow recalcitrant residents to be punished and to have 
greater peer pressure exerted upon them. Two key mechanisms of punishment were to 
invoke “residents’ autonomous redevelopment” and to take residents’ dependence 
upon existing redistributive mechanisms as a chance to threaten them. These 
mechanisms are further examined in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
 
182 
6.3 Housing allocation as punishment: Binding residents together to punish 
recalcitrant residents 
Residents’ autonomous redevelopment is now a widely used strategy in the 
redevelopment of penghuqu in China41. It first appeared in Zhejiang Province in 2004 
(Li, 2014), but the best-known case was the redevelopment of Caojiangxiang 
Neighbourhood in Chengdu, the capital city of Sichuan Province (for details of this 
case, see Deng, 2017). In 2013, Chinese Central Television, the mouthpiece of the 
Communist Party, put out a series of reports on the practice of RAR in Caojiaxiang, 
making it the most famous case as I have already shown in the introduction chapter. 
The redevelopment of Qiancao also adopted this mode and made some reference to 
the practices in Caojiaxiang. 
As indicated by the term used, residents’ autonomous redevelopment (hereafter 
RAR) was meant to be a mode of redevelopment within which residents played a 
significant role. According to this mode, a redevelopment project was to be initiated 
in response to residents’ urgent demand to improve their living conditions. An RAR 
committee, composed only of local residents, would be organised to implement the 
redevelopment project in cooperation with the local government, indicating a degree 
of residents’ autonomy. But in practice, this mode was manipulated by local 
redistributive bureaucrats to bind residents together and play them off against each 
other, linking it to the “relational repression” used to demobilise protesters (Deng and 
O’Brien, 2013). 
Relational repression represents a “soft” form of repression directed against 
protesters. In contemporary China, the local cadres have much more limited influence 
                                                      
41 Evidence can be found in Zibo, Shandong Province (http://www.sohu.com/a/219890071_99965055), Xiangyang, 
Hubei Province (http://www.xydjw.gov.cn/publish/cbnews/201609/13/cb27730_1.shtml), Deyang, Sichuan 
Province (http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2018-04/18/content_36050819.htm), Panjin, Liaoning Province 
(http://zjw.panjin.gov.cn/fdcyjphqgz/hyzd/content/ff8080815e7fb570015ebcfb78b32903.html), etc. 
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than in the past, making it difficult for them to approach individuals when an incident 
occurs. If short of force, they would have to mobilise protesters’ social ties. According 
to Deng and O’Brien (2013), relational repression is a control technique that rests on 
persuasion, pressure and the impact of influential people. To be specific, after any 
incident, the local state tends to assemble local officials, government officials or staff 
of public organisations such as school teachers and the beneficiaries of government 
largesse (namely, people who depend on redistributional state resources) with personal 
ties to protesters into a work team to conduct a “thought work” (sixiang gongzuo 思想
⼯作). If the members of this work team fail to persuade protesters, they become 
subject to punishment through their dependence on the redistributive resources (such 
as cutting off their subsidies) (ibid., 546), thus making them work more zealously. By 
such actions, the local state intends to “move the mass” (Perry, 2002), pacify people 
and therefore exert pressure upon them to abandon popular actions (Deng and O’Brien, 
2013: 534). The RAR mode is in many ways similar to relational repression, as 
explained below. 
 
The origin of RAR: depriving residents’ actions of legitimacy and denying them 
the opportunity to appeal to legal measures 
The origin of RAR was linked to the change of national regulations on 
demolition issues that empowered local residents to defend their interests in the face 
of the mighty local state (Li, 2014). In 2011, a new stipulation on demolition was 
issued by the State Council after a wide debate had been sparked (XNA, 2010). The 
new regulation (State Council, 2011) made some critical changes to the version that 
had been issued in 2001 (State Council, 2001). First, it replaced the name of the former 
version, “demolition of urban housing and resettlement (chengshi fangwu chaiqian 城
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市房屋拆迁)” by “expropriation of or compensation for housing on state-owned land” 
(guoyou tudi shang fangwu zhengshou yu buchang 国有⼟地上房屋征收与补偿). Second, 
the new regulation stipulates explicitly that any expropriation, including that for 
affordable housing projects and old town redevelopment, should be conducted in the 
public interest. Third, the new regulation required the local state to organise public 
hearings and amend its original plans for compensation in response to public opinion. 
Fourth, if people subject to expropriation were dissatisfied with the formal decision on 
expropriation made by the local government, they could appeal for administrative 
reconsideration by a higher authority (xingzheng fuyi ⾏政复议), or even sue the local 
government (xingzheng susong ⾏政诉讼). And fifth, should some residents still refuse 
to move after having exhausted all legal means, local government could resort to law 
enforcement supported by court. Even so, any violence, threats or illegal measures 
such as cutting off residents’ utilities were strictly forbidden by the new regulation. 
These changes did constrain the actions of the local state, making considerable 
progress in terms of protecting the rights of residents in the face of expropriation and 
resettlement (Gransow, 2014). Recalcitrant residents empowered by the new 
administrative order (though it was not a law) could follow the procedure stated above. 
Despite the great likelihood that residents would lose their appeal against these legal 
measures, since local governments held the whip hand, the procedure could delay the 
process of expropriation. 
The RAR mode was devised in some sense to deprive residents of legitimacy 
and the opportunity to resort to legal weapons of this kind. The key mechanism of the 
RAR in this regard was a model called two-phase expropriation. In Qiancao, the 
expropriation of housing was divided into two phases: quasi-expropriation (moni 
zhengshou 模拟征收) and formal expropriation (see Figure 6-1). Quasi-expropriation 
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was organised by the RAR committee; consequently the local government did not need 
to involve technically in this type of expropriation at this stage. Residents would sign 
a consent agreement with the RAR committee. Quasi-expropriation could be turned 
into formal expropriation, led by the local state (normally the district government) 
once the rate of consent reached a required level. According to the stipulation of the 
Luzhou Municipal Government (LMG, 2013), this rate is 100 per cent, but in practice 
the accepted rate is 90 per cent. At this second phase, government agencies stepped in 
to initiate the formal expropriation. As noted above, only when formal expropriation 
is initiated by the local government can discontented residents turn to legal measures 
to challenge the local government’s proposed compensation scheme. However, the 
accumulation of residents’ consent from the quasi-expropriation phase would be used 
by the local government to legitimise its expropriation practices. If a 90 per cent 
consent rate was attained, it was used to indicate that a majority of residents was 
demanding redevelopment and had accepted the compensation scheme.  
To accumulate a high consent rate in the quasi-expropriation phase, the RAR 
mode operated in two ways, both manipulating the allocation of resettlement housing, 
namely, the redistributive mechanism, to exert peer pressure upon residents in a 
manner akin to relational repression (Deng and O’Brien, 2013). First, the local state 
offered the RAR Committee members preferential benefits. The Committee was thus 
mobilised to conduct “thought work” to persuade the reluctant residents to sign the 
consent agreement. Second, all the residents within a block were bound together in the 
allocation of housing. The compliant ones would even be punished, that is, by being 
sorted at a disadvantage position in the course of resettlement housing selection, for 
the reluctance of their close neighbours. 
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Figure 6-1 The final page of the formal agreement 
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The constitution of the RAR Committee 
The RAR committee was supposed to be the engine, propelling the 
“autonomous” redevelopment. As shown in Figure 6-1, in the quasi-expropriation 
phase, it was in “Part A” that residents signed their agreement. But in practice, the 
RAR committee was throughout its operation subject to the control of the local state. 
Members of the RAR committee had no say in any decision-making, but were merely 
provided with certain benefits in exchange for their reputation and influence, as further 
explained below. In this regard, their role, under the concept of “neo-traditionalism”, 
was similar to that played by clients in the social control exerted in state-owned 
enterprises, which Andrew Walder (1988) describes. 
In Luzhou, the municipal government stipulated the adoption of the RAR mode 
in penghuqu redevelopment as a standard requirement for any penghuqu 
redevelopment project (LMG, 2013). In Qiancao, nevertheless, the Sub-district Office 
decided at first to avoid organising a “real” RAR committee and run a merely nominal 
one. Only after some protests against the initial plan of redevelopment (more on this 
in Chapter 7) did the Sub-district Office move back to the standard procedure and 
organise an RAR committee in each of the three communities (shequ 社区) in Qiancao. 
All the members of these committees were local residents. They did not become RAR 
committee members through any democratic process, but were appointed by the Sub-
district Office. As observed by Deng (2017) in the case of Caojiaxiang in Chengdu, 
the RAR committee members were relatively reliable and rational in the view of the 
local officials. In Qiancao, the RAR committee members were either enthusiasts in 
community affairs or retired cadres well thought of by their neighbours. The Sub-
district Office would buy their support and make use of their reputations and 
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capabilities with benefits or preferential treatment in the housing allocation process to 
facilitate the housing expropriation. 
Mr Tian, a member of Changwa’s RAR committee, exemplified the first type 
member, who joined mainly for the benefits. In my two interviews with him, he 
explained to me his intention to join the committee and how he had done so (Interview 
CW 2109, CW-3101). Mr Tian, aged 46, was still at his post at the security sector of 
Changwa. He was born in Luzhou as a child of Third Front migrants. Since then, he 
had spent almost his entire life in Changwa. Before the reform, he had worked well in 
the enterprise and even become one of the “Ten Outstanding Young Persons” (shida 
jiechu qingnian ⼗ ⼤ 杰 出 ⻘ 年) awarded by the Municipal Government in 1992. 
Affiliating himself with the enterprise, however, did not bring him any benefits in the 
process of the dramatic reform of the state-owned enterprises, but had instead trapped 
him in poor living conditions. Therefore, he viewed the redevelopment as a precious 
opportunity to make up for lost opportunities. He described his incentive to join in the 
RAR committee as follows (Interview CW-3101): 
“People were eager to join the committee. Frankly speaking, people had 
reached such a pitch that they would prepared to benefit from being enrolled in it, even 
if it meant that their gain was someone else’s loss. To secure their own good, people 
could disregard the good of others … As a member of the RAR committee, I have a 
sense of privilege. When I go to the community to get something done, it gets the green 
light all the way, while others have to wait in the queue.” 
Mr Tian claimed that some of his personal traits made him an appropriate 
person to join the RAR community. According to him (Interviews CW-2109, CW-
3101), he was good at writing. He always posted articles on online forums and earned 
much money by publishing newspaper articles, including some that flattered the 
government. He also eagerly participated in community affairs, such as collecting 
water utility fees and making payments on behalf of his neighbours, which made him 
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a well-known enthusiast of community affairs amongst his neighbours and the local 
officials. Third, he established good personal relationships with Secretary Chen, the 
Party Secretary of Qiancao Sub-district and the deputy secretary, Mr Yang. In Mr 
Tian’s words, they were his close acquaintances and friends. 
To become a member of the RAR committee, Mr Tian also made other 
preparations. In his account, after the protests of local residents against the initial 
project of redevelopment, officials of the Sub-district Office gathered several 
enthusiasts in community affairs like him and retired cadres of the three factories and 
informed them that the redevelopment of Qiancao would adopt the RAR mode. They 
were asked to inform their neighbours. Mr Tian sought to translate the complicated 
compensation policies into more intelligible formulas. His formulas were even 
borrowed by the Sub-district Office and distributed to residents to explain the 
compensation policies. In addition, made uncomfortable by the idea of “autonomy” in 
the RAR mode, Mr Tian also tried to organise a “spontaneous” neighbourhood meeting 
to elect the RAR committee in a democratic way. As the organiser of the meeting, Mr 
Tian thought he would have a great chance to be elected as the RAR committee 
member. Therefore, he actively used the social media to propose a time and place for 
the meeting to his neighbours, presenting himself as the key figure who could not be 
ignored in the redevelopment process, either by his neighbours or by the local officials. 
Ironically, he was summoned to the local police station, as the local police doubted 
whether he could guarantee social order. Mr Tian was astonished by the immediate 
response of the local police. This neighbourhood meeting was not cancelled, but some 
plainclothes officers were deployed to the meeting site in case of any trouble. However, 
the meeting did not end in agreement, let alone the election of RAR committee 
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members. Finally, all the RAR members were appointed by the Sub-district Office. Mr 
Tian, despite his unsuccessful attempt to organise an election, was among them. 
Some collaborative members of the RAR committee did derive some benefits 
for their work. According to Mr Tian (Interview CW-3101), the director of his RAR 
committee came in for some unusually good luck. In a lot drawing event for the 
resettlement housing allocation (see the next section), the director drew number one, 
meaning that he was to be the first person to choose a resettlement flat. Later, the 
construction company of the resettlement housing organised a lottery to reward the 
residents. This director, again, got the first prize, with an additional monetary benefit 
of 5,000 yuan. No-one believed that his two first-level rewards were due to luck alone. 
Mr Tian believed that the redistributive bureaucrats had manipulated the lottery 
procedure to reward the committee director preferentially. But the bonus they provided 
for Mr Tian was far below his expectations. 
Master Sun, the deputy chair of Changwa’s RAR committee, represented the 
other kind of members of the RAR committee, that is, retired cadres of the enterprises. 
While some other residents might respect them due to their seniority, their reputation 
and their status as leaders or mentors (shifu 师傅), these retired cadres were well 
disciplined by the ideology of the Party State and were loyal to it. Whenever the local 
state was in need of their help, they were happy to lend a hand. The local state decided 
to mobilise them to persuade their neighbours to accept the compensation scheme. 
Master Sun, aged 79, had come to Luzhou from Liaoning in 1966 as a member 
of the Third Front Construction. In 1973, after working in Changwa for a time, he was 
dispatched for more than four years to Somalia as an expert bringing Chinese aid to 
Africa. According to him (Interview CW-2106), the principal qualification for being 
sent overseas during the Cold War era was political loyalty. Back in Changwa, he had 
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served as cadre in several middle-level posts, including first manager of the sales 
department and the head of a branch factory. He claimed he had even had a chance of 
being promoted to the head of Changwa, but lost to someone with a better educational 
background. In addition to political loyalty and expertise, he had also earned a good 
reputation and was respected among his neighbours, making him an appropriate person 
to join the RAR committee. When Mr Chen, the party secretary of Qiancao Sub-district 
who had once worked in Changwa, invited him to join the RAR committee, he did not 
hesitate. At the time, Master Sun said (Interview CW-2106): 
“I told Secretary Chen, ‘You guys are too hasty. You should learn from the 
experience of Caojiaxiang. They spent three years (on the redevelopment project). You 
are too hasty. These people (of Changwa) are simple-minded (laoshi ⽼实). We had 
already come to the Third Front. If the resettlement houses are good, why not move? 
You didn’t get the policy ready! [not clear] I gave him an example. Xiao Chen (Chen 
Junior), do you know how many people died for the South-to-North Water Diversion 
Project? Party Secretaries alone, 28 died for it! The Party Secretary should work on it. 
I can understand these young cadres. They have good intentions. They want us to move 
as fast as possible just as they want the work to be done well. They are impatient 
because they work for the party. But this is an issue of the masses. You should represent 
the masses.” 
The conversation between Master Sun and Secretary Chen may demonstrate 
how well Master Sun had been disciplined by the Party State. Even though Secretary 
Chen was the highest government official in Qiancao, Master Sun could teach him an 
ideological lesson. He not only borrowed discourse from the official propaganda, but 
was deeply convinced by it. In the face of a representative of the state, Master Sun 
displayed more “state-ness” than the local cadre. Retired cadres like Master Sun 
constituted the majority of three RAR Committees, and the directors of each 
committee were all retired cadres. By doing so, even if some RAR committee members, 
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such as Mr Tian, were not highly cooperative due to the reward that was far below his 
expectation, the work of the RAR committee could proceed. 
 
The task of the RAR Committee 
The work of the RAR committee comprised two major parts. First, they needed 
to collect people’s opinions on the proposed compensation and resettlement scheme 
for the local state, which would then make necessary changes accordingly to meet the 
requirement of the central state (see above). Second, when the scheme had been 
finalised, the members of the RAR committee had to persuade their neighbours to 
accept it and sign the consent agreement. In addition, they also organised local 
residents to visit the construction site of the resettlement housing complex. 
However, in practice, the RAR committees in Qiancao functioned merely as 
the mouthpiece of the local state. When the RAR committees were organised in 
October 2014, the construction of Qiancao’s resettlement complex had already started, 
leaving very little space, if any, for amendments to reflect collected public opinions. 
According to Mr Tian (Interview CW-3101), when he and his fellow members of the 
RAR committee were asked to collect people’s opinions on the compensation scheme, 
he stayed up all night to think about it and came up with seven suggestions. Yet later 
in an RAR committee meeting, Secretary Yang, whom Mr Tian regarded as his good 
friend, rejected his suggestions one after another, arguing that they were impractical. 
Mr Tian began to realise that the RAR committee would only ever be allowed to play 
a symbolic role. The local government made only a symbolic minor compromise to 
the redevelopment project, which was to rename the title of the redevelopment project 
of Qiancao as the “the redevelopment of old town and penghuqu” (jiucheng he 
penghuqu gaizao 旧城和棚户区改造) when the project was informed to the public. 
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Nevertheless, it was still implemented as penghuqu redevelopment and adopted the 
policies of penghuqu redevelopment (Interview OH-1001). The main schemes of 
compensation remained unchanged. 
The second task of the RAR committees, namely to persuade local residents to 
accept the finalised version of the compensation and resettlement scheme, thus became 
their primary job. The members of the RAR committees had to use their energy, 
reputation and emotional ties to persuade their reluctant neighbours. The RAR 
committee members had to communicate repeatedly (fanfu zuogongzuo 反复做⼯作) 
with the reluctant ones. Master Sun told me how he had tried to persuade one of his 
neighbours (Interview CW-210) 
“There was one such case. The person concerned lived in the same block as 
me (there was no escalator in this block), on the seventh floor. I went three times to 
visit him. He had bought his house from an engineer in our factory. I asked him, ‘Why 
don’t you move? Everyone else has moved out’, He said, ‘Master Sun, I have a 
problem’. I asked, ‘What’s that? He replied, ‘They didn’t inform me when they decided 
on the location for the resettlement housing complex. I don’t agree with the location 
they selected. I said, ‘The land is owned by the government. It is the government that 
requires us to be resettled there, rather than a decision made by some specific person.’ 
I made a joke of it. I said, ‘Master, we also don’t know the content of the Politburo 
meeting chaired by Xi Jinping. The government knows. This project is led by the 
government. The government takes account of the big picture (daju ⼤局). This place 
will be spared for commercial development.’” 
The operation of the RAR committee, as we have seen, indicates a similar 
rationale to that of relational repression. Beyond the direct reach of the state power, 
local officials in charge of redistributive resources may exploit the social ties of 
protesters. We can also regard the residents who are reluctant to give their consent as 
a kind of protester. Because the members of the RAR committee were their close 
neighbours who had frequent interaction with them (or even kinship), it would have 
been difficult to be free from such relational pressure. The members of the RAR 
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committee were motivated to assist the local authorities either by the thought of 
benefits or by their sense of affiliation to the Party. The price was losing something of 
their reputation and reliability in the eyes of their neighbourhood. In my interviews, 
there were many critics of their roles and themselves. 
 
Binding neighbours together 
A second mechanism to use peer pressure to accelerate expropriation is to bind 
together the neighbours in one block of flats, as the speed at which they surrendered 
their current dwellings was an important dimension of residents’ contribution to the 
production of land-based revenues, but in Qiancao, what mattered was not the speed 
of an individual household, but rather the speed of an entire block (neighbouring flats 
sharing the same stairs)42. 
As noted above, according to the stipulation of the Luzhou municipal 
government (LMG, 2013), only when the rate of consent reached 100 per cent could 
the quasi-expropriation be converted to formal expropriation. The 100 per cent 
standard was applied to the entire project. But in Qiancao, the 100 per cent standard 
was applied to an individual block. In the quasi-expropriation phase, having decided 
to accept the compensation scheme, each household needed to sign the consent 
agreement with the RAR committee. If one household chose a resettlement flat rather 
than monetary compensation, this family could choose a flat type (any flat of the same 
size in the same house structure), but not a specific flat. The rate at which agreements 
were signed was published on a noticeboard in each neighbourhood. The housing 
expropriation office set 31 January 2015 as the deadline for the first batch of agreement 
                                                      
42 In Qiancao (and all residential buildings in Luzhou built before 2000), each residential building was divided into 
several blocks (danyuan 单元). Each block had two or three flats on each storey. An eight-storey block would 
contain 16 or 24 households. 
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signatures. Residents were categorised into seven bands according to the consent rate 
of their whole block (see Table 6-1). When the housing selection started, residents who 
would like to choose the same type of flats were sequenced according to the band they 
were categorised into (from 1 to 7)43 . Residents in higher bands could select their 
specific resettlement flat first before those in lower bands. If several households of 
residents were all in the same bands, their sequence was determined by drawing lots. 
Table 6-1 Residents’ bands in housing selection 
Band Consent rate of the entire block 
1 100 per cent 
2 95 to 100 (not included) per cent 
3 90 to 95 (not included) per cent 
4 80 to 90 (not included) per cent 
5 70 to 80 (not included) per cent 
6 50 to 70 (not included) per cent 
7 Below 50 per cent 
 Source: based on a notice issued by the Qiancao Sub-district Office. 
 
By doing so, the fate of residents within the same block was bound together. 
The competition amongst residents for flats with better quality had been directed into 
residential blocks. Residents from buildings with less favourable conditions (smaller, 
older, or more vulnerable to floods) were more willing to be relocated, resulting in the 
consent rate of the entire block usually higher than those buildings with better housing 
conditions and more residents unwilling to move. Residents would be implicated by 
their neighbours’ reluctance and punished by obtaining a disadvantaged position in 
                                                      
43 For example, in a block with 24 households, if two households failed to sign the consent agreement by 31 January 
2015, the rate of this block would have been 91.67 per cent. Therefore, all the other 22 households within the block 
who had signed the consent agreement, however early they signed, would be categorised in Band 3. 
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housing allocation. As the situation of agreement signing was published to the public, 
those who refused to accept the resettlement scheme had been put under the pressure 
from their close neighbours who were willing to move. Such pressure could even 
escalate to resentment. A story told by Mrs Yin, aged 53 living in the Second Village 
of Changwa, could exemplify the discontent amongst residents. Mrs Yin’s block 
reached a consent rate of 100 per cent. When I interviewed her, she had already moved 
to her new flat in the resettlement complex, whilst her mother was still waiting to move 
(Interview CW-2101): 
“In my mother’s block, the consent rate was only around 70 per cent. The type 
of housing she wanted was 73 square metres. She had to wait for those with 100 per 
cent consent rate to select first. Eventually, she didn’t have any other option. She had 
to pick what was left out by others, although we were all not satisfied with that zone. 
My mother thus resented those three households. They didn’t sign it (the consent 
agreement). Don’t you think they are annoying? At last, they still had to sign the 
agreement and select a resettlement flat. The degree to which these guys harm others! 
They didn’t get any extra money after selecting houses, but they made the entire block 
to be the last one to select. How unlucky!” 
If Mrs Yin’s opinion remains at the stage of criticising an individual person, 
Mr Shui, another resident whose block also had a low rate of consent, pointed to the 
core of this mechanism. According to Mr Shui (Interview CQ-1101), he was deprived 
of “the right to select resettlement housing” (xuanfang quan). By binding the entire 
block together, the local state was actually rejuvenating an old mass strategy from the 
Maoist era, that is, “to mobilise the mass to fight against the mass” (fadong qunzhong 
dou qunzhong 发动群众⽃群众; or play the mass off against each other), as said by Mr 
Shui (Interview CQ-1101). 
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6.4 Punishing recalcitrant residents within the existing redistributive system 
The operation of the RAR mode manifests how the local state manipulates 
redistributive resources to punish uncooperative residents. In fact, the manipulation of 
redistributive resources was not limited to the new ones brought about by the 
redevelopment project, such as the allocation of housing, but could extend to the 
existing redistributive system itself. In Qiancao, the local state also turned to some 
other long-existing redistributive resources within their reach, such as government 
largesse, and the arrangement of working post. If residents themselves or their close 
relatives were depending on these resources, the local state could threaten them by 
suspending or cutting back these resources, thus exerting pressure upon them and 
pressing them to surrender their housing. The local state could practice such measures 
not only among residents with the property ownership of their dwellings, but also 
among those feichengtaofang public tenant residents. 
For example, Mrs Chen, aged 65, was a Luzhou native. She once worked in 
Changye by replacing her father’s post. She lived in a feichengtaofang flat as tenant 
without property ownership. As mentioned earlier, the local state would provide her 
with a small rental flat that was still owned by the public sector as compensation. Mrs 
Chen thought the compensation scheme was unfair, thus refusing to sign the consent 
agreement. Her only son passed away several years ago. To comfort senior parents like 
Mrs Chen who lost their children, the state offered them an extra sum of regular subsidy. 
As Mrs Chen refused to surrender her flat, the local government in Qiancao planned 
to exclude her from receiving this subsidy as a threat (Interview CY-2201): 
“This sum of subsidy was about 4,000 yuan per year. This year it increased to 
6,000 yuan, equalling twice of my monthly retiring pension. My only son passed away. 
According to national policy, I could receive this subsidy until death, as a reward for 
my sacrifice to the one-child policy. One official of Qiancao Sub-district Office in 
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charge of family planning gave me a call. He threatened me, as you hadn’t moved, I 
would cut off your subsidy. I would delete your name from the list of recipients. I was 
quite angry. I interrogated him, who offered me this subsidy? It was the central 
government! I deserved it. I should receive. If it was Luzhou municipal government 
that offered me this subsidy, and it linked the provision of this subsidy with my housing, 
I would just give it up. I’m not in short of that subsidy.” 
If redistributive resources like the subsidy offered to Mrs Chen constitute only 
a minor part of people’s livelihood, which people like Mrs Chen could even give up to 
secure their dwellings, another mode of punishment is more difficult to be escaped 
from. For local officials and staff of public organisations (such as school teachers and 
SOE workers), their leaders have the decision power on what position they could serve, 
even if they did not pursue promotion. To secure their position, or avoid being 
transferred to disadvantaged positions, they had to comply with the order of the local 
state. Such dependence could explain why in relational repression, it is these groups 
of people that constitute the “thought work team” to persuade protestors (Deng and 
O’Brien, 2013: 534). As said by Mr Tian (Interview CW-3101), if there is one civil 
servant within a family, it would be quite easy to proceed with housing expropriation. 
In Qiancao, the local state did so first by urging the three factories to place pressure 
upon recalcitrant residents. A worker of Changqi explained why some of his 
neighbours had to surrender their dwellings unwillingly in this way (Interview CQ-
2201): 
“There were still some households that had not moved out. Later they (the 
factory leader) added more pressure. If you were still on guard, your leader would 
increase the pressure. ‘Go back to move house first. If you don’t move, I will lay you 
off. We have redundant employees anyway. Our enterprise is still in recession.’ It is 
possible that they will ask you to go back home and wait for the posts to be available 
(lungang 轮岗). The head of a workshop said like this explicitly. He said, it was required 
by his higher leader. The middle-level cadre of a plant ordered workers on guard like 
this. This is his original word. In this way, another patch moved out.” 
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This strategy seems only valid for residents who have not yet retired, but could 
hardly be applicable to retired workers. The local state in Qiancao thus extended the 
application of this strategy to the close relatives of retired residents who refused to 
move, even beyond the administration of Qiancao Sub-district Office, but to any other 
public sector in Luzhou as the land and housing expropriation in Qiancao has been a 
major task of the municipal government. Two stories could demonstrate such reach of 
the state power. The first one is the experience of Master Lan, who was 75 years old 
and a retired worker of Changwa. He refused to sign the consent agreement. His 
daughter, who is a teacher in a primary school in Qiancao, thus became the target to 
be laid pressure on (Interview CW-2102): 
“So they (the expropriation office) found my daughter. I said, excuse me! You 
want the school to suspend her work? NO WAY! I said. If you did that, I would risk 
my elderly life to fight against you! Dare you do that? I asked. I said, I walked straight 
and sit still. (Q: They even threatened to suspend your daughter’s work?) They called 
my daughter today, tomorrow, which made my daughter frightened that her job would 
be affected. I put the ugly word in front! Whoever go to school and suspend her work, 
I will go to this person’s home! I will sue this person to the court! There is no such 
thing now. You are the Communist Party, not Kuomintang, nor the Japanese Army (that 
once invaded China). If you use such contemptible means, I will fight against you until 
the end!” 
Encountering Master Lan’s fierce opposition, at the time when I conducted the 
interview (July 2016), the local state had not taken further measures to expropriate his 
dwelling yet. But for some others, this strategy had achieved success, as said by a 
resident who had not moved yet (Interview CQ-2201): 
“My neighbour Master Wang, who resides in the building in front of mine, his 
son works in the Police Bureau of Naxi District44. He is in his 60s and has already 
retired. He told me, he cannot do anything more to resist. He cannot adhere to it. He 
told me, his son called him the day before. The political commissar45 of the bureau had 
                                                      
44 Another suburban district of Luzhou Municipality. 
45 In China’s public security bureau at the county level, the political commissar is the head of the Party branch in 
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looked for (zhao 找)46 his son. The political commissar asked him to persuade his father 
to move. If his father still refused to move, the police bureaux of Xuyong County and 
Gulin County47 will be in short of staff (suggesting that he would be transferred to these 
two counties).” 
 
6.5 Discussion 
Why is the speed of housing expropriation so important? In fact, the 
importance of speed (or velocity) in capital accumulation is evident. For Marx, the 
turnover time of capital in its primary circuit is crucial for the production of surplus 
(1974: Part II). As summarised by Harvey (1975: 12), “the longer the turnover time of 
a given capital, the smaller is its annual yield of surplus value.” While this logic can 
also be applied to the secondary circuit of capital, the built environment could act 
simultaneously as the source of and the barrier to capital accumulation. This results 
from the characteristics of fixed capital in the built environment, which is “long-lived, 
difficult to alter, spatially immobile and often absorbent of large lumpy investments” 
(Harvey, 1978: 115). In the real estate sector, the circulation time can be quite long 
because “capital is tied up for varying periods of time in the process of production and 
exchange and thereby cannot immediately be returned back to the capitalist in its 
enhanced form” (Gotham, 2009: 356). Therefore, according to Harvey, when the 
secondary circuit of capital became dominant, as a result of pursuing the speed 
(velocity) of capital accumulation, a contradictory tendency became apparent within 
capitalism: a perpetual struggle “in which capitalism builds a physical landscape 
appropriate to its own condition at a particular moment in time, only to have to destroy 
                                                      
charge of ideology and political issues, whose administrative level is the same as the director of the bureau. 
46 “zhao” is a repeated words in my fieldwork. Although not very strong, “zhao” here has the connotation of 
“looking to make trouble”. 
47 Xuyong and Gulin are the two most remote counties in Luzhou with the lowest GDP per capita. 
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it, usually in the course of crisis, at a subsequent point in time” (Harvey, 2001: 247). 
Some recent changes in state actions, innovations in the financial sector and advances 
in computing and communications technology all aim at speeding up the velocity (or 
creating fluidity) in the secondary circuit of capital (Gotham, 2006, 2012). 
Particularly in the Chinese context, speed is also a vital dimension of China’s 
urban growth. As observed by Ananya Roy (2011), speed has permeated into all 
discourse and practices in China. To explain why and how speed is crucial in China’s 
urban growth, Chien and Woodworth (2018) have coined the term the “urban speed 
machine”. According to them, the urban speed machine is composed of three 
institutional gears: “the Communist Party’s personal review system; urban planning 
dominated by fragmented local states; and a system of finance that faces strong 
political influences from local states” (ibid.: 726). However, the three components 
identified by these two authors entail two levels of analysis. On the one hand, local 
leaders in China are appointed by higher levels of officials. Their promotion is partly 
associated with the economic performance (namely, economic growth) within their 
administration (Li and Zhou, 2005; Zhou, 2010). But local leaders’ tenure is not fixed, 
making it urgent for them to accelerate urban expansion projects and demonstrate some 
proof of their capability as quickly as possible (Chien and Woodworth, 2018: 729). 
This urgent need felt by local leaders became the major driving force of speed. On the 
other hand, the two mechanisms (urban planning and the local finance system), which 
the local state could intervene in and manipulate (for the urban planning system, see 
Wu, 2015; for the local financial system, see Lin and Yi, 2011), make the operation of 
the urban speed machine possible. In fact, the dependence upon the financial system 
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generates something else that makes speed necessary: that any loan has a fixed term 
and will generate interest48. 
With speed becoming this crucial dimension of entrepreneurialism, then, 
people’s contribution to the production of land revenue was not merely the land they 
could surrender for redevelopment, but also the speed at which they surrendered it. 
Therefore, in the distribution process, residents would also be rewarded for their 
contribution on these two fronts. Similarly, if residents hinder the process of 
redevelopment, thus slowing it down, they would be punished for failing to make 
contribution. 
The pursuit of speed also provides another perspective from which to view 
residents’ protests against land and housing expropriation. Protests in any form, such 
as rejecting the local state’s scheme and demanding higher (or fair) compensation 
(further discussed in Chapter 7; see also He and Asami, 2014); becoming a “nail 
household” (dingzihu 钉 ⼦ 户) (see Erie, 2012; Shin, 2013); or appealing to legal 
measures (see Hsing, 2010: Chapter 3), could all cause detrimental effect on the 
realisation of speed. A “stalled negotiation” between the local state and residents would 
drag the development plan out to great length, thus forming obstacles to further 
redevelopment (Shin, 2016b). To exert pressure upon residents, the local state would 
therefore use direct violence against the residents who had caused the delay (Sargeson, 
2013; Shao, 2013), or, more mildly either by generating conflicts within their family 
(Zhang, 2017) or implicating their relatives (Deng and O’Brien, 2013). The allocation 
of resettlement housing in Qiancao exemplifies how the local state has endeavoured to 
manipulate the redistributive process to accelerate housing expropriation. 
                                                      
48 For example, in the case of Qiancao, the local state was under huge pressure to repay the loan of more than 6.2 
billion yuan from the CDB that the penghuqu redevelopment project had taken out. 
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As presented this chapter, housing allocation in Qiancao, as the redistribution 
of a scarce resource for residents, has been manipulated by the local redistributive 
bureaucrats to accelerate housing expropriation, which exhibits the second 
characteristic of “entrepreneurial managerialism”, that is the redistributive bureaucrats 
could employ the redistributive mechanism to achieve their entrepreneurial purposes. 
In order to complete the housing expropriation and land assembly as fast as possible, 
the local state devised a sophisticated mode of residents’ autonomous redevelopment 
to deprive recalcitrant residents of the right to resort to legal measures. In addition, the 
local state attempted to use three mechanisms that involved manoeuvring 
redistributive resources to punish residents who were unwilling to surrender their 
dwellings and were thus delaying the housing expropriation. First, the local state 
convened residents’ autonomous committees of influential local people to persuade 
their obstinate neighbours. Second, under the auspices of “residents’ autonomous 
redevelopment”, the local state bound neighbours together. Any household within a 
block would be punished for its neighbours’ delay. By doing so, they could transform 
some residents’ eagerness for a resettlement flat of better quality (seeking a better 
position in the housing selection queue) into peer pressure between close neighbours. 
Third, if uncooperative residents, or their close relatives, relied upon any existing 
redistributive resource, the local state could threaten to cut it off to make them 
compromise. 
The RAR mode, which bound residents together and involved residents’ close 
relatives in, suggest an interesting mode of social control that locates people as parts 
of a relationship, rather than treating them as isolated or even atomised. To divide and 
rule is a common strategy for achieving social control. On the one hand, people’s 
interests may be intrinsically fragmented. For example, Ching Kwan Lee (2007) calls 
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workers’ protests in China “cellular activism” that targets local government and 
seldom evolves into lateral, cross-locality rebellion. According to Lee, the 
decentralisation of economic decisions, market competition and differentiated state 
policies predisposes Chinese workers to form fragmented and cellular interest groups, 
thus driving wedges between workers and channelling them into dispersed units of 
activism (ibid.: 121). This finding is to some degree in accordance with Elizabeth 
Perry’s comment on an earlier strike by Chinese workers that “different workers 
engage in different politics” (1993: 239), suggesting a sense of continuity. 
On the other hand, the state also intentionally divides the public. In his research 
on the daily governance of neighbourhoods in urban China, Luigi Tomba (2014) 
identifies a rationality called “social clustering”. For Tomba, residential spaces in 
China are becoming increasingly segregated since the collapse of the work-unit system 
and the privatisation of housing. Within each residential community, collective 
interests are more or less homogenous. The techniques of governance, therefore, are 
flexibly aligned to the traits of a given community. This mode of “social clustering” 
highlights that “governance practices as much as space are being tailored to address 
the specific needs of a stratified society and to respond to the expectations created 
among different social groups by China’s economic reform” (ibid., 60; emphasis 
added). In a less institutional way, the division of people may also be made possible 
through “the ‘porous array of intersections’ of various governmental interventions” 
(Cho, 2013: 147). 
The local practice in Qiancao seems like a counter-action binding local 
residents to one another in the mode of “residents’ autonomous redevelopment”. In 
fact, it demonstrates the resilience of the Party State that mobilises different adaptive 
governance to retain social control (Howell, 2016). However, residents’ interests 
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remain fragmented and heterogeneous under the united surface. Compared to the state 
apparatus, society may be porous (for the porousness of the state apparatus, see 
O’Brien, 1996). When people are forcibly bound together, rather than achieving a kind 
of collective autonomy or stability, the potential antagonism between the state and the 
society had been channelled into the antagonism within the society itself, bringing 
destructive implications for relationships with relatives, colleagues and neighbours 
(Deng, 2017; O’Brien and Deng, 2015; Zhang, 2017). In this regard, the strategy that 
seems to bind residents together actually increases the divisions in society, as indicated 
by the residents’ mutual resentment in Qiancao. Some scholars (Deng, 2017; Deng and 
O’Brien, 2013) trace the use of such a binding strategy back to imperial China. When 
the capacity of the state to penetrate into society was still limited, the state used 
systems of collective punishment such as baojia (保甲) and lianzuo (连坐) (several 
households in a village were grouped together. If one member of the group committed 
a crime, all the members would be punished). But similar strategies can be found 
elsewhere as well. For example, in the redevelopment of Seoul in South Korea, poor 
tenants’ interests were bound with those of homeowners (Shin, 2009b). In this regard, 
we see how policies converge as if they were driven by the entrepreneurial pursuit of 
speed.  
 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I explored the second characteristic of “entrepreneurial 
managerialism” to see how local bureaucrats manipulated the redistributive 
mechanism for their entrepreneurial purposes, especially that of the quickest possible 
expropriation of housing. With the secondary capital circuit, the allocation of housing 
also served other purposes. On the one hand, residents could be rewarded for their 
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contribution to the process of surplus land-related revenues generation, including the 
land they gave up for redevelopment and the speed at which they did so. On the other, 
negative consequences of the redistribution process would be meted out as punishment 
to uncooperative residents and those in their relational network, in order to exert 
pressure upon them and accelerate the housing expropriation. In the next chapter, I 
look at these events from the residents’ perspective and assess how “entrepreneurial 
managerialism” shaped their discourse of satisfaction and discontent.
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Chapter 7 Framing Justice: The implications of entrepreneurial 
managerialism for residents 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Researchers on the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance focus mainly on 
policy innovations made by the state (Lauermann, 2018; particularly on China see, for 
example, Wu, 2003; Duckett, 2006; Chien, 2013; He et al., 2018). The entrepreneurial 
urban authorities usually excluded local residents from any decision-making process. 
The actions of the local residents were seldom explained within the framework of 
entrepreneurialism. It might be argued that these residents were voiceless and passive 
recipients, who had to accept a course of urban redevelopment imposed by the mighty 
of the state and suffer enforced displacement. But the implications that 
entrepreneurialism has for people may be more variegated and nuanced. 
Entrepreneurial practices entail a diverse range of social groups, such as creative 
workers (Markusen, 2006; Peck, 2005; Binnie and Skeggs, 2004; Quilley, 2000), as 
the “consumers” of the products of entrepreneurial activities. Some who are the 
victims or opponents of entrepreneurial practices (such as NGOs and workers’ 
organisations) would even find their domain infiltrated by entrepreneurialism (Ong, 
2011: 4-5). In response, they may appropriate entrepreneurial discourses and practices 
for their own retaliatory activities. Furthermore, civil society may also display its 
agency by actively participating in the entrepreneurial production of their space, with 
reference to particular models shaped and used by entrepreneurial states (McFarlane, 
2012), such as transforming their informal settlements as cultural parks to make it 
exempt from being demolished (Chien, 2017). 
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In China, a vivid example of such entrepreneurial practices led by the public is 
the minor property right housing (xiaochanquanfang ⼩产权房), which consists of 
illegal residential buildings constructed on land owned by village collectives (Liu et 
al., 2010; Kan, 2012; Paik and Lee, 2012). In regions that have industrialised rapidly, 
village collectives and individual villagers can also join the game of land speculation 
played by entrepreneurial local governments in China: they can construct residential 
buildings on their land parcels and lease them to migrant workers (Hsing, 2010: 
Chapter 5). When their housing is to be expropriated, villagers as landowners may 
even welcome such expropriation, because the high compensation could bring them 
substantial extra cash income (Paik and Lee, 2012; Lin, 2015). This practice stands in 
sharp contrast to the scene of “accumulation by dispossession” (Shin, 2016). 
In an ideological sense, entrepreneurialism may also cast impact upon public 
opinion, including the perception of social justice and injustice, as I show below in this 
chapter with evidence from Qiancao. In the context of the dominance of land 
speculation when the exchange value of housing is prioritised over its use value (as 
displayed in the change from “blight” to “obsolescence”; see Weber, 2002), residents 
upon talking about justice would be inclined to calculate the market price of their 
dwellings and entrepreneurially determine accordingly whether their compensation 
has been fair or not. They might also seek to hammer out some strategies to claim a 
greater share of the surplus generated after the redevelopment of the land. 
Meanwhile, in the context of transitional economics, the influence of the 
socialist redistributive system continues. Its influence is not limited to the mode of 
urban governance, but also to the public perception of justice, especially by those who 
share the collective memories of Chinese socialism and believe that the socialist state 
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should still take care of them. Residents also frame their sense of justice and injustice 
with reference to the redistributive logic that has long saturated their morality. 
In this chapter, I explore residents’ response to entrepreneurial managerialism, 
looking especially at the rise of their sense of justice/injustice. I first investigate how 
local residents in Qiancao refer to the entrepreneurial and managerial logic of 
governance to express their sense of justice and injustice. Then, moving beyond these 
two logics, I examine how the residents’ sense of grievance may also be framed around 
the use value of their housing, which could hardly be fully recognised under the logic 
of redistribution. 
 
7.2 Sense of social justice shaped under entrepreneurialism 
In Chinese, the idea of gongping (公平) has gained great political importance 
in the past few decades (Wu, 2009: 1038). But this word can contain a series of 
combined meanings, including equality, equity, and fairness, and is always used 
together with ‘justice’ (zhengyi 正义). Although these ideas, especially equality and 
justice, have some underlying differences, they are intentionally yoked together in the 
official rhetoric. Whenever some kind of equality was achieved, it would be articulated 
as justice and could therefore impose moral constraints upon residents should they be 
minded to sue for justice in its other sense. 
As introduced in Chapter 6, the compensation scheme in Qiancao complies 
with a simple logic of equality, based on residents’ capacity to contribute to the 
production of land revenue. Resident belonging to a particular eligibility category was 
compensated as per the same scheme. Households who owned their previous flats in 
Qiancao could be compensated either in cash or in kind, taking into consideration of 
the flat size and the evaluated market price. Flats in different physical conditions would 
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be subject to different levels of price evaluation, but the actual difference was quite 
slight. Only a flat less than 50 square metres in size was specially compensated for: it 
counted as a 50 square metre flat for this purpose. Except for such households, no other 
claims for additional compensation were admitted. Households renting their previous 
flats were offered resettlement rental flats in public ownership. 
In general, this compensation scheme sought to maintain a kind of equality, or, 
as indicated by a slogan used in Qiancao, “use only one ruler to measure until the end” 
(yiba chizi liangdaodi 一把尺子量到底)49. But such an equality must be interrogated 
in its entrepreneurial context. The local state had land as its main concern. All existing 
residential buildings, however good their conditions were, were doomed to demolition 
to leave room for redevelopment in the future. Or, as I put it in Chapter 6, in the 
redevelopment process the particular condition of current buildings made no 
contribution to the generation of land-based revenues. Thus the local state seldom paid 
attention to housing quality. Besides, applying a singular criterion with only minor 
variance could also simplify and thus hasten the process of expropriation. 
 
Sense of justice and injustice shaped under entrepreneurialism 
Some residents appear to have accepted a sense of justice based on the logic of 
equality, especially those who had moved to the resettlement complex. They reportedly 
felt that the condition of the resettlement flat was better than their previous dwelling. 
They would consider claiming for any further special treatment as over-demanding, 
generating possible inequality if the local government accepted such claims, especially 
when the majority had already taken their compensation based on official schemes. 
                                                      
49 A local resident repeated this slogan to me in her interview (Interview CQ-2104). Interestingly, this slogan was 
also used in Caojiaxiang (CCTV, 2012). It meant that, to ensure equality, the same standards would be applied to 
all residents in the same category. 
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For instance, Mr Xiao, in his 40s, worked in the assembly section of Changqi and had 
not hesitated to sign the consent agreement. Asked about his attitude to those who were 
still unwilling to sign as he had, he replied that they were irrational (Interview CQ-
2101): 
“Some people say, even if this resettlement complex is not the best throughout 
China, it is probably the best in the whole province of Sichuan … (But some were still 
claiming for higher compensation.) In the end, they had to accept the compensation 
scheme. There’s no special treatment. People like this expect to find gold by digging 
only once [yi chutou wage jinwawa ⼀锄头挖个⾦娃娃]. How can they? It would be 
impossible!” (emphasis added) 
Other residents, who were not satisfied, centred their discontent and sense of 
injustice on the indiscriminate compensation scheme that did not recognise the better 
conditions of their dwellings, rendering the potential exchange value of their dwellings 
unrealised. This was particularly the case for residents being asked to vacate flats built 
more recently, thus having better conditions. For them, equality could not be achieved 
by simply applying the same compensation criteria to all buildings whatever 
conditions they had. On the contrary, based on the logic of market exchange, justice 
would be secured only if their superior flats got higher compensation. In the course of 
redevelopment, a state-sponsored appraisal company was hired to assess the market 
value of residents’ dwellings. However, despite the dwellings exhibiting significantly 
different conditions, they all ended up being evaluated at the same price of around 
3,100 yuan per square metre. For many residents, such evaluation did not reflect the 
actual difference in physical condition between dwellings. This was evidently not what 
they had anticipated. For instance, Mrs Luo, aged 60, was a retired clerk in Changqi. 
She used to live in a building constructed in 2002, which was among the last batch of 
residential buildings erected by Changqi for the welfare of its employees. Although 
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she finally surrendered her flat and moved to the resettlement complex, she still 
expressed a strong sense of discontent with the indiscriminate compensation scheme 
(Interview CQ-2103): 
“Some residents of Changwa and Changye, living in feichengtaofang, even 
without a private toilet for each flat, were more than happy to move. Their housing 
was built in the 1960s when the factories had just relocated. They asked me ‘Why don’t 
you move, when the local authority has provided such a generous compensation 
scheme, and the resettlement housing was much better than our current housing?’ In 
the end, I said ‘Yes, I will definitely move’. But we saw things from a different 
perspective. We were offered a compensation criterion that was only 20 to 40 yuan 
higher. With prices at their current level, what could you buy with so little? How much 
better our housing is than theirs! Can you say this is justice? Definitely not!” 
In fact, Mrs Luo was misinformed. As stated in Chapter 6, residents in 
feichengtaofang could not obtain the ownership of the resettlement rental flats 
straightaway. They did not benefit from the “generous” compensation scheme but were 
subject to a separate compensation scheme and were treated differently. But for Mrs 
Luo, what really mattered was that the superior character of her flat had not been 
recognised and was not compensated at a higher level based on its market price. 
Residents’ discontent with a compensation scheme, which was seen to have 
undervalued or even devalued their dwellings, was deeper rooted in the redevelopment 
project per se that was carried out under the banner of penghuqu redevelopment, which 
was originally designed to improve the poor living conditions for specific 
disadvantaged social groups. As discussed in previous chapters, the term penghuqu 
was strategically used by the local state to open the door to the redevelopment project. 
Without possessing redistributive resources, the compensation that the local state could 
have offered to the Qiancao residents might even have been much less generous. 
According to an official of the Qiancao Sub-district Office, the local state’s packaging 
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of Qiancao as penghuqu was considered as doing something good for the local 
residents (Interview OH-1001). 
But local residents did not see it as a benign act of the state. As demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, penghuqu had been closely associated with stigma since its emergence. 
Even if the state’s discourse on penghuqu avoided stigmatising residents directly, 
residents inevitably felt a sense of humiliation, or at least believed that their dwellings 
had been stigmatised and hence had felt devalued themselves. Moreover, the local state 
in Luzhou tried to complete the expropriation in a very short period at first50, making 
the residents suspect an intentional haste to lessen the chance that public scrutiny 
would find any evidence of dwellings’ devaluation. Residents were aggrieved by the 
term penghuqu and the hasty expropriation process. Their feeling of injustice was soon 
transformed into major protests. 
In the morning of 15th November 2014, on a cloudy Saturday in early winter, some 
residents of the chengtaofang flats gathered around the Qiancao Cross bus stop, which 
is the only entry to Qiancao Peninsula. As time passed, more residents arrived, 
resulting in a traffic jam all over Qiancao Peninsula (See Figure 7-1). According to an 
official report from the district government to the municipal government, around 300 
people gathered, including some onlookers (rather than participants). But according to 
the information I gathered during the fieldwork and on the Internet, over 1000 people 
were present. The next afternoon, the same scenario was repeated. These protests were 
amongst the few large-scale public protests that had ever been seen in Luzhou. To 
appease the indignant residents, the district mayor and other officials all came to the 
                                                      
50 The district government officially initiated the redevelopment project on 10th November 2014, and announced 
that the selection of resettlement housing would start on 17th November, leaving only a week for the residents to 
make up their minds. 
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site and tried to persuade the residents. Only when the officials promised the 
postponement of their original plan did the crowd disperse. 
 
Figure 7-1 Traffic blockage on 15th November 2014 
Source: Sina Weibo (http://www.weibo.com/u/3995596243, access on 31 January 2018), posted 
by a participant. 
The residents’ protests succeeded only temporarily. With the introduction of the 
RAR mode and some other punishment measures (see Chapter 6), the expropriation of 
housing proceeded very quickly. But even though the residents surrendered their flats, 
they never lost their indignation at their flats being called penghuqu, especially those 
living in the better-conditioned flats such as Mrs Luo. 
 “If our complex can be categorised as penghuqu, the office buildings of the 
municipal government should be demolished before ours!” (Interview CQ-2104). This 
was said in fun by Mrs Xia, a retired worker of Changqi in her 60s, living in 
Qianxiyuan (千禧苑; literally, ‘Millennium Garden’). Qianxiyuan was a small 
residential complex with 130 flats, located next to the main entrance of Changqi. As 
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its name suggests, this residential complex was built in the new millennium, from 2000 
to 2002, and most of its residents moved there around 2004, whereas the oldest office 
building of the city government had been built in 1983. Qianxiyuan was built as the 
last batch of flats for the employees of Changqi, along with Mrs Luo’s building. 
Residents needed to pay the price of these flats, but the allocation system was the same 
as in previous years. In Qianxiyuan, all the flats were large, at least 100 square metres. 
In 2014, when its clearance was announced, this complex had had the very short life 
of only ten years and buildings were still well maintained, with ceramic tiles covering 
their exterior walls (see Figure 7-2). In my interviews, Qianxiyuan was often referred 
to as the best housing complex in Qiancao Peninsula, by both its residents and those 
from elsewhere. Therefore, its residents found the label penghuqu attached to their 
complex unacceptable, even when they were aware that this label was being used 
strategically. This attitude may be demonstrated by Mrs Ou’s comments. Aged 50, Mrs 
Ou was still working as a technician in Changqi. She had previously lived in 
Qianxiyuan, but owned another flat in the city centre. She finally surrendered her flat 
in Qianxiyuan and moved to the city centre, but when I mentioned penghuqu to her, 
she still thought this label made no sense (Interview CQ-2108): 
“You [the local authority] can never treat our complex as penghuqu! They 
used the label of penghuqu to redevelop our neighbourhood. If everyone in China could 
live in ‘penghuqu’ like ours, it would advance modernisation and the Xiaokang 
society51 by many years. I think this was falsification. They told me that if they used 
the label penghuqu, they could lever more subsidy from above to redevelop our 
neighbourhood. I said, ‘In that case, you are cheating Xi Dada52’.” 
                                                      
51 Xiaokang society (小康社会) is a target set by Deng Xiaoping to describe a specific level of development of 
Chinese society. According to the Communist Party, China will comprehensively achieve Xiaokang society by 2020. 
52 Xi Dada (习大大) literally means Father Xi or Uncle Xi, referring to Xi Jinping, the incumbent president of the 
People’s Republic of China. But in Chinese, “da” could also refer to big or strong. Xi Dada is now widely used by 
Chinese people as the nickname for this president. 
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Figure 7-2 The entrance of Qianxiyuan 
Source: Photo by the author, 23rd July 2015. 
For Mrs Ou and her neighbours, it was intolerable to attach the title penghuqu to 
their neighbourhood. Moreover, because their flats were assessed at a similar price 
level to that of buildings where conditions were much poorer, they felt that their 
complex had been treated as penghuqu as a matter of fact, rather than of nomenclature. 
The unrealised market price of their flats became a major source of their frustration 
and sense of injustice. 
 
Entrepreneurial response by residents to expropriation 
The above residents who located their discontent in the compensation scheme 
applied to the market price that they had expected for their flats. As they succumbed 
to pressure and finally surrendered their flats to the local government, they lost their 
leverage in bargaining. But others responded to the redevelopment in a more 
entrepreneurial way. They regarded the redevelopment as a precious opportunity and 
 
 
217 
devised some speculative strategies in order to claim a larger share of the land-based 
revenues generated from the redevelopment. 
One category of resident who tried to respond as an entrepreneur consisted of 
workers who declined to surrender their housing unless the scheme was altered. Their 
claims for higher compensation were justified in two ways. Firstly, they thought that a 
“fair” compensation scheme should be based on a market price that is to be realised 
after redevelopment. Secondly, because the speed of expropriation was crucial for the 
redevelopment (see Chapter 6), they thought that the state should not punish those who 
dragged their feet, but on the contrary, should provide extra payment to anyone who 
contributed to speed up the redevelopment; if not, they would refuse to cooperate. 
While their only stake was their housing, they could still strategically use it to negotiate 
with the local state. They believed that if they could hold on to their housing for as 
long as possible, enduring against all odds, such as pressure from the local state or the 
RAR committee, the local state would eventually compromise and offer higher 
compensation. This anticipation among the residents was confirmed in an interview 
with the official of Qiancao Sub-district Office. According to him, if only a few dozen 
of the residents were left in the end, they might be paid more than others (Interview 
OH-1001). The case of Mr Tian, a unique RAR committee member cited above who 
turned out to be uncooperative, is a demonstration of such actions. 
Mr Tian lived in a 74-square-metre flat in the New Second Village of Changwa. 
After realising that his membership of the RAR committee would not bring him the 
benefits he anticipated, he decided to resist. When I revisited him in August 2017 (the 
RAR Committee had already disbanded), he was one of the last three households left 
in the entire building. He said that nobody could threaten him with dismissal, for his 
salary was merely 1,600 yuan per month. Mr Tian supposed that nobody, including 
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himself, would be reluctant to live in the new flats. But residents were subject to 
“forced consumption” (Shin, 2008) as the redevelopment brought about a new 
additional burden on their living costs in the new flats, such as lift maintenance and 
property management fees. Therefore, the local state should make up for this extra cost. 
In addition, as stated in Chapter 6, he regarded the redevelopment of Qiancao as the 
last chance to transform his living conditions after the reform of the state-owned 
enterprises, an opportunity he should seize. Hence, he refused to be relocated and 
continued to bargain with the housing expropriation authority. 
Mr Tian put forward three compensation options, all with reference to the potential 
market price of his flat after the redevelopment. First, he claimed compensation at 
9,000 yuan per square metre for his flat, almost three times the official compensation 
scheme (around 3100 yuan). In making this claim, he referred to a comparable newly 
built housing project in Qiancao, Evergrade (hengda 恒⼤) housing. By the end of 2016, 
the local state had leased several parcels of land in Qiancao. Evergrande, one of the 
largest real estate magnates in China, acquired these lots and started to build a 
residential complex. By July 2017, the minimum pre-sale price in this complex was 
set at 7,400 yuan. This price gave Mr Tian a reference point for the potential market 
price after the redevelopment of his flat. The compensation he claimed kept on 
increasing in line with the rise of the price of flats in the Evergrande estate. According 
to Mr Tian, by surrendering his flat, he was vacating land upon which high-rise 
buildings with a higher density (floor-to-area ratio) would stand, enabling “vertical 
accumulation” (Shin, 2011): thus it was fair to claim such a high level of compensation, 
even though local officials and other local residents regarded it as over-inflated. The 
second option was similar: to get a flat of similar size in the Evergrande residential 
complex. As for the third option, he would accept a resettlement flat built by the local 
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state, provided that the resettlement flat was 120 square meters, and that he received 
further 200,000 yuan as bonus compensation53. 
Mr Tian’s claim was not limited to money or a new flat in compensation. In 
addition, he also hoped a new job for him would form part of the compensation, such 
as a position in the district government. As he said (Interview CW-3101): 
“You know what I am capable of. In 1992, I was one of the “Ten Model Youths 
of Luzhou”. I still keep the certificate of honour. In 1993, I was honoured again as the 
model worker of Luzhou. For the entire decade from 1990 to 2000, I was rewarded to 
the hilt. As I had received so many honours (indicating a better career within the 
enterprise), I followed my parents’ suggestion not to resign when Changwa started to 
reform in 1995. I missed that opportunity to start my own business. If I seized that 
chance, I would haven been left as you see me now! My honours let me down. I missed 
my own development opportunity. So you (the local state) should provide me with a 
better job! This is my demand.” 
Such a set of compensation demanded would turn out to be remarkably higher 
than the official scheme. The government’s acceptance of Mr Tian’s proposal might 
make other residents feel unfairly treated. When I asked him whether his proposal, if 
accepted by the local government, ran the risk of irritating other residents who had 
accepted the scheme as it stood. As his response to this question, Mr Tian innovatively 
figured out a plan for the local government, which would symbolically exclude the 
excessive part from the formal compensation and thus forestall murmurs about 
inequality (Interview CW-3101): 
“There are many solutions to this problem. Too easy. I once said, policy is 
fixed, whilst the man (who stipulates the policy) can be flexible. They can honour me 
as an outstanding citizen at the end of the year with a monetary award of 200,000 
yuan. … Or they can orchestrate a fake robbery. I play the fearless rescuer. The 
                                                      
53 According to the compensation scheme, counting in the 20 per cent bonus compensation, Mr Tian could have 
got an 88.87-square-metre flat with around 20,000 yuan as compensation for decoration. 
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government can honour me with a reward of 200,000 to 300,000 yuan. Just like … a 
film.” 
In this regard, Mr Tian not only sought to maximise his own gain on the basis of 
a level of compensation which only he would deem fair, he was also aware of the 
possible inequality if he got a special treatment. But for him this was not a big issue; 
it could be solved by some grey strategies of his own devising to maximise his own 
gain. According to Mr Tian, although he and some other residents in a similar situation 
sometimes might get in touch with to exchange information, they never formed any 
alliance, but rather hid the details of their negotiation with the housing expropriation 
office as a kind of trade secret. But if the details of the compensation offered them by 
the local government were leaked to others, these others would use the details to claim 
as much compensation for themselves. This would increase the burden on the local 
government and result in the refusal of their proposal for higher compensation. 
Therefore, these residents were acting as individual entrepreneurs to maximise their 
own interest, even at others’ expense. They were one by one trying new schemes and 
devices as they negotiated with the local government to augment their own 
compensation, in a way “competing” against each other. 
One type of local resident in Qiancao consisted of peasants. As stated in Chapter 
4, on Qiancao Peninsula were still some buildings owned by the peasants who lived in 
them. Unlike workers in their residential buildings, these peasants had some autonomy 
in reconstructing their housing. Informed of the redevelopment project, some of these 
peasants hastily added an upper storey to their existing buildings, anticipating that 
floor space of the new addition could be counted by the company that measured the 
size of their buildings to determine the level of compensation (see Picture 7-3). In a 
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sense, this is the same as the informal minor-property housing (Liu et al., 2010; Kan, 
2012; Paik and Lee, 2012). 
 
Figure 7-3 Some buildings owned by peasants in Qiancao 
Source: Photo by the author, 18th September 2015. Notes: The wall of the first two floors had been 
plastered with cement, while the top floor built with raw red bricks was newly built to merit higher 
compensation. 
 
Amongst these residents, the case of Mrs Mou, aged 60, was very interesting as 
she achieved her entrepreneurial purpose. She was a Luzhou native born in Qiancao. 
Her late parents had been peasants who grew vegetables there. She had left Qiancao 
more than forty years ago, to live and work in the city centre. When her mother passed 
away, Mrs Mou and her two sisters all inherited a share of her mother’s dwelling, an 
old cottage with a yard. Her two sisters still lived in Qiancao and in the 1990s they 
reconstructed new residential buildings on their share of land, but Mrs Mou, finding 
no use for her land at the time, left it vacant but only until 2008. Then, when the 
construction of the new bridge across the Changjiang River heralded the 
redevelopment of Qiancao, she used 40,000 yuan to build a two-storey house on the 
land parcel that she had inherited. Mrs Mou described her intention in constructing this 
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building as “waiting to obtain a new flat (after demolition)” (Interview CQ-2106). 
Since she had several flats somewhere else in the city centre, she then allowed one of 
her sisters to live for a while in the Qiancao house. 
Mrs Mou was luckier than her neighbours who added an extra storey. None of 
them obtained a property right certificate which would have gained the formal 
recognition of the local authority for the new construction. However, Mrs Mou’s house, 
having stood there for so long, was regarded as eligible for compensation: Mrs Mou 
only had to pay 18,000 yuan to obtain a resettlement flat 140 square metres in size. 
According to her, she had spent only 58,000 yuan (40,000 yuan for construction plus 
the extra 18,000 yuan) but had obtained a flat worth 400,000 to 500,000 yuan: 
According to Mrs Mou, this seemed like “making money by sitting still” (Interview 
CQ-2106). By contrast, the new constructions of those who had only recently added 
an extra storey were compensated only for building materials, which amounted 500 
yuan per square metre, which meant that they were not recognised as integral to the 
residence. 
From these cases residents proposing new justifications and ways to claim higher 
compensation and peasants adding extra floors, we see the implications for local 
residents of the entrepreneurial mode of urban governance. As the local state turned 
urban redevelopment into land and real estate speculation, residents also made efforts 
of various kind to capture their own share of the surplus generated by the 
redevelopment, rather than passively accepting the share that the state allocated. 
Therefore, for them, the use value of their housing no longer mattered; it was the 
exchange value that mattered the most. 
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7.3 Sense of social justice shaped under managerialism 
The previous section has shown how the entrepreneurial mode of urban 
governance has implications for the residents’ perception of justice and their actions 
in response. But as (former) employees of state-owned enterprises for decades, under 
the auspices of the socialist redistributive system, the residents still feel the shadow of 
the socialist legacy in Qiancao. For them, the state ought to retain its paternalist 
responsibility for them. Their sense of justice and injustice was also constructed upon 
whether they thought the state fulfilled this managerial role. 
 
Framing Satisfaction 
In Qiancao, it was important for the local government of Luzhou to appease 
potential opposition and create a “sample project” of penghuqu redevelopment 
(Sichuan Daily, 2016). Empowered by the special loan from the China Development 
Bank, the local government devoted more resources to making the resettlement 
complex more attractive. The resettlement complex for the chengtaofang residents was 
still located on Qiancao Peninsula, only two kilometres away from Qiancao Cross, the 
previous centre of Qiancao and next to a large forest park nearly 300 ha in size. All the 
residential buildings were trendy high-rises, surrounded by gardens (see Figure 7-4). 
As Mr Xiao’s noted previously, for most of the residents that were interviewed, this 
resettlement complex has significantly upgraded their living conditions. 
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Figure 7-4 The resettlement complex for residents in chengtaofang 
Source: Photo by the author, 06 August 2016. 
 
 Residents imbued with the paternalist logic under the socialist welfare system 
attributed this upgrade to a well-intentioned Party State. Mrs Yin’s response may stand 
as typical among these residents. Mrs Yin, now 53 years old, has spent almost all her 
life in Qiancao. At the age of seven, she came to Luzhou from Liaoning with her 
parents. After graduating from a local normal college, she returned to Qiancao and 
worked as a mathematics teacher in the affiliated primary school of Changwa. The 
reform of the state-owned enterprises hardly affected her because the local state took 
over the responsibility for basic education. Like other residents, Mrs Yin moved house 
several times, whenever she was allocated to a new flat by her enterprise. Before the 
redevelopment of Qiancao, she lived in a flat built in 1990 in the Second Village of 
Changwa. As Mrs Yin saw it, those who protested against the label of penghuqu 
misunderstood the benign intention of the state. This redevelopment project had 
brought everyone great benefits (Interview CW-2101): 
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“To my mind, people all feel delighted by this resettlement because it has 
dramatically changed things for us. Speaking frankly, I sincerely appreciate the 
Communist Party. This is not flattery! … Third-Front migrants like us came by train 
all the way down south to Luzhou. When we arrived in Luzhou, in Qiancao, there was 
nothing here! We had to cross the Changjiang River in wooden boats that had to be 
paddled. When we arrived, the building that we were supposed to live in had just been 
constructed – shortage of construction workers. We had to cement the walls by 
ourselves! We had such a difficult time when we came to Sichuan! … Now, for only 
4900 yuan, I get such a new flat!” 
Mrs Yin contextualises this redevelopment within her life as a whole. For her, all 
flats she has ever lived in have been allocated to her by the managerial socialist state. 
In a sense, so was the resettlement housing, since she paid so little for the new flat. 
When the enterprise ceased to allocate housing and the price of real estate rocketed, it 
became very difficult for some residents in Qiancao to buy a new flat at the market 
price. As another respondent said, if it were not for this redevelopment, “my parents 
in their 80s would never have had the chance to move into a new flat” (Interview CW-
2104). Structured by their experience in the socialist managerial system, they would 
not be likely to ask what had contributed to this rapid rise in house prices, making them 
unaffordable, nor to regard the resettlement housing as an equivalent exchange for the 
flats that they surrendered. Instead, they are grateful to the Party State for bringing 
them improved living condition that would otherwise have been out of their reach. To 
some degree, it may be said that, as they once did in the socialist welfare system, they 
did get a share in the redistribution of the surplus value provided by the state. 
 
Sense of injustice with the absence of the paternalist state 
In the meantime, the discontent felt by certain other residents with the 
compensation scheme has also been conditioned by the discourse involving the 
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managerial state. This is particularly true for residents in feichengtaofang, who were 
provided with resettlement flats to rent that were still owned by the state to maintain 
unchanged the situation of property ownership. However, for feichengtaofang 
residents, this compensation scheme creates a fundamental difference between them 
and their colleagues living in chengtaofang. For them, both housing type were all 
welfare housing (fuli fang 福 利 房) before the housing reform. Their source of 
frustration is rooted in the previous actions of the managerial socialist state. 
As have outlined the logic of the allocation of housing before the housing reform 
in Chapter 6 (also see Wang and Murie, 1998; Wang and Murie, 2000), people ranking 
higher in the sequence of housing selection had a greater opportunity to obtain 
chengtaofang flats of better quality. But initially, the difference between chengtaofang 
and feichengtaofang was in no sense huge. They were all owned by the state. Residents 
paid only a small sum in rent to secure their tenancy. In some cases, people ranking 
higher in the housing selection sequence might select a feichengtaofang flat as long as 
it was large enough to accommodate their family. 
The housing reform made the difference between chengtaofang and 
feichengtaofang significant, in that only chengtaofang could be privatised. Residents 
could buy the chengtaofang flat they lived in at a discounted price (cf. Wang and Murie, 
1996). In Qiancao, an older, smaller chengtaofang flat might have cost less than 5000 
yuan in total then. As revealed by Davis (2003), the privatisation turned housing from 
a welfare benefit into a capitalised asset. The feichengtaofang, on the contrary, were 
regarded as “incomplete”. They lacked the independent bathroom, kitchen and balcony 
that constituted a complete individual flat (chengtaofang), and thus were impossible 
to privatise as an individual purchase. The public ownership of this type of housing 
was thus retained and residents in feichengtaofang were still tenants, while their 
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colleagues became homeowners. In the years after the housing reform, they never 
ceased to pursue the right to own their flats, but always in vain. Because their employer 
no longer reallocated housing, these residents, despite not having the right to own their 
accommodation, considered themselves the de facto owners who could decorate or 
even restructure their rental dwellings. The housing management authority did not 
interfere in such actions. 
The redevelopment of Qiancao, however, made a significant difference between 
chengtaofang and feichengtaofang (cf. Shin, 2008). The residents in chengtaofang 
found themselves with flats which had been purchased at little cost in the era of 
privatisation and were worth hundreds of thousands of yuan. They had a clear market 
price. For example, a small 40-square-metre flat, which could have been bought for 
3,000 yuan in the process of housing reform and privatisation, was now worth at least 
180,000 yuan54 . In comparison, feichengtaofang residents, although housed in the 
same resettlement rental housing complex, became asset-less, if not homeless. They 
could rent this resettlement flat at a subsidised price, namely, 0.8 yuan per square metre 
per month: For a 60-square metre flat, the total monthly rent would thus be 48 yuan, 
which was far below the average rent in Luzhou. The only possible opportunity for 
these tenants to become property owners was to purchase their resettlement flats five 
years later, but at their market price at the time, which promised to be substantially 
higher than the price at which their colleagues had bought their changtaofang flat at 
the time of privatisation. 
Moreover, the stipulations of the rented resettlement housing placed their 
residency after the redevelopment in a more precarious position. Some residents 
                                                      
54 As mentioned earlier, there was a 20 per cent bonus size, according to the compensation plan. A flat smaller than 
50 square metres would count as one of 50 square metres, the difference being a kind of benefit provided by the 
government. (according to the introductory brochure provided by the sub-district office) 
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pointed out a clause in the contract of their resettlement rental housing, which states 
that: 
“When it is necessary to demolish the building for the sake of urban planning 
and construction, Part A (the management office of the resettlement rental housing) 
ought to inform Part B (the tenant) one month in advance that the lease will be 
terminated. Part B ought to vacate the flat by itself and move away. Part A has no 
obligation to compensate Part B in any case.” (emphasis added; document collected 
during fieldwork) 
Such an arrangement gave the feichengtaofang residents who had not moved from 
Qiancao an even stronger sense of injustice. The receipt of resettlement flats, albeit 
rented ones, was due to the remnants of the socialist legacy. Although they were not 
property owners, they were still shielded by the socialist legacy. Therefore, they felt 
that the state still had the obligation to accommodate them. They did not become 
homeless after the redevelopment, differentiating them altogether from those tenants 
(e.g., migrant tenants with no local hukou) with no entitlement at all, who could be 
evicted without any compensation (see Zhang, 2001; Shin, 2013; Wu, 2016). But the 
new resettlement rental housing, which the local state had the legal power to demolish 
without any compensation, brought them the possibility, however small, of finally 
becoming homeless at some unknown point in the future. Therefore, they had to cling 
to the title of their previous housing as “welfare housing”, which after the dismantling 
of the socialist welfare system no longer existed. They clamoured for the recognition 
of their rights, according to Mrs Chen, a feichengtaofang resident (Interview CY-2201): 
“Why are there still more than ten households in this building who have not 
moved out? Because this flat was allocated to me by my factory. It’s mine! We 
contributed to its construction … This flat belongs to me. I have all the proofs, as you 
have seen. I have told them, ‘If you do not take them into consideration, so be it.’ Of 
course, if they come to demolish this building by force, I will just die here. My 
grandson will be taken care of by his mother. … These flats, under the conditions laid 
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down in that era, do indeed belong to us! How can you have the power to take them 
away?” (emphasis added) 
When people protest in China, it is quite common, especially for those whose 
memories go back to the socialist welfare system, to turn to the socialist past to 
articulate their appeals (Lee, 2007; Lee and Zhang, 2013). Their appeal for justice is a 
call to perpetuate the socialist welfare structures, since they cannot compete any longer 
in the market redistributive system. They demand the return of the paternalist state to 
take care of them. In this regard, as observed by Elizabeth Perry (2008: 46), “in a 
country where rights are seen more as state-authorised channels to enhance national 
unity and prosperity than as naturally endowed protections against state intrusion, 
popular demands for the exercise of political rights are perhaps better seen as an 
affirmation of – rather than an affront to – state power”. Either satisfaction or a sense 
of injustice shaped by the managerial logic may in some sense enhance the state’s 
authority. 
 
7.4 Beyond redistribution: housing as use value 
In the previous two sections, I explored how residents’ perceptions, narratives and 
actions were influenced by the entrepreneurial or managerial mode of governance. 
However, residents’ grievances are not all focused on the issue of unjust redistribution. 
Different residents used their dwellings in different ways, which constitutes the unique 
use value of their housing. But the unique use value can hardly get recognised in any 
redistributive compensation scheme that prioritised exchange value while ignoring use 
value, and is founded upon a singular logic, that of market exchange. Therefore, their 
sense of injustice may also derive from their failure to recognise their own use of the 
housing. In this section, I explore further how residents hung their sense of injustice 
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on use value of their housing. By looking into their appeals, we can find both that 
residents are no longer the passive recipients of welfare provision that they were in the 
socialist era, and also that their claims for justice based on the use value associated 
with their dwellings resist being simplified as claims for higher compensation that 
could be satisfied with redistributive measures. 
 
Layout Design 
In the compensation scheme, size was a crucial factor, but in terms of dwellings 
with use value, residents’ concern for the layout design, or the relationship between 
rooms and other space, was also important. The dissatisfaction with the layout design 
of the resettlement housing became a source of some residents’ refusal to sign any 
agreement to move into them. In Qiancao, all the chengtaofang residential buildings 
were multi-storey blocks. The maximum number of stories was eight as the regulations 
stipulated; thus a lift was considered unnecessary55. Each floor held two to three flats. 
But in the resettlement complex, made up of eight sub-complexes, all the buildings 
were vertical high-rises with more than 20 storeys. On each floor, at least 6 flats shared 
two or more lifts. This plan allows more green space and more public facilities than 
the previous mode did. The cost of this is that internal space may not be used very well: 
to ensure that each room in a flat has the appropriate orientation, sufficient daylight 
and a good enough view makes some spaces redundant, in the view of certain residents. 
Perhaps such a layout was the best the architects could come up with in striking a 
balance between the competing factors, but to the residents, who would be the 
everyday users of these flats, the design of the resettlement was unacceptable 
                                                      
55 Such a type of residential building is called a “small high-rise” (xiao gaoceng 小高层) or “multi-storey” (duoceng 
多层) in Chinese. 
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compared to what they were leaving behind. Mr Tian found a very vivid analogy when 
he described this comparison (Interview CW-2104): 
“You have a handkerchief. After using for ten years, it is now old and torn. 
Now the government tells you they will give you a new handkerchief. It is 20 per cent 
larger than the one you have now. Are you willing to accept it? Of course! However, 
once you get it, you find that the handkerchief was not a complete one, but fragments 
of cloth, the remnants after tailoring. In a resettlement flat claimed to have three 
bedrooms, some rooms might be only 6 to 7 square metres. Once I had moved my bed 
in, there was no enough space for anything else.” 
For another resident, Master Lan, the irrational design of the resettlement housing 
was the last straw; it persuaded him to refuse to sign up to any agreement. Master Lan, 
aged 74, was a retired worker of Changwa. He and his wife had been living in a 
spacious flat of 143 square metres. According to the compensation scheme, Master 
Lan could have obtained a flat of at least 170 square metres. But the larger the flat was, 
the more difficult to use its space effectively. According to Master Lan (Interview CW-
2102): 
“When they built the foundation of the resettlement housing, I visited it and was 
quite satisfied. I thought that such a solid foundation could last for generations. It is very 
stable. But once they laid the bricks on it, I realised that it was unacceptable, no matter 
what the condition! They wasted so much space. Have a look at this flat [in contrast]! I 
bought it in 2003. Its arrangement is perfect, with no space wasted.” 
 
Size 
People’s dissatisfaction with the layout and design of the resettlement housing 
derived partly from the mismatch of two rationales of architectural design. Equally, 
they were dissatisfied by the size of the flats, because what “size” referred to was 
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different in the different logics of housing design. This applies to residents of both 
chengtaofang and feichengtaofang. In most cases, the recognised size of a flat in China 
is the gross floor area (jianzhu mianji 建筑面积). It contains the net floor area (shiyong 
mianji 使用面积) that people can actually use within their flats (including the space 
that occupied by the walls), and any shared area (gongtan mianji 公摊面积), namely 
the size of the public space shared by residents such as lobbies, staircases and lift shafts. 
As the users of the dwellings, residents find that what matters is the net floor area. The 
residents’ previous flats in Qiancao, whether chengtaofang or feichengtaofang, had 
quite a small shared area. The size of the shared area of the resettlement flat was 
significantly larger once the area of the lift shaft, the lobby, and other public facilities 
was included. Under the compensation scheme, the flats offered to chengtaofang 
residents included a 20 per cent “bonus” in the size of the new flat. However, due to 
the large size of the shared areas, the net floor area residents could actually use saw 
only a small expansion, if any. Therefore, the promised “bonus” space became a kind 
of deceit, or in Mr Tian’s words, the government’s “embezzling” of what he considered 
“his” space (Interview CW-2109). 
For the residents of feichengtaofang, the impact of the shared areas was even more 
evident. Master Chen, aged 59, and a worker in Changwa who was about to retire, had 
formerly lived in a 28-square-metre flat. He signed the consent agreement once but 
later decided to breach it, although 49-square-metre resettlement housing had been 
provided for him. Although 49 square metres seemed significantly larger than 28 
square metres in numerical terms, in practice it made little difference. As an 
“incomplete” flat, Master Chen’s previous dwelling had contained some “invisible” 
space. The size of the kitchen and the bathroom, for example, was not included in the 
area as officially stated. In addition, because some of his neighbours had moved out, 
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he could adapt any shared space into his private use. In contrast, the actual size of the 
resettlement flat that he could use was only around 40 square metres. With kitchen and 
toilet incorporated, the bedroom was even smaller. Master Chen said (Interview CW-
2203): 
“I have a suite of furniture. When I made up my mind to move, I realised that 
this would have to be discarded if it could not fit into the resettlement housing. This 
suite was made from timber that I brought in from the countryside when I served as a 
“knowledge youth” (zhiqing) there (40 years ago). It’s authentic timber. I cherish it 
deeply and I’m reluctant to throw it away. After that, I hesitated to move. I started to 
recheck the details of the compensation scheme and found it monstrously unjust. 
Therefore, I withdrew from the agreement that I’d signed at first.” 
 
Interior decoration 
Another dimension of the residents’ regard for the use value of their dwellings was 
the interior decoration of their flats. The compensation scheme laid down that, in 
addition to the flats themselves, the interior decoration of residents’ flat would also be 
evaluated by the appraisal agency and would receive compensation at a specified level, 
ranging from 300 yuan per square metre to 1000 yuan. But the residents of Qiancao, 
especially those in newly built dwellings, had devoted their enthusiasm and energy to 
decorating their flats themselves. The pride and care devoted by residents to their flats 
was impossible to translate in material or economic terms, Master Lan was even more 
frustrated when it came to his interior decoration. He said (Interview CW-2102): 
“I spent 87,000 yuan on the interior decoration of my flat (143.87 square 
metre). The appraisal company evaluated the interior decoration of my housing at only 
500.4 yuan per square metre (equal to 72,000 yuan in total). The resettlement housing, 
costing the developer at most 600 yuan per square metre for decoration, could never 
match what I have at present. I have lived here for more than ten years, nothing has 
lost its shape. I purchased the decoration materials myself, together with my wife. I 
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really cared about the quality. (Master Lan stood up, walked around and sounded the 
door and window with his knuckles.) The wood of this door is solid (ordinary lumber). 
You see? This window frame, as well. We two went to the market to buy these materials 
and tried to design things all by ourselves … I asked another guy to make an 
assessment. He said it would take at least 300,000 yuan to decorate to the same 
standard today. The assessing company evaluated it at 500.4 yuan. I asked them to 
provide me with a detailed checklist. Without that, I will never agree!” 
As stated earlier, to the local state in hot pursuit of land, the interior decoration 
of Master Lan’s flat seemed only a collection of valueless old materials that had had 
more than ten years’ use; they were worth merely 500 yuan per square metre. But for 
Master Lan, it represented the energy and effort he and his wife had spent on the flat. 
Although he was talking about a monetary amount, the fact that he had not forgotten 
the precise figure over ten years and more may indicate what he felt about it. To 
replicate the current condition of the interior decoration in his resettlement housing 
would have taken at least 300,000 yuan (equal to almost 2,000 yuan per square metre), 
which no compensation scheme would have met, not to mention the effort he had put 
in. 
 
7.5 Reflections on the implication of the study for the right to the city 
Reflecting upon her study of the redevelopment of an old neighbourhood in 
Guangzhou and residents’ resistances, Bettina Gransow (2014) argues that the major 
driving force of opposition to enforced expropriation is the search for, or the lack of 
recognition. She refers to the work of Axel Henneth (2003)56 to regard redistribution 
                                                      
56 The issue of recognition has caught theorists’ attention since the 1990s with the rise of social movements 
addressing issues of identity, centring on gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, etc. There are two major orientations in 
defining recognition. For theorists such as Charles Taylor (1994), recognition refers to the way in which people are 
seen and esteemed by others, which may satisfy a deeply rooted human need to be recognised as the bearer of a 
particular identity. The politics of recognition, therefore, is the efforts made by people to transform 
(mis-)recognition, which ignores distinctiveness, into some degree of acknowledgement. Alternatively, Axel 
Honneth (2003) argues that injustice arises from the denial of intersubjective recognition, contributing to the violent 
rupture of a subject from him/herself. Both orientations, despite critical differences, treat recognition as a kind of 
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as the economic manifestation of recognition, and identifies four layers of recognition 
associated with residents’ grievances: (1) economic recognition (compensation 
standards that are acceptable to different types of resident); (2) social recognition 
(recognising the neighbourhood as a homeland to which their residential networks 
attach, rather than merely a parcel of land with the potential for being appreciated); (3) 
cultural recognition (that the neighbourhood, Xiguan, should be respected and 
preserved for its historical value); and (4) political recognition (local residents 
claiming the right to participate in making any decisions that affect to the 
redevelopment of their neighbourhood). Attention should be paid to these alternative 
sources of residents’ grievances, as Gransow suggests (2014).While it is constructive 
to bring the issue of recognition into the debate around justice. But replacing 
redistribution with recognition is only one perspective. Another key issue, which may 
be more important, in the discussion of redistribution and recognition is how 
particularity, or heterogeneous claims, can be accommodated. 
Fraser (1995a) puts forward the thesis of “the redistribution-recognition dilemma” 
to highlight this problem. She refers to the mode of identity-related injustice as 
“cultural injustice” (1995a). To acquire recognition to overcome cultural injustice, the 
claims for recognition are inclined to affirm or even strengthen specific group 
identities and unique associated values. Consequently, the differentiation between 
social groups is enhanced when we seek to tackle this mode of injustice. But there is 
another mode of injustice, that is, the injustice associated with (re-)distribution, or 
“socioeconomic injustice”, as Fraser (1995a) names it. This mode of injustice has long 
been the focus of the Marxist tradition. The claims for (re-)distributive justice may 
                                                      
“good” that a subject may possess (Fraser, 2003: 27-28; Markell, 2008: 455). In this regard, justice may be achieved 
when people’s distinctive identities (Taylor, 1994) or valuable qualities (Honneth, 2002) are affirmed. 
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prove the existing economic arrangement that strengthens group specificity to be 
unjust as it delivers more redistributive resources to specific social groups and thus 
caused economic inequality. Therefore, it advocates group “de-differentiation”, or 
egalitarianism as advocated by Karl Marx and John Rawls. Thus, it seems inevitable 
that there will be an internal tension between remedies for socioeconomic injustice and 
those for cultural injustice due to their contradictory attitude towards specificity or 
particularity; this is exactly what Fraser calls the “redistribution-recognition dilemma” 
(1995a). 
For Fraser, affirmative remedies for injustice, that is, any remedy for injustice that 
affirms existing group specificities without fundamentally restructuring the unjust 
underlying framework that generates the difference may increase (rather than eliminate) 
injustice. The mainstream policies adopted in Western societies, such as 
multiculturalism and the liberal welfare state, could be regarded as the manifestation 
of “affirmative remedies for injustice” as they leave the capitalist relations of 
production intact. Specific social groups may be marked out and given special 
privileges, which may generate resentment or even hostility towards them from the 
wider society (Fraser, 1995a). Fraser’s critique of affirmative remedies is echoed by 
other scholars. As argued by Markell (2008), regarding recognition as a discrete kind 
of “good” and proposing to affirm such recognition would undermine the malleability 
of group identities. Moreover, the desire for the recognition of identity per se may 
become the source of exploitative social relations (see also Oliver, 2001). 
In opposition to affirmative remedies for injustice, Fraser (1995a) advocates 
transformative remedies, which call for the fundamental restructuring of the 
underlying framework (such as the capitalist relations of production) in order to correct 
injustice. For one thing, transformative remedies for redistributive injustice are 
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actually in line with Marxist ideas, that is, the restructuring of the capitalist mode of 
production. For another thing, transformative remedies for recognised injustice 
employ a kind of deconstruction that not only destabilises established categories of 
identity and differentiation, so as to raise the self-esteem of members of social groups 
who feel disrespected, but will also reshape the sense of belonging, affiliation, and self 
of every member of the society (Fraser, 1995a: 82-83). This action does not wipe out 
group differences (or particularities), but reconstructs them on a new basis, where 
people from a wider society would achieve a sense of mutual understanding and 
establish a wider coalition (ibid., 93; emphasis added). 
Overcoming particularity has long been the key issue in the debate on social 
justice. David Harvey (1996), invoking Raymond Williams’s concept of “militant 
particularism”, seeks to highlight the dilemma between particularity and universalism. 
According to Harvey (ibid.: 32), particular movements and claims for social justice are 
always forged out of the “affirmative experience of solidarities in one place”. They 
may make sense in these particular circumstances, rendering them “militant”. But 
extending the claims to a more general movement always raises problems. Harvey 
argues that in the post-modern era the tendency to stick to particularities whilst 
fragmentising or even invalidating a universal idea of social justice, has become 
prevalent (Harvey, 1996: 342-343). But in the face of the alliance of capitalists, 
especially the rise of the logic of justice shaped by the market (“social justice is 
whatever is delivered by the market” [Harvey, 1996: 343]), the fragmented situation 
can paralyse social movements and makes it urgent to resurrect a more universalised 
idea of social justice. Inspired by Young (1990), Harvey proposes universalism based 
on “similarity” rather than sameness (1996: 359). Young (1990: 47, quoted in Harvey, 
1996: 348) proposes that the concept of social justice “requires not the melting away 
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of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group 
differences without oppression”. From this standpoint, universalism is necessary, but 
needs to be constituted in a dialectical relationship with particularity (Harvey, 1996: 
362), which accords with Fraser’s proposition. Alongside this approach, Harvey (1996: 
359) redefines class as “situatedness or positionality in relation to the process of capital 
accumulation”. One of the most enduring similarities of our time is that of people 
sharing a situation vis-à-vis the process of capital accumulation. 
This debate could be applied to the issue of justice and injustice in the case of 
Qiancao. The redevelopment, which was speculation-oriented and profit-driven, 
imposed the logic that prioritised the exchange value of housing over its use value. 
When residents framed their sense of justice and injustice around the result of 
compensation and claimed for “fair compensation” based on some of their particularity 
(such as their particular contribution to the “Third Front Construction”, the particular 
quality of their housing) as the realisation of justice, could further reinforce this 
imposed logic (similarly, see Shin, 2013). Even if such claims had been satisfied with 
“fair compensation” as the recognition of these particularities, it was still a kind of 
“affirmative remedy”, whilst the underlying logic that generated such injustice, namely, 
the speculative urban redevelopment, remained unchallenged. A sense of spatial and 
social justice could only be achieved when this logic has changed and the use value of 
housing has been placed at a more central location than its exchange value, which 
could be regarded as the “transformative remedy” of spatial justice. By doing so, the 
variegated use value of housing for different people, has not been wiped out, but rather 
being recognised on a new basis. 
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7.6 Summary 
In this chapter, I explored how entrepreneurial managerialism as a mode of urban 
governance may have implications for residents. By referring to both entrepreneurial 
logic and managerial logic, people were able to express their specific sense of justice 
and injustice. Furthermore, residents were also able to appropriate some strategies used 
by the entrepreneurial state to maximise their own potential gain by taking speculative 
actions of their own in the course of the redevelopment. They calculated the exchange 
value of their housing realised in the market and scrutinised the compensation scheme 
provided by the local state. If they found the latter to be acceptable, and if it was 
deemed that a unified criterion had been applied to all indiscriminately, they could 
regard it as fair. But for the residents who found their housing to be undervalued or 
devalued, and those who believed they ought to obtain some special treatment, a sense 
of injustice arose. At the same time, because the local state was still serving as the 
agent of redistribution, the residents who could remember life under the socialist 
welfare system referred to some paternalist logics under the managerial socialist 
governance and expressed their dissatisfaction. For those who were not taken good 
care by the state that had adopted some entrepreneurial practices, they exhibited a 
sense of injustice and frustration. 
It is to be noted that residents’ discontent cannot be fully explained by the 
dysfunction of the redistributive system. In fact, no redistributive mechanism can 
easily accommodate the uniqueness associated with housing as use value. As revealed 
by the debate around redistribution and recognition (see Fraser, 1995a), social justice 
cannot be achieved with “affirmative remedies”, which involve some effort to address 
the injustice (especially via redistributive measures) but leave the underlying structure 
that generates existing social injustice intact. As shown in this chapter, local residents 
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framed their sense of grievance around the state ignorance of their housing as use value. 
However, as the entrepreneurial urban redevelopment oriented by speculation is the 
fundamental cause of injustice, redistributive measures can hardly realise social justice 
without a fundamental change of the land speculation logic. To achieve social and 
spatial justice, to reemphasise use value, rather than simply replacing it with exchange 
value is of profound importance. 
 
 
241 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
8.1 Summary of the thesis 
In this research, I used the redevelopment of Qiancao as a case in order to 
illustrate the rationale of urban governance which I named entrepreneurial 
managerialism. Two major characteristics of entrepreneurial managerialism are 
discussed in this thesis. First, the national project of penghuqu redevelopment driven 
by its entrepreneurial mind, the local state was able strategically to serve its 
entrepreneurial purpose of land acquisition by appropriating resources redistributed by 
the central state in the name of improving public welfare. As shown in Chapter 5, by 
exerting its symbolic power (cf. Slate, 2018) and articulating discursive resources of 
different kinds (such as the local history in relation to the Third Front Construction 
and the negative living conditions in these locations), the local state in Luzhou 
successfully distorted the redevelopment of Qiancao. This incorporated the diverting 
of housing types in a wide range of conditions into the national project of penghuqu 
redevelopment. As shown by the evolution of the planning for Qiancao, the local state 
had long been pursuing the transformation of Qiancao, which occupied a prime 
location in this city. Driven by entrepreneurial initiatives, its ambition had also been 
gradually growing. The local state eventually came up with a plan to fundamentally 
redevelop Qiancao. It aimed to replace the peninsula’s dull industrial buildings and 
residential neighbourhoods with “up-market” uses, such as financial services, 
commerce, creative industry, industrial heritage tourism and luxury flats (LRDC, 2014: 
1). In the word of a local official in Qiancao, the local government sought to transform 
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Qiancao into “the Pudong of Luzhou” 57  (JYW, 2017). But such a dramatic 
transformation required a large amount of funding, which was beyond the fiscal 
capacity of the municipal government. The financial and policy resources redistributed 
by the central state for the purpose of redeveloping penghuqu handed it a long-awaited 
opportunity. The local government of Luzhou thus “invented” the penghuqu 
redevelopment project, hitherto the largest individual penghuqu in the entire Sichuan 
province (Sichuan Daily, 2016). The project accompanied the reordering of improperly 
categorised dwellings (ironically, with decent living conditions) as penghuqu, in order 
to procure the resources redistributed for redeveloping penghuqu. 
The local practice of entrepreneurial managerialism may be interpreted in the 
framework of a split between a “benign” central state and a “malign” (or predatory) 
local apparatus (So, 2009; see also Guo, 2001; Lin and Ho, 2005). The central state 
has been portrayed as having “good intentions” and as having redistributed much 
funding to make the development more “balanced” (So, 2009: 569). It was the “malign” 
local apparatus, whose practices deviated from the principles inculcated by the central 
state, contributing to the production of detrimental consequences (such as illegal land 
seizure, see So, 2009). Regarding the redevelopment of the penghuqu, the central 
policies (especially MOHURD, 2009, see Section 5.2) had strictly prohibited 
indiscriminate demolition and recommended the local government, where applicable, 
to adopt “real” renovation measures for penghuqu dwellings (rather than 
redevelopment), including enhancing construction frames, adding lifts and step-free 
access and introducing environmentally friendly facilities. However, driven by a desire 
to maximise the revenue from land, the entrepreneurial local state was inclined to 
                                                      
57 Pudong New District is an urban region in Shanghai that has developed rapidly since 1990. It is now the financial 
and commercial centre of Shanghai. Pudong New District is located on the opposite bank of the Huangpu River, 
facing the traditional city centre of Shanghai. The spatial relationship between Pudong and Shanghai is analogous 
to that between Qiancao and Luzhou. 
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circumvent these recommendations and redevelop the entire region categorised as 
penghuqu, or even extend the range of penghuqu to cover some decent (and thus 
ineligible) urban neighbourhoods. 
But such an appropriation is actually not unique to Qiancao. Different modes 
of appropriating the national project of penghuqu redevelopment may be observed 
throughout China (Southern Weekly, 2014b). As demonstrated in Section 5.2, local 
appropriation was made possible, if not explicitly encouraged, by the flexibility of the 
central policies. Penghuqu seems like a policy doxa (common sense), but in light of 
central policies, its reference was ever-changing in terms of scale, scope and policy 
purposes, and so was the length of the penghuqu redevelopment project. In particular, 
following the pilot practices of penghuqu redevelopment in Liaoning Province, the key 
mechanism which the central government provided in order to financially support 
penghuqu redevelopment projects was the CDB loan, rather than direct fiscal 
investment. To repay the loan (and of course, the interest payments on it) the local state 
had to rely on the prospective land revenue upon redevelopment, or on the operation 
of the land finance system (see Cao et al., 2008; Tao et al., 2010). In this regard, the 
institutional arrangement of penghuqu redevelopment was closely linked with the 
land-centred entrepreneurial practices of the local government. Therefore, instead of a 
split between the “benign” central state and the “malign” local state (So, 2009), it is a 
nuanced collaboration between the central state and the local state that constitutes the 
entrepreneurial managerialism. 
The proposition of entrepreneurial managerialism could further the argument 
that China’s urbanisation is a political and ideological project (Shin, 2014a), as well as 
an economic project. According to Shin (ibid.: 510), urbanisation in China is a political 
project in that it receives the utmost attention from the top leadership; it is also an 
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ideological project “that envisages the urban as the most desirable status quo for the 
country and population” (ibid.). By launching the national project of penghuqu 
redevelopment as something that would provide desirable living conditions for 100 
million people (General Office of the State Council, 2014), the central state retook the 
responsibility for redistribution and exhibited a strong sense of accountability for its 
population, both of which are in line with the ideological commitment of the Party 
State to socialism and communism. But such a redistributive function also reinforced, 
and was buttressed by, the entrepreneurial practice of the local state, which was centred 
on land speculation. The local state may be accused of distortion in the way that it 
implemented the central policies, but it was able to benefit from its appropriation of 
land. Only when the managerial and entrepreneurial modes of urban governance are 
considered together in a dialectic way can we grasp the essence of such a mode of 
governance. 
The second characteristic of entrepreneurial managerialism concerns the 
practices of redistributive bureaucracts. As an essential part of the managerial mode of 
urban governance, the redistributive bureaucrats played a significant role as the 
“gatekeepers” of scarce resources (Forrest and Wissink, 2017). Redistribution entails 
a process of distribution, or allocation, to channel societal resources to individual 
recipients. With a certain amount of discretion, the redistributive bureaucrats may 
manipulate this process according to their personal ideology, preferences and attitudes. 
As shown in Chapter 2, such a role played by a bureaucratic system in charge of 
redistribution was never unique to Western societies, but could also be observed in 
former socialist ECC countries (Szelényi, 1978) and in China in its pre-reform era 
(Walder, 1986). 
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As shown in Chapter 6, the redistributive bureaucrats, in particular, the local 
government in Qiancao, played the role of “gatekeeper” in the process of allocating 
resettlement housing. It devised a complicated scheme of allocation, rewarding those 
residents who contributed to the generation of land revenues, and punishing the 
incompliant residents, whose resistance would delay to the process of fixed asset 
accumulation. By doing so, the local officials strategically used the redistributive 
mechanism to serve their own entrepreneurial purposes, especially that of 
expropriating land as fast as possible. 
In some sense, the new mechanism of resettlement housing allocation emerged 
as the result of the change in the dominant mode of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1978; 
Lefebvre, 2003). Based on post-industrial cities in the West, Lefebvre (2003: 160) 
highlights this process: 
“As the principal circuit – current industrial production and the movable 
property that results – begins to slow down, capital shifts to the second sector, real 
estate. It can even happen that real-estate speculation becomes the principal source for 
the formation of capital, that is, the realization of surplus value. As the percentage of 
overall surplus value formed and realized by industry begins to decline, the percentage 
created and realized by real-estate speculation and construction increases. The second 
circuit supplants the first, becomes essential.” 
It is argued that the process of de-industrialisation did not occur in China in 
general (Shin, 2014a). But in particular sites, Qiancao for one, it could be observed 
that the secondary circuit of capital had supplanted the primary circuit as the dominant 
mode of generating surplus in the form of land revenue. The rationale of housing 
allocation changed accordingly. What local residents received was based on the 
contribution they might have made to the production process of land revenue, namely, 
the land upon which their housing stood, and the speed of surrendering their housing. 
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Therefore, when being compensated, residents were divided by the home ownership 
situation, and sorted by the order of signing the consent agreement with the housing 
expropriation office. Scarce resources, namely, resettlement flats promising better 
living conditions were offered as reward to compliant residents. 
In order to address the goal of speedy expropriation, the local officials further 
manipulated the redistributive mechanisms, either existing ones or the new one 
brought into being by the redevelopment, to exert pressure upon residents to comply 
without delay. First, some prestigious members of the local residents were mobilised 
as “residents’ autonomous redevelopment committee” to persuade (or in other words 
harass) their neighbours. Second, residents within the same block were bound together 
in the process of housing allocation. Even if a household was submissive, it might still 
be judged in the same class as its close neighbours and assigned the same 
disadvantageous position as theirs in the allocation of resettlement housing. Therefore, 
these active residents would spontaneously assist the local officials to alter the attitude 
of their close neighbours. Third, the local government took advantage of the 
dependence of the residents themselves, or their family members, on existing 
redistributive mechanisms to force them to yield to the government’s decision. These 
manipulations of the redistributive mechanism generated an impact upon local 
residents from different directions. 
As a mode of urban governance, entrepreneurial managerialism, which consists 
of the features of both managerialism and entrepreneurialism, also has major 
implication for local residents. As shown in Chapter 7, they may turn to the framework 
of either managerialism or entrepreneurialism to shape and present their sense of 
justice/injustice, with particular focus on the issues of redistribution. The co-existence 
of the two logics within entrepreneurial managerialism may cause its own 
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contradiction. On the one hand, for feichengtaofang residents, they were once taken 
care of by the managerial state. But now, the entrepreneurially oriented local state 
recognises only property ownership in their compensation scheme. Residents of 
feichengtaofang flats became asset-less, unless they owned other accommodation, and 
had the precarious prospect of homelessness looming in the near future. The 
redevelopment gave them a sense of injustice derived from the sharp contrast with 
their peers. Penghuqu redevelopment had been designed to improve the living 
conditions for the most dilapidated urban dwellings. On the other hand, the housing of 
some chengtaofang residents, if it was still in a decent condition, ran the risk of being 
devalued by the redevelopment project in the name of this redevelopment. The sense 
of injustice felt by such residents arises from the gap between the prospective value 
their housing might realise in the housing market and the compensation they actually 
received after the label penghuqu had been attached to it. Not only was this sense of 
injustice directed against the logic of governance, but in its name the residents imitated 
the tactics of the entrepreneurial state and sought in their turn to maximise their 
potential gain from land speculation. 
However, as I have shown above, reducing housing merely to its exchange 
value and completely ignoring its other dimension, that is, housing as use value, 
precludes social and spatial justice. As noted by Lefebvre (1996), the city (or the urban) 
should be considered as an oeuvre, which is a collective work (rather than a product) 
made by all those living in the city. Only by reemphasising the use value of the city 
and recognising its difference and particularity (say, the different ways of using a 
particular city) can we approach spatial justice. 
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8.2 Reflections on the study of Qiancao 
By investigating managerialism and entrepreneurialism in a dialectical way, 
the analysis of entrepreneurial managerialism seeks to extend the prevailing 
understanding of the change of urban governance as a shift from managerialism to 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). In fact, it needs to be reminded that managerial 
urban governance and entrepreneurial urban governance are not mutually exclusive. 
An existing mode of urban governance may bear simultaneously features of 
managerialism and of entrepreneurialism (Shin, 2016a). Along with a general trend 
towards neoliberalism, even in typical neoliberal countries such as Britain, the United 
States and Australia, the state is still pursuing some welfare regimes in a reshaped 
mode. As described by Hartman (2005: 64), “neoliberalism had indeed got into bed 
with its putative enemy”. 
The idea of entrepreneurial managerialism as exemplified by the 
redevelopment of Qiancao also provides vivid evidence of the above argument. To a 
large extent, the national project of penghuqu redevelopment, or the entire of the new 
affordable housing project did manifest that the Party State took a greater 
responsibility in redistribution. Meanwhile, the way that the local state controlled the 
process of resettlement housing allocation shows how the socialist legacy could be 
strategically mobilised. These are indeed the features of the managerial mode of urban 
governance. In practice, driven by entrepreneurial initiatives, the local state is eager to 
pursue economic growth and land-based accumulation. Therefore, it appropriates 
resources redistributed by the central state for the sake of redeveloping penghuqu for 
its entrepreneurial urban projects, and manoeuvred the redistributive mechanism to 
achieve speedy housing expropriation, which is also an internal requirement of 
entrepreneurialism. Nevertheless, in the end, the entrepreneurial local practices not 
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only help the central state to address its goal of delivering social services, namely, the 
improvement of the living conditions for 100 million penghuqu residents, and 
therefore of enhance the legitimacy of the regime of the Communist Party, but also 
maintains the persistent presence of the Party State in the society. In this regard, in this 
thesis, I advocate “entrepreneurial managerialism” as the key node of urban 
governance, laying emphasis on how the entrepreneurial promotion of local 
(re)development ultimately serves the purpose of the Party State to enhance its 
legitimacy. 
Further, the nuanced interplay of the managerial mode of urban governance 
and urban entrepreneurialism may be better understood with reference to the 
instrument dimension of redistribution. From an objective standpoint, social 
redistribution can indeed play the role of regulating the distribution of social wealth 
and achieve some degree of social equality. But it may also be used to serve many 
other purposes, such as the perpetuation of the dominance of the relations of 
production, say, capitalism. As revealed by Holliday (2000) in his discussion of the 
“productivist welfare capitalism”, the provision of social welfare in East Asian 
developmentalist states, albeit quite limited, is subordinated to and underpins the 
predominating purpose of economic growth. Social policies have been used to co-opt 
the productive working and middle classes (see also Song, 2009) and buttress the 
legitimation of the regime. A similar logic may also be applied to other capitalist 
societies, which exhibit more typical of welfare capitalism. For these societies, 
although they may be categorised differently, the ultimate objective of welfare 
provision is to maintain social solidarity, regime legitimation (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
and hence, the reproduction of the relations of production. Further, subjects who are 
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suitably docile, obedient and self-disciplined for the requirements of production, may 
be produced therein as well (for example, see Hartman, 2005). 
Manipulating the provision of welfare to serve specific purposes is also not 
alien to (former) socialist societies (including China) (Szelényi, 1978; Szelényi and 
Manchin, 1987; Walder, 1986), and even led to high levels of social inequality. As 
manifested by Szelényi’s work (1978), socialist cadres who were already privileged 
may take advantage of their control of the process of redistribution to benefit 
themselves, thus enlarging the inequality between them and the rank and file. In China 
before the era of reform, a redistributive system strongly tinged with the shades of the 
welfare state was established. However, motivated by the regime’s urgent desire to 
achieve rapid industrialisation, the state only put a privileged minority of the entire 
population, that is, party cadres, employees in the public sector and formal workers in 
large state-owned enterprises under the auspices of the welfare system, which was 
regarded as helpful for the realisation of this at political and economic priority. On the 
other hand, the vast majority of Chinese people, peasants in particular, were altogether 
excluded, thus entrenching social inequality (Dillon, 2015). Moreover, the peasants 
were further exploited by the enforced “price scissors”, that is, they were sacrificed for 
the goal of industrialisation when agriculture’s terms of trade with urban-based 
industry began to favour the latter (Knight, 1995; Oi, 1999). In this regard, the use of 
managerial measures to address the purpose of accumulation is not brand new, but has 
been deeply embedded in the enduring instrumentalist use of redistribution. 
The idea of entrepreneurial managerialism further sheds light on the debate 
surrounding neoliberalism in the Chinese context. Following Harvey’s approach (2005: 
34) that reads Chinese governance as “a particular kind of neoliberalism interdigitated 
with authoritarian centralised control”, researchers wanting to analyse China’s urban 
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and regional development also resorted to the framework of neoliberalisation (Liew, 
2005; Lee and Zhu, 2006; Wu, 2008; Wu and He, 2009). For example, in dealing with 
the urban redevelopment issue in China, Wu and He (2009: 299) identify two major 
neoliberal characteristics: first, an increasing degree of market operation and private 
investment, along with the retreat of the state in welfare provision; second, the 
tendency to recognise marketisation (with real estate development as the leading thrust) 
as the fundamental means of promoting economic and urban growth. However, these 
two authors also admit that constant state intervention under the authoritarian regime 
of the Communist Party causes the “neoliberal urbanisation” in China to deviate from 
its Western counterpart. But the core of neoliberalism means that the state limits its 
intervention in the markets to a bare minimum, and functions to secure private property 
rights and guarantee (even by force) the proper functioning of the market (Harvey, 
2005: 2). Neoliberalism does not necessarily entail the demise of the state (Peck, 2004; 
Jessop, 1998; Peck and Tickell, 2002), but requires the (entrepreneurial) state to play 
an ancillary role. Wu and He (2009) had to admit that “the actually existing 
neoliberalism” in China (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) may not fit snugly into the 
orthodox Western stereotype. Regarding the remarkable presence of the state, 
researchers on neoliberalism in China have to argue in a somewhat conciliatory 
manner and emphasise that the essence of neoliberalism (of which state neoliberalism 
is an example [So and Chu, 2012]) is variegated. 
However, this kind of conciliatory application of the neoliberal framework in 
the Chinese context is still awkward. As argued by Aihwa Ong (2007: 4), “Harvey has 
trouble fitting China into his neoliberal template” given the constant intervention of 
the Communist Party. Looking through the lens of the everyday practices of 
personalism, Nonini (2008) heavily criticises the view that China is becoming 
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neoliberal. According to him (ibid.), the residue of the socialist legacies and the 
prevailing personalist ties (guanxi 关 系) foster the emergence of “an oligarchic 
corporate state and Party”, which is far from neoliberalisation. Fulong Wu (2017) also 
alters his earlier idea and argues that neoliberalisation does not fit well in Chinese 
urban governance. Rather than “authentically” following the neoliberal ideology to 
restructure itself, the logic of the market (or market-oriented instruments) were 
selectively adopted by the state in a utilitarian or pragmatic way (Wu, 2017: 170). The 
state is directly involved in market and functions as a series of market agencies to 
enhance its regime by expanding the amount of capital that it accumulates for itself 
(Wu, 2010) in coalition with foreign capital (Wu, 2017). It is not that the state bends 
to the logic of the market, but rather that the state in China seeks to bend this logic for 
its own needs. Therefore, to label the urban transformation in China a neoliberal 
change is questionable. 
The idea of entrepreneurial managerialism resonates with this perspective. As 
I have shown in Chapters 5 and 6, not only the entrepreneurial practices with a strong 
market-orientation may be mobilised if necessary, but also the managerial mode of 
urban governance (the provision of public welfare in general and the allocation process 
of redistributive resources) to serve the purposes of the state, such as capital 
accumulation and economic growth, and hence, the regime of the Communist Party. 
Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 7, any discussion of the ways in which 
people make particular use of their housing brings out the fact that housing, or cities 
in general are highly heterogeneous. The use value of any given thing is linked to the 
particularity of each user. However, any redistributive measure runs the risk of 
replacing use value by exchange value, or narrows down people’s particular claims to 
only one dimension, i.e. the material. This seems inevitable for a redevelopment 
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project, but it may also demonstrate how the redevelopment project can infringe upon 
spatial and social justice. Only by cherishing housing, or, more broadly, cherishing the 
city as a thing with use value, can we approach the right to the city advocated by 
Lefebvre (1996). 
Scholars debating the right to the city have begun to elaborate this idea from a 
sense of what a “right” means and to debate what rights compose “the right to the city” 
(Attoh, 2011). Multiple rights have been identified, including socio-economic rights 
such as the right to housing (Darcy and Rogers, 2014; Weinstein and Ren, 2009), the 
right to public facilities such as transportation (Attoh, 2012), the right to natural 
resources such as water (Philips and Gilbert, 2005), or more generally, the right of 
democratic control over the production, distribution and use of urban surplus (Harvey, 
2013: 22). Other rights that may contribute are political rights such as the right to 
occupy public space (Mitchell, 2003), the right to citizenship (Purcell, 2003), or the 
right to combat the overreach of the state’s apparatus (Mitchell and Heynen, 2009). 
In fact, these diverse modes of particular rights can all be encompassed in 
Lefebvre’s idea because the openness of this notion constitutes a kind of 
“capaciousness” that “allows for solidarity across political struggles” (Mitchell and 
Heynen, 2009: 616). As for Lefebvre, “the city” as he uses the term is in some sense 
not the current concept of the city, the geographical concentration where surplus is 
produced, absorbed, and distributed (Harvey, 2013: 5; also see Harvey, 1982). For 
Lefebvre (1996), the city is a kind of oeuvre, a work (as opposed to a product) made 
(rather than produced) through the labour and the daily activities of all who live in the 
city. The city remains “the type and model of an urban reality whereby use (pleasure, 
beauty, ornamentation of meeting places) still wins over lucre and profits, exchange 
value, the requirements and constraints of markets” (1996: 102; emphasis original). It 
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is “a difference, or rather, an ensemble of differences” (1996: 131). The right to the 
city is the right to difference (Lefebvre, 1996: 34). 
In this regard, residents’ claim to receive justice based on their particular ways 
of using their housing, or the housing as use value, is in some sense their claim for the 
right to the city. The city as use value is heterogeneous, encompassing particularities 
and differences. The land-based accumulation logic that prioritises the exchange value 
of the city, seeks to reduce the multiple dimensions of the city into merely one factor, 
that is, interest, and to impose a market-oriented sense of justice based on either 
singularity or sameness. When residents have to accept this logic and claim only 
“better” redistribution, the particular use value is hard to recognise, thus generating a 
widespread sense of injustice. Hence, to achieve a kind of justice, we must not 
concentrate on the issue of redistribution, but instead must fundamentally transform 
the land-based accumulation logic and reconfirm the priority of use value. 
 
8.3 Proposed further research in the future 
As for researches in the future to elaborate the discussions I made in this thesis, 
two topics may be promising. 
The first topic is related to the industrial heritage site. In post-industrial 
societies, industrial heritage has become an innovative tool for urban planning and 
regional (re-)development, and caused wide academic attention (Jones and Munday, 
2001; Hospers, 2002; Xie, 2006; Dorstweitz, 2014). However, in China, where the 
history of modern industrialisation was much shorter than those advanced industrial 
countries and has not yet entered the process of deindustrialisation in general, how 
people view and experience industrial heritage site could be an interesting topic to 
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explore and make some comparative discussion, especially concerning the unique 
local history in Qiancao related to the Third Front Construction. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, in order to get access to interview local officials, I tried to lay some 
emphasis on the industrial heritage site in Qiancao. However, this project proceeded 
very slowly when I was conducting my fieldwork. I cannot even find the state-
sponsored investment company that would be in charge of the design, construction and 
operation of the industrial heritage site, as it had not been established yet. However, 
afterwards, the construction of the industrial heritage project accelerated. On 19th 
February 2018, the fourth day of the Chinese New Year, an industrial heritage museum 
in Qiancao mounted a temporary exhibition (LBS, 2018a). Named the “Industrial 
Memory of Qiancao 1965” (1965 Qiancao gongye jiyi 茜草⼯业记忆), this museum 
had formerly been a large scale workshop previously used by the general assembly 
department of Changqi (see Figure 5-3). According to the coverage by the local press, 
the exhibition displayed old industrial workshops, old machines and equipment, old 
photos and historical documents, which sought to bring to life the working and living 
conditions of the Third Front workers, and thus demonstrate the precious Third Front 
spirit, which was characterised by “self-reliance, hard working and plain living, fear 
no difficulties and selfless contribution” (zili gengsheng, jianku fendou, bupa kunnan, 
wusi fengxian ⾃⼒更⽣，艰苦奋⽃，不怕困难，⽆私奉献) (LBS, 2018b). These terms are 
in line with the discourse used in the official document, as stated in Section 5.3. 
But this exhibition was set up very hastily. The construction management office 
of the industrial heritage project, which was established as late as 27th January 201858, 
had only two weeks to make preparation (LBS, 2018a). The façade of this workshop 
                                                      
58 During my fieldwork, I tried very hard to find the institution responsible for the industrial heritage site (an 
institution like the one described above), but, as stated in Chapter 3, I found no-one in charge of the site but an 
official in the bureau of culture, on a temporary appointment. 
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remained unchanged, except for two political slogans attached, written in Mao 
Zedong’s calligraphy, which said, “sending more talented staff and best equipment to 
the Third Front, preparing against wars and famine for the people” (haoren haoma 
shang sanxian, beizhan beihuang wei renmin 好⼈好⻢上三线，备战备荒为⼈民; see 
Figure 8-1; also see Section 4.1). The display within this museum was also 
unpretentious. Some old machines collected from the three factories were on show 
inside. Banners of red paper were hung up, on which slogans from the Maoist era had 
been written (see Figure 8-2). 
 
Figure 8-1 The façade of the industrial heritage museum 
Source: Luzhou Broadcasting station, available at http://www.luzhoubs.com/tsxw/p/40856.html. 
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Figure 8-2 A view inside the industrial heritage museum 
Source: Photo by a friend of the author, taken in February 2018 and authorised for use in this 
thesis. Note: The slogans on the red paper banner say, “Make your bed in the plant, eat and sleep in the 
factory”. 
It was unclear why the industrial museum had opened this exhibition to the 
public in such a hurry. According to the plan (LBS, 2018a), the construction work was 
to be divided into three phases. The industrial heritage museum was merely the first 
museum to be constructed. More commercial development, as stated in Section 5.3, 
would follow in the second and third phases. Some follow up research in Qiancao 
could fill this gap. 
A second issue that could be engaged in future research is the debate on an 
alternative approach of entrepreneurial managerialism. To some degree, the idea of 
entrepreneurial managerialism provided a permissive vision of urban governance, in 
that the mighty state could mobilise both managerialism and entrepreneurialism to 
enhance its statecraft, which made the society more difficult to protect itself. One 
possible alternative is still embedded in the Chinese context, that is the “Chongqing 
Experiment” (Cui, 2011; Huang, 2011). When Mr Bo Xilai was in power as the party 
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secretary of Chongqing Municipality, a lot of experimental measures were adopted in 
Chongqing to promote equitable development. According to Zhiyuan Cui (2011), at 
least two mechanisms were critical: first, if the government can capture a large portion 
of increases in land value and use it for social service that benefit a wide public, it can 
levy lower taxes and keep a tight rein on the rise of real estate price (ibid., 653); second, 
when the government can get revenue from public assets, it can also reduce tax burden 
and realize the co-development of public and private ownership of business (Cui, 2011: 
656). The experiment of Chongqing was terminated drastically due to the political 
scandal of Mr Bo, but some underlying logics of Chongqing’s experiment, such as a 
kind of popular share of the land revenue, which contrasts sharply with the 
entrepreneurial managerialism under which the state and market forces 
disproportionally monopolise the land revenue, could still be constructive for an 
alternative mode of governance. 
Another alternative is the claiming for “democratic public ownership” 
(Cumbers, 2012), which is embedded in the Western democratic society. By proposing 
this idea, Cumbers (2013: 547) rejected older forms of public ownership that were 
often over-centralised and undemocratic, which is dominated by the state. This mode 
of public ownership could bring negative results for the ordinary citizens in a similar 
way as neoliberalism. According to Cumbers (2017), democratic public ownership 
entails two major mechanisms. First, it requires the public or common ownership to 
ensure surpluses arising from economic activities would not be appropriated for 
private interests; Second, it also demands a kind of democracy, that “the public 
decisions over the future shape of the economy, allowing social and environmental 
needs to take priority over private wealth accumulation” (2017: 86). The detrimental 
consequences brought about by entrepreneurial managerialism as shown in this thesis 
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were partly because the monopolised ownership and development right of land by the 
state. In this regard, “democratic public ownership” could be an approach, along which 
to figure out an alternative mode of ownership and redistributive scheme. 
The political regime in China remains authoritarian under the Communist Party, 
rendering the vision to achieve democratic public ownership dim. However, as shown 
by the introduction of the RAR mode into penghuqu redevelopment, a kind of 
democratic measures, albeit superficial, is still necessary for the authoritarian regime 
to legitimse its pratices and appease pontential resistence and ensure the survival of 
the regime. If the RAR mode does achieve what it has been assumed, such as the 
autonomous control over the future use of land, we could anticipate a kind of de-
centralised and de-statelised mode of urban change, which may facilitate the 
realisation of social and spatial justice. 
Finally, this thesis on entrepreneurial managerialism focuses on the mode of 
urban governance, centring the discussions on the actions of the state to understand 
how it has managed to advance its interests while containing social unrest and ensuring 
a degree of social stability. This approach does not assume that the state exists in 
isolation, and situates the state in a broader state-society relations. While the 
entrepreneurial managerialism has been depending upon the maintenance of the 
redistributive system in support of the ruling regime, the question remains as to how 
much this stability of the regime and its redistributive system would continue in the 
future. When it becomes difficult for the state to maintain the same level of resource 
accumulation, the operation of the existing governance system may face difficulties, 
leaving more spaces for the society to challenge the hegemony of the state. Recently, 
the financial pressure generated by the trade war and the potential crisis of the real 
estate market becomes even more evident. Howell (2010: 33) argues that with the 
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increasing internationalisation of China, the public actions have internationalised as 
well, making the state harder to enforce restriction on the civil society. Building on 
this, the economic internationalisation may also expose Chinese economy to greater 
precarity brought about by the global economy, as it is now experiencing 59 . 
Furthermore, even though the Party State has been successfully containing the social 
unrest, China also sees an increasing degree of social pressure exerted by frustrated 
workers (Lee, 2007), minority ethnic groups (Hastings, 2005), peasants subject to land 
expropriation (Hsing, 2010), urban citizens threatened by environmental hazards 
(Geall and Hilton, 2014), and so on. If the entire logic of capital accumulation and 
redistribution were to be impaired, we may anticipate a rising role for the society, 
including a range of emerging autonomous organisations, which could be followed in 
my future research.  
 
8.4 Epilogue 
My main fieldwork in Qiancao ended by the end of 2016 among scenes of 
massive demolition. When I was writing this thesis, the most recent change occurring 
to the redevelopment of penghuqu may further demonstrate the flexibility of penghuqu, 
as argued in Chapter 5. On 25 June 2018, a rumour that the national project of 
penghuqu redevelopment would terminate prematurely was spreading, with serious 
impact on the stock related to real estate (21CFR, 2018). Later, by the end of July, the 
Politburo of the CCP announced in its conference that the central state would take 
measures to strictly curb any rise in property prices (Xinhua News Agency, 2018). It is 
now unclear whether the real estate speculation that has lasted for more than a decade 
                                                      
59 See for example, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-30/china-s-manufacturers-slow-in- 
september-as-trade-war-worsens. 
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has come to an end. If it has, the prospects for redevelopment in Qiancao, which hinged 
heavily upon land and real estate speculation, would be dim. Entrepreneurial 
managerialism hinges heavily on the accumulation of land revenue, or in general, the 
wealth that the Party State could control. Amid the ongoing trade war that has already 
caused negative impact upon China’s manufacturing sector, the slow-down of land-
based accumulation may further shake the pillar of what I proposed as entrepreneurial 
managerialism. We may see how the societal power could then make a difference. I 
want to end this thesis with a paragraph from “Hometown”, a novel by Lu Xun, a 
leading figure of modern Chinese literature: 
“My hometown receded even farther into the distance and the familiar 
landscapes of the surrounding countryside gradually disappeared too. Strange to say, 
there was not a shred of regret in my heart. I only felt that there was a high and invisible 
wall all around me that isolated me from my fellow human beings, a wall that was 
squeezing the breath out of my body.”60  
                                                      
60 Lu Xun (1990). Diary of a Madman and other Stories. Trans. By William A. Lyell. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press: 89-100. 
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Appendix  Full List of Interviewees 
 
Interview Date Description 
CQ-1101 16 August 2015 Luzhou native 
CQ-1201 14 September 2015 Beijing native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native  
Luzhou native 
CQ-1202 16 September 2015 Luzhou native 
CQ-2101 10 September 2016 Luzhou native (laid-off after my interview) 
Luzhou native 
CQ-2102 30 October 2016 Luzhou native (re-visit) 
CQ-2103 24 October 2016 Luzhou native 
CQ-2104 17 November 2016 Tianjin native 
Sichuan native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CQ-2105 3 December 2016 Tianjin Native 
CQ-2106 26 November 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native (zhandi gong) 
Luzhou native (zhandi gong) 
CQ-2107 5 December 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CQ-2108 2 January 2017 Luzhou native 
CQ-2201 16 August 2016 Beijing native (re-interview) 
CQ-2202 16 August 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CW-1101 7 August 2015 Liaoning Native 
CW-1102 16 September 2015 Liaoning Native, cadre 
Liaoning Native 
CW-1201 18 August 2015 Liaoning Native 
CW-1202 16 September 2015 Liaoning Native, laid-off 
CW-2101 6 September 2016 Second generation of Liaoning Migrants 
Third generation of Liaoning Migrants 
CW-2102 6 September 2016 Sichuan Native 
CW-2103 18 September 2016 Liaoning Native, cadre 
Liaoning Native 
CW-2104 23 September 2016 Second generation of Liaoning Migrants, laid-off 
CW-2105 23 September 2016 Yunnan Native, cadre, RAR member 
CW-2106 12 November 2016 Shandong Native, cadre, RAR member 
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CW-2107 28 November 2016 Luzhou native 
CW-2108 22 November 2016 Luzhou native 
CW-2109 6 November 2016 Second generation of Liaoning Migrants, RAR 
CW-2110 8 December 2016 Second generation of Liaoning Migrants, laid-off 
CW-2201 4 October 2016 Luzhou native 
CW-2202 4 October 2016 Liaoning native 
Liaoning native 
Liaoning native 
Liaoning native, RAR member 
CW-2203 5 Januray 2017 Luzhou native 
CW-3101 27 August 2017 Second generation of Liaoning Migrants (re-visit) 
CY-2101 28 July 2016 Luzhou native, laid-off 
CY-2102 31 July 2016 Late, Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CY-2103 8 September 2016 Luzhou native 
CY-2201 3 August 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CY-2202 4 August 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
CY-2203 4 August 2016 Luzhou native 
Luzhou native 
Sichuan native 
CY-3201 12 September 2017 Luzhou native (revisit) 
OH-1001 11 September 2015 High level official of Qiancao Sub-district 
OH-1101 13 August 2015 Luzhou native 
OH-2001 14 September 2016 Chief Planner of Luzhou Planning Bureau 
OH-2002 1 November 2016 Deputy-director of Luzhou Cultural Relic Bureau 
OH-2003 21 November 2016 Visiting Prossor of Southwestern University 
OH-2004 21 October 2016 High level cadre of Changqi 
OH-2101 27 November 2016 Luzhou native 
OH-2102 8 December 2016 Luzhou native (zhandi gong); laid-off 
OH-2201 22 September 2016 Luzhou native; laid-off 
 
